Part I: The Deep Colonial Roots (1472-1961)

The Pre-Colonial and Early Contact Period

The territory now known as Cameroon has a complex pre-colonial history that shaped its eventual fragmentation. Before European colonization, the region hosted diverse kingdoms and societies. The Sao civilization flourished around Lake Chad from the 5th century BCE. The Kanem-Bornu Empire extended influence into northern regions. In the grassfields of what would become Anglophone Northwest Cameroon, sophisticated fondoms (traditional kingdoms) like Bali, Nso, and Kom developed complex political structures, with powerful fons (traditional rulers) governing through councils of notables.

The coastal areas, particularly around the Wouri River estuary and Ambas Bay (Victoria/Limbe area), were home to the Duala and various coastal peoples who became crucial intermediaries in European trade. Portuguese explorer Fernando Pó arrived in 1472, naming the Wouri River "Rio dos Camarões" (River of Prawns), from which "Cameroon" derives. For four centuries, European contact remained primarily coastal, focused on trade—initially legitimate goods, then slaves, then palm oil and other commodities during the 19th century.

The German Period (1884-1916): Kamerun as a Unified Territory

Germany's annexation of Cameroon in 1884, during the Berlin Conference's "Scramble for Africa," created for the first time a unified territorial entity called Kamerun. This is historically significant because it established borders that encompassed both what would become Anglophone and Francophone regions as a single administrative unit.

German colonial rule, though brutal and exploitative, did not create the linguistic divisions that would later tear Cameroon apart. The Germans imposed their own language and administrative system uniformly. They built infrastructure—railroads from Douala to the interior, the port at Douala, roads connecting various regions—that treated the territory as an integrated economic unit. German missionaries established schools and medical facilities. While German colonization was harsh (including violent suppression of resistance, forced labor, and economic exploitation), it did not create separate Anglophone and Francophone identities.

The German period also saw the expansion of Kamerun's borders through agreements with France and Britain, reaching its maximum extent by 1911, stretching from Lake Chad to the Atlantic and from the Nigerian border deep into equatorial forest regions. This larger Kamerun included territories that would later be ceded to France.

World War I and the Partition (1914-1922)

Germany's defeat in World War I proved catastrophic for Cameroon's territorial integrity. When war broke out in 1914, British and French forces invaded from Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa respectively. By 1916, they had driven out the Germans. The question then became: what happens to Kamerun?

The answer came through the League of Nations mandate system established after the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. In 1922, the League formally divided the territory between Britain and France. This partition was not based on ethnic, linguistic, or historical boundaries but on colonial convenience and the balance of spoils between the victors.

The French Mandate received approximately four-fifths of the former German colony—the larger, more populous, and economically richer portion. This became French Cameroun, administered from Yaoundé. France treated it as virtually an extension of French Equatorial Africa, implementing the French colonial system: direct rule, assimilation policies, French language imposition, integration into the French economic sphere, and the Code de l'Indigénat (a system of administrative justice that gave French officials arbitrary power over African subjects).

The British Mandate consisted of two non-contiguous strips along the Nigerian border. British Northern Cameroons, adjacent to Northern Nigeria, was home primarily to Muslim populations culturally similar to neighboring Nigerian groups. British Southern Cameroons, a crescent from the coast at Ambas Bay to the grassfields, was culturally diverse but developed a distinct identity under British rule.

British Southern Cameroons: The Formation of an Anglophone Identity (1922-1961)

The British mandate over Southern Cameroons was characterized by administrative neglect that paradoxically fostered a unique identity. Rather than developing Southern Cameroons as a separate entity, Britain administered it as an appendage of Nigeria—first as part of Southern Nigeria, then from 1939 as two provinces (Cameroons Province and Bamenda Province) within Nigeria's Eastern Region.

This administrative arrangement had profound consequences:

Constitutional Development: Southern Cameroonians participated in Nigerian constitutional development. They elected representatives to the Nigerian House of Representatives. They experienced the gradual expansion of self-government that Nigeria underwent in the 1940s-1950s. The Richards Constitution (1946), Macpherson Constitution (1951), and Lyttleton Constitution (1954) all included provisions for Southern Cameroons representation. This gave Anglophone Cameroonians experience with representative democracy, legislative debate, and electoral politics that their French Cameroun counterparts did not have during the same period.

Legal System: British Common Law became the legal foundation. The adversarial court system, presumption of innocence, trial by jury, the doctrine of precedent—all the distinctive features of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence took root. Lawyers trained in Common Law. Judges applied British legal principles adapted to local circumstances through Native Courts and customary law. This created a legal culture fundamentally different from the Napoleonic Code-based system in French Cameroun.

Educational System: British colonial education, though limited in reach, followed the Anglo-Saxon model. Mission schools (Baptist, Catholic, Presbyterian, and Methodist) provided primary education. The emphasis was on English literacy, critical reading, and essay-writing. Secondary education prepared students for Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examinations (O-Levels and A-Levels). The curriculum included British and world history, English literature, and civics emphasizing individual rights and democratic governance. This contrasted sharply with French colonial education's emphasis on French civilization, memorization, and the French baccalauréat system.

Economic Integration with Nigeria: Southern Cameroons' economy became linked to Nigeria's. The Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), established in 1947 from former German plantations, became one of West Africa's largest employers, producing rubber, palm oil, tea, and bananas primarily for export through Nigerian ports. The Nigerian pound became the currency. Trade networks, labor migration, and commercial relationships all oriented toward Nigeria rather than French Cameroun.

Political Awakening: The 1940s-1950s saw the emergence of Southern Cameroons nationalism, distinct from both Nigerian and French Cameroun nationalism. The Cameroons National Federation (CNF) formed in 1949, advocating for Southern Cameroons' interests within Nigeria. Dr. Emmanuel M.L. Endeley emerged as the first major political leader, advocating initially for separation from Nigeria and eventual reunification with French Cameroun. John Ngu Foncha, who founded the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1955, would become the Father of Reunification.

A critical moment came in 1954 when the Nigerian constitutional conference granted Southern Cameroons quasi-regional status with its own House of Assembly in Buea. This gave Southern Cameroonians their first taste of self-government. Premier Endeley led the first government (1954-1959), succeeded by Premier Foncha (1959-1961). These years of autonomous governance within Nigeria fostered distinct political institutions, bureaucratic culture, and civic identity.

Cultural Development: English became the lingua franca, though indigenous languages remained vibrant. Pidgin English emerged as a common language across ethnic groups. Southern Cameroonians consumed British and Nigerian media, read Nigerian newspapers, and participated in West African cultural movements. They saw themselves as distinct from French Cameroun, which felt foreign—French-speaking, culturally distant, administratively separate.

French Cameroun: The Formation of a Francophone Identity (1922-1960)

French Cameroun's experience under colonialism differed fundamentally from British Southern Cameroons. France implemented direct rule, seeking to create évolués—Africans culturally assimilated to French civilization.

Administrative Structure: France governed through appointed administrators, implementing policies from Paris and Yaoundé with little local input. Unlike British indirect rule working through traditional authorities, France often undermined traditional leaders who resisted French authority. The administrative language was French; no accommodation was made for indigenous languages in government.

Legal System: The Napoleonic Code became the legal foundation. The inquisitorial system replaced adversarial proceedings. Judges actively investigated cases rather than passively hearing arguments. Legal principles of presumed guilt in certain circumstances, civil law approaches to property and contracts, and a fundamentally different conception of law and justice took hold.

Education: French colonial education aimed at assimilation. The curriculum focused on French history, geography, and civilization. Students learned about "our ancestors the Gauls." French was the only language of instruction; speaking indigenous languages could result in punishment. The system emphasized memorization and respect for authority rather than critical thinking. The French baccalauréat became the gold standard. Elite students who excelled might attend university in France, returning thoroughly Gallicized.

Economic Exploitation: French Cameroun's economy was structured to serve French interests. Agricultural production focused on crops for French markets—coffee, cocoa, cotton. Mining extracted bauxite and other minerals. Infrastructure served extraction—railroads ran from interior production zones to the port of Douala for export to France. Local manufacturing was discouraged to protect French industry. The CFA franc, controlled by the French Treasury, became the currency, linking the economy permanently to France.

Political Repression and the UPC Insurgency: The most significant political development in French Cameroun was the rise and suppression of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). Founded in 1948, the UPC advocated for immediate independence and reunification with British Cameroons. Led by Ruben Um Nyobè, Félix Moumié, and Ernest Ouandié, the UPC represented radical nationalism with socialist leanings.

France banned the UPC in 1955 and launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. Um Nyobè was killed in 1958. Moumié was assassinated (likely by French intelligence) in Geneva in 1960. Ouandié was captured and executed in 1971. The anti-UPC campaign killed tens of thousands—some estimates range from 60,000 to 100,000—in what some historians call a forgotten genocide. This violence set the pattern for post-independence Cameroun: political dissent met with extreme state violence.

France carefully managed French Cameroun's transition to independence, ensuring compliant leadership. Ahmadou Ahidjo, a Muslim from northern Cameroun who had collaborated with French authorities, became Prime Minister in 1958 and President at independence on January 1, 1960. Ahidjo was acceptable to France because he guaranteed French economic interests and maintained close political ties to Paris.

The Fatal Plebiscite (1961): A Choice That Wasn't

When French Cameroun gained independence in 1960, the status of British Cameroons remained unresolved. The UN Trusteeship agreement required that the territory's future be determined by the wishes of its inhabitants. But how that wish would be expressed became the source of enduring grievance.

The United Nations organized a plebiscite for February 11, 1961, posing two questions:

• Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?

• Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroun?

Notice what was absent: the option to become an independent sovereign state. Southern Cameroons, despite having its own government, legislature, and administrative apparatus, could not choose independence. This was decided by the UN Fourth Committee, influenced heavily by Britain and France who feared that granting independence to such a small territory (approximately 2 million people) would set a precedent for fragmenting other colonial territories.

The campaign preceding the plebiscite was contentious:

The Pro-Nigeria Camp (led by Dr. Endeley): Argued that Southern Cameroons had prospered under association with Nigeria, that the economies were integrated, that joining French Cameroun meant joining a foreign, French-speaking entity with different institutions. They emphasized that Nigeria's federal structure would preserve Southern Cameroons autonomy.

The Pro-Reunification Camp (led by Premier Foncha): Argued for reunification based on common German colonial history and the idea that Cameroons should be reunited after the artificial British-French partition. They emphasized African unity and ending colonial divisions. Crucially, they promised that reunification would be as equal partners in a federal structure, not absorption into French Cameroun.

The results were clear but not overwhelming:

• Northern Cameroons: 146,296 (60%) for Nigeria; 97,659 (40%) for French Cameroun

• Southern Cameroons: 233,571 (70.5%) for French Cameroun; 97,741 (29.5%) for Nigeria

Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria (now part of Nigeria's Taraba, Adamawa, and Borno states), disappearing as a distinct entity. Southern Cameroons prepared for reunification with French Cameroun.

But the critical question remains: what if independence had been an option? Historians and Anglophone activists argue that a significant percentage—perhaps even a majority—would have chosen independence over either Nigeria or French Cameroun if given the choice. The denial of this option is seen as the original sin that condemned Anglophones to their current predicament.

The Federal Republic: Hope and Promise (1961-1972)

On October 1, 1961, Southern Cameroons and French Cameroun reunited as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The constitution established two federated states: West Cameroon (former British Southern Cameroons) with its capital at Buea, and East Cameroon (former French Cameroun) with its capital at Yaoundé. The federal capital was Yaoundé.

The federal structure appeared promising on paper:

Separate State Governments: Each federated state had its own government, prime minister, and legislature with substantial autonomy over internal affairs including education, local government, and customary law.

Separate Legal Systems: West Cameroon retained Common Law; East Cameroon kept Civil Law. The federal Supreme Court supposedly balanced both systems.

Bilingualism: English and French were equal official languages. Federal documents would be in both languages.

Proportional Representation: West Cameroon, despite smaller population, had guaranteed representation in federal institutions.

Constitutional Protections: Changes to the federal structure required approval from both states' legislatures.

In practice, problems emerged immediately:

Demographic Imbalance: East Cameroon had approximately 4.5 million people; West Cameroon roughly 1.2 million. This disparity gave East Cameroon overwhelming influence in federal institutions.

Economic Disparity: East Cameroon controlled most resources, infrastructure, and economic activity. The federal government, dominated by East Cameroonians, controlled national revenue allocation.

Ahidjo's Centralization: President Ahidjo, despite the federal structure, worked systematically to concentrate power in Yaoundé. He established a single-party state (the Cameroon National Union/Union Nationale Camerounaise), banned opposition parties, and used security forces to suppress dissent.

Language Imbalance: French increasingly dominated federal institutions. Many federal documents appeared only in French. Francophone ministers often held meetings exclusively in French even when Anglophone ministers were present. The message was clear: French was the language of power.

Erosion of West Cameroon Autonomy: Federal authorities increasingly interfered in West Cameroon affairs. Federal police operated in West Cameroon without coordination with state authorities. Economic development funds promised to West Cameroon were diverted. The federal government began appointing officials to positions in West Cameroon traditionally under state control.

Premier Foncha, who had led Southern Cameroons into reunification, grew increasingly disillusioned. As Vice President of the Federal Republic, he witnessed the betrayal of the federal principles he had championed. Other West Cameroon leaders who had believed in the promise of equal partnership watched helplessly as their autonomy eroded.

Several incidents during the federal period highlighted the growing tensions:

The 1966 Crisis: When Foncha's KNDP party merged with Ahidjo's Union Camerounaise to form the single party UNC, many West Cameroonians saw this as the end of their political representation. The merger was portrayed as national unity but functioned to silence Anglophone voices.

Educational Conflicts: Attempts to harmonize the educational systems invariably meant imposing French-style education on West Cameroon rather than genuine integration. The GCE examination system came under pressure. French-speaking teachers posted to English-medium schools couldn't teach effectively but weren't removed.

Economic Neglect: Promises of industrial development in West Cameroon went unfulfilled. The deep seaport that would have made Limbe (Victoria) competitive with Douala was never built, ensuring West Cameroon's economic subordination. Roads deteriorated while East Cameroon cities received infrastructure investment.

Cultural Marginalization: State television (Cameroon Radio Television/CRTV) broadcast primarily in French. English programming was minimal and of poor quality. National celebrations emphasized French Cameroun's independence (January 1, 1960) while October 1st—the reunification date and West Cameroon's independence from Britain—received little attention.

Part II: The Abolition of Federalism and Systematic Marginalization (1972-2016)

The 1972 Coup Against Federalism

On May 20, 1972, Cameroon held a referendum on abolishing the federal structure and creating a unitary state. The official results: 99.99% voted "yes." This absurd figure reveals the referendum's fraudulent nature.

The campaign preceding the vote was one-sided. The government controlled all media, which promoted only the "yes" position. Opposition to the unitary state was portrayed as treason. Security forces intimidated potential "no" voters. In West Cameroon, many voters didn't fully understand what they were voting for—government propaganda portrayed it as merely administrative efficiency, not the abolition of their state.

Premier (now Vice President) Foncha opposed the referendum but was powerless to stop it. His protests were ignored. When he later resigned in 1970 in protest against the erosion of Anglophone rights, his resignation was barely reported.

The new constitution abolished West Cameroon and East Cameroon as distinct entities, creating instead seven provinces (later ten) cutting across the old federal boundary. The old West Cameroon was divided into two provinces: Southwest Province and Northwest Province. This division intentionally weakened Anglophone political unity.

The consequences were immediate and devastating:

Institutional Destruction: The West Cameroon House of Assembly was abolished. The Prime Minister position disappeared. The distinct West Cameroon civil service was absorbed into the national civil service, with Anglophone officials often transferred to Francophone regions where they couldn't function.

Legal System Assault: While the constitution technically preserved Common Law in former West Cameroon, the reality changed. The unified Supreme Court was dominated by Civil Law judges. Francophone judges were appointed to hear Common Law cases without understanding Common Law principles. Legal education increasingly emphasized Civil Law. The promise of maintaining both legal traditions became fiction.

Economic Integration: The Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), West Cameroon's largest employer and economic engine, came under increased federal control. Its profits were diverted to Yaoundé. Investment in CDC facilities declined. Workers' conditions deteriorated.

Educational Assimilation: The unified Ministry of Education began harmonizing curricula in ways that disadvantaged the Anglo-Saxon system. French-speaking inspectors evaluated English-medium schools. The GCE examination system faced constant pressure. University of Yaoundé became effectively Francophone; Anglophone students struggled in French-language courses.

Administrative Colonization: Governors of Northwest and Southwest Provinces were increasingly Francophone appointees who spoke no English. District officers, prefects, and administrators who couldn't communicate with local populations were imposed from Yaoundé. The message was clear: Anglophones would be governed by Francophones, and English was irrelevant.

Symbolic Erasure: May 20th (the date of the 1972 referendum) became the national day, replacing October 1st (reunification day). This symbolically erased Anglophone Cameroon's history. The national anthem, flag, and symbols all emphasized unity while effectively privileging Francophone culture.

The Biya Era Begins: From Bad to Worse (1982-1990)

When Paul Biya succeeded Ahidjo in November 1982, Anglophones hoped for improvement. Biya initially promised liberalization, releasing political prisoners and tolerating some criticism. This "Renewal" period raised hopes.

They were quickly dashed. In 1984, Biya changed the country's name from the "United Republic of Cameroon" to simply the "Republic of Cameroon"—the exact name French Cameroun held before reunification in 1961. To Anglophones, this was symbolic genocide: their history, their choice to join, their very existence as a distinct community was being erased. The federated state of West Cameroon had never existed; there was only Cameroon, and Cameroon was Francophone.

The 1984 coup attempt, led by northern Francophone officers seeking to restore Ahidjo to power, resulted in massive repression. Biya used the failed coup to consolidate power, establishing security services that would become instruments of terror. While the coup had nothing to do with Anglophones, the security apparatus created to prevent future coups would later be turned against them.

The late 1980s saw economic crisis as commodity prices collapsed and structural adjustment programs imposed austerity. Anglophones suffered disproportionately. CDC workers went unpaid for months. Infrastructure in Northwest and Southwest collapsed. Brain drain accelerated as educated Anglophones emigrated.

The Nominal Democratization (1990-2008)

International pressure and domestic unrest forced Biya to accept multiparty politics in 1990. Multiple parties formed, including the Social Democratic Front (SDF) led by Ni John Fru Ndi, which had its base in the Anglophone Northwest.

The October 1992 presidential election saw Biya face serious challenge from Fru Ndi. When results showed Biya winning with 39.9% to Fru Ndi's 35.9%—incredibly suspicious given the government's unpopularity—Anglophones believed the election was stolen. Protests in Bamenda were violently suppressed. At least six people were killed in what became known as "Bloody Sunday" (May 26, 1990, during earlier protests) and subsequent incidents. Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest for months.

Multiparty democracy became meaningless as Biya's CPDM used state resources, control of electoral machinery, and systematic fraud to ensure victory. Opposition parties won some local and legislative seats but could never threaten CPDM dominance. Elections became rituals affirming the existing power structure rather than meaningful democratic exercises.

Several Anglophone-specific developments during this period merit attention:

The All Anglophone Conferences (AAC I and AAC II, 1993-1994): Frustrated with continued marginalization despite democratization, Anglophone elites convened conferences in Buea and Bamenda. These conferences, bringing together political leaders, traditional rulers, intellectuals, and civil society, issued the "Buea Declaration" and "Bamenda Proclamation." They documented systematic discrimination and demanded a return to the federal structure. AAC II went further, threatening secession if grievances weren't addressed. The government dismissed these declarations, refusing meaningful dialogue.

The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC): Emerging from the AAC conferences, the SCNC advocated for Southern Cameroons independence, arguing that the 1961 reunification had failed and that separation was the only solution. The government declared the SCNC illegal, arrested its leaders, and banned its activities. SCNC members were routinely harassed, imprisoned, and tortured. The movement went underground but kept the independence idea alive.

The Ta Gwanyam: This group represented more radical Anglophone nationalism, including some willing to consider armed struggle. Their activities were limited, but their existence showed growing frustration with peaceful advocacy's ineffectiveness.

Economic Decline: The Northwest and Southwest provinces became the poorest regions despite their agricultural and resource wealth. Unemployment was massive. Young educated Anglophones had few opportunities. The CDC, once a source of pride and employment, became a shadow of its former self. Infrastructure crumbled—roads, schools, hospitals deteriorated while Francophone regions developed.

Brain Drain: Thousands of educated Anglophones emigrated—to Europe, North America, Nigeria, South Africa. This diaspora would later become crucial to the separatist movement, providing funding, advocacy, and international awareness.

The Constitutional Coup (2008)

In 2008, Biya changed the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits, allowing himself to rule for life. This required a two-thirds parliamentary vote. The constitutional amendment passed 157-5, with many opposition MPs intimidated or bribed into supporting it.

Protests erupted nationwide, including significant demonstrations in Anglophone cities. The government's response was brutal—over 100 protesters were killed in what became known as the "February 2008 events" or "hunger riots" (as they coincided with economic grievances). In Anglophone areas, protesters specifically targeted symbols of government authority and Francophone economic dominance.

The 2008 crisis demonstrated that Anglophones had not forgotten their grievances and were willing to risk their lives to resist. It also showed that the regime would kill to maintain power. The stage was set for the 2016 explosion.

 

 

Part III: The Eruption - From Professional Protests to Armed Insurgency (2016-2017)

The Lawyers' Strike: October-November 2016

The immediate catalyst for the current crisis emerged from what seemed like technical, professional grievances. In October 2016, Anglophone lawyers in the Northwest and Southwest regions initiated a strike that would inadvertently ignite a revolutionary movement.

The Specific Grievances of Lawyers:

The Common Lawyers Association of Cameroon, representing Anglophone lawyers, had been documenting systematic undermining of the Common Law system for years. By 2016, the situation had become intolerable:

1. Francophone Judges in Common Law Courts: The Ministry of Justice routinely appointed judges trained exclusively in Civil Law to preside over Common Law courts in Anglophone regions. These judges didn't understand fundamental Common Law concepts—precedent, adversarial procedure, rules of evidence, cross-examination practices. Cases were being decided based on Civil Law principles in contexts requiring Common Law application, creating legal chaos and denying litigants justice.
   
   

2. OHADA Encroachment: The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), a Francophone legal framework based on French commercial law, was being imposed on Anglophone Cameroon despite incompatibility with Common Law commercial principles. Anglophone lawyers couldn't practice effectively under OHADA without retraining in an entirely different legal philosophy.
   
   

3. Unavailability of Legal Texts in English: Court registries lacked English versions of laws, regulations, and legal codes. Lawyers couldn't access the legal materials they needed. When English versions existed, they were often poor translations that changed legal meanings.
   
   

4. Language Discrimination in Courts: Francophone judges insisted on conducting proceedings in French even in Anglophone regions. Court documents were issued only in French. Lawyers were expected to argue in French or have their arguments dismissed. English-speaking defendants couldn't understand proceedings against them.
   
   

5. Staffing Discrimination: Court administrative staff in Anglophone regions were increasingly Francophone appointees who couldn't communicate with lawyers or litigants in English. Simple administrative tasks became impossible.
   
   

6. Educational System Threats: The proposed harmonization of legal education threatened to eliminate Common Law training at the University of Buea, forcing Anglophone law students to study Civil Law at the University of Yaoundé.
   
   

On October 6, 2016, lawyers in Bamenda (Northwest Region) began their strike. Lawyers in Buea (Southwest Region) quickly joined. They wore red gowns and red armbands, marching peacefully through streets, submitting petitions, and refusing to appear in court until their grievances were addressed.

The Government's Fatal Response:

Rather than engaging with the lawyers' legitimate professional concerns, the government responded with contempt and violence:

• Dismissal: Government ministers publicly dismissed the lawyers as "extremists" and "enemies of national unity." Minister of Justice Laurent Esso claimed the lawyers were exaggerating problems for political purposes.
  
  

• Intimidation: Security forces were deployed to intimidate striking lawyers. Police surrounded courthouses. Plainclothes security agents photographed and followed prominent lawyers.
  
  

• Violence: On November 21, 2016, security forces attacked a peaceful lawyers' march in Bamenda. Videos circulated showing gendarmes beating lawyers in their professional robes with batons, firing teargas into crowds of suit-wearing professionals, and dragging prominent lawyers through streets. The image of Barrister Agbor Nkongho (known as Agbor Balla), a respected human rights lawyer, being manhandled by security forces became symbolic of the government's contempt for Anglophone professionals.
  
  

• Arrests: Several lawyer-leaders were arrested and detained without charge. The government accused them of terrorism and attempting to secede—absurd claims against professionals who had simply asked to practice law in their own language.
  
  

The violence against lawyers shocked Anglophone society. Lawyers are respected professionals, symbols of education and civilization. Seeing them beaten on streets while wearing their professional regalia was deeply traumatic. If the government would treat lawyers this way for professional grievances, what hope did ordinary Anglophones have?

The Teachers' Strike: November 2016-January 2017

Emboldened by the lawyers' stand and facing their own systematic marginalization, Anglophone teachers joined the protest movement in November 2016. The Teachers' Association of Cameroon (TAC), representing Anglophone teachers, had long complained about the destruction of the Anglo-Saxon educational system.

The Specific Grievances of Teachers:

1. Francophone Teachers in English Schools: The Ministry of Education systematically posted French-speaking teachers to English-medium schools in Anglophone regions. These teachers couldn't teach in English. Students learned mathematics, science, and other subjects from teachers they couldn't understand. Educational quality plummeted.
   
   

2. Curriculum Imposition: French-style curricula and pedagogical approaches were being imposed on Anglo-Saxon schools. The emphasis on memorization and rote learning replaced critical thinking and analytical approaches. Teaching methods fundamental to British-style education were being replaced.
   
   

3. Examination System Threats: The General Certificate of Education (GCE) Ordinary and Advanced Level examinations—the cornerstone of Anglophone education, recognized internationally and throughout the Commonwealth—faced constant pressure for "harmonization" with the French baccalauréat system. This would have made Anglophone certificates worthless internationally and destroyed a system that had successfully educated Anglophones for generations.
   
   

4. Administrative Incompetence: Francophone education inspectors and administrators who spoke no English were appointed to supervise English-medium schools. They couldn't evaluate teachers, couldn't communicate with parents, and made decisions that damaged educational quality.
   
   

5. Resource Discrimination: English-medium schools received fewer resources than French-medium schools. Textbooks were unavailable or inappropriate. School infrastructure in Anglophone regions deteriorated while Francophone regions received investments.
   
   

6. Language Requirements: Teachers were increasingly required to teach certain subjects in French even in English-medium schools, confusing students and undermining the entire purpose of English-language education.
   
   

7. Professional Development: Training and professional development opportunities prioritized French-speaking teachers. Anglophone teachers were expected to attend training conducted entirely in French.
   
   

Teachers began their strike in November 2016, initially in the Northwest, then spreading to the Southwest. They refused to teach, marched peacefully, submitted petitions, and demanded respect for the Anglo-Saxon educational system. Some schools closed completely; others operated with minimal staff.

The Government's Escalating Violence:

The government's response to teachers mirrored its treatment of lawyers but escalated the violence:

• Characterization as Terrorists: Government propaganda labeled striking teachers as "secessionists" and "terrorists" trying to destroy children's education. State media ran programs showing angry parents (often staged) denouncing teachers for "using children as hostages."
  
  

• Military Deployment: Rather than education officials to negotiate, the government sent soldiers and gendarmes. Schools became militarized zones. Teachers conducting peaceful sit-ins were beaten and dispersed.
  
  

• Targeted Violence: In Bamenda, Kumbo, Buea, and other Anglophone towns, security forces attacked teachers with particular brutality. Videos emerged of soldiers shooting teargas into schools, beating teachers with rifle butts, and firing live ammunition into crowds of striking teachers.
  
  

• Mass Arrests: Hundreds of teachers were arrested. Many were detained for weeks without charges. Some were tortured in custody. The message was clear: the government would rather imprison teachers than address their grievances.
  
  

• School Burnings: In January 2017, as the crisis escalated, government forces burned several schools suspected of being strike headquarters. The government blamed separatists, but witnesses and video evidence often showed uniformed security forces setting fires.
  
  

The Expansion: From Professional to Mass Movement (December 2016-January 2017)

By December 2016, what began as professional strikes had become a mass movement encompassing all sectors of Anglophone society. Several factors drove this expansion:

Internet Activism and Social Media:

Diaspora Anglophones used social media to spread information and organize solidarity. Facebook groups, WhatsApp networks, and Twitter hashtags (#AnglophoneCrisis, #SouthernCameroons) brought global attention. Videos of government violence went viral. The diaspora raised funds for lawyers and teachers, organized protests at Cameroon embassies worldwide, and lobbied international organizations.

Prominent activists emerged online: Tapang Ivo Tanku, Mark Bareta, and others became influential voices coordinating protests and countering government propaganda.

The Coffin Revolution (December 2016):

One of the most powerful protest symbols emerged in December 2016: demonstrators carried empty coffins through streets of Bamenda and Buea, representing the death of federalism, the death of their identity, the death of their hopes for equal partnership. The "Coffin Revolution" was peaceful, creative, and deeply symbolic. Images of thousands marching behind coffins draped in the blue and white Ambazonian flag became iconic.

The government's response was predictable: violence. Security forces attacked the coffin marchers, beating protesters, destroying the coffins, and arresting organizers.

The Consortium:

In December 2016, Anglophone civil society formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), bringing together lawyers, teachers, trade unions, civil society organizations, traditional rulers, and religious leaders. The Consortium leadership included:

• Barrister Agbor Nkongho (Agbor Balla): Chairman, prominent human rights lawyer

• Dr. Fontem Neba: Vice Chairman, teacher and activist

• Justice (Rtd) Ayah Paul Abine: Former Supreme Court justice who had documented government discrimination

• Mancho Bibixy: Radio journalist and activist

• Penn Terence Khan: Trade unionist

The Consortium became the organized voice of Anglophone grievances, issuing demands and attempting to negotiate with the government. Their demands were initially moderate:

1. Immediate release of all arrested lawyers, teachers, and protesters

2. Withdrawal of military forces from Anglophone regions

3. Return to the federal structure

4. Protection of Common Law and Anglo-Saxon education

5. Addressing economic marginalization

6. Genuine bilingualism in government

The government refused to engage meaningfully with the Consortium.

Internet Shutdown (January 17-April 20, 2017):

On January 17, 2017, the government imposed a total internet shutdown in Anglophone regions—the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa. For 93 days, Northwest and Southwest Regions were cut off from the digital world. No internet, no social media, no ability to communicate with the outside world or coordinate protests.

The shutdown had devastating economic effects. Businesses relying on internet communication collapsed. Students couldn't research. The tech industry in Buea (the "Silicon Mountain") ground to halt, with startups closing and entrepreneurs fleeing. The World Bank later estimated the shutdown cost Cameroon's economy approximately $4.5 million.

But the shutdown backfired politically. It confirmed Anglophones' worst fears: the government viewed them as enemies requiring collective punishment. International attention intensified. Tech companies, digital rights organizations, and international media condemned the shutdown. The #BringBackOurInternet campaign went global.

When internet was restored in April 2017, the movement had grown stronger, not weaker. Anglophones had organized without digital tools, proving their resilience.

Mass Arrests (January 2017):

On January 17, 2017—the same day as the internet shutdown—security forces arrested the Consortium leadership en masse. Agbor Balla, Fontem Neba, Mancho Bibixy, Penn Terence Khan, and others were seized in coordinated raids. They were transferred to Yaoundé's maximum-security prison and charged with terrorism, secession, hostility against the state, and other serious crimes carrying potential death sentences.

These arrests eliminated the moderate leadership trying to find peaceful solutions. With the Consortium leaders imprisoned, more radical voices gained influence. The movement's center of gravity shifted from negotiation toward confrontation, from federalism toward separation.

Ghost Towns and Civil Disobedience:

A new tactic emerged: "Ghost Towns" (villes mortes). On designated days (typically Mondays, later expanding), Anglophone cities became empty. Businesses closed, streets emptied, markets shut down. This demonstrated the population's unity and the government's inability to enforce normalcy.

Ghost Towns continued for months, becoming routine. The economic costs were enormous—businesses failed, workers lost income, economic activity collapsed. But the population accepted these sacrifices as necessary to maintain pressure on the government.

October 1, 2017: The Turning Point Massacre

September 2017 saw escalating tensions. The government released some Consortium leaders in August 2017 (Agbor Balla and Fontem Neba were released; others including Mancho Bibixy remained imprisoned). But rather than calming the situation, this reinforced perceptions that only sustained pressure forced government concessions.

Plans circulated for mass demonstrations on October 1, 2017—the 56th anniversary of Southern Cameroons independence from Britain and reunification with French Cameroun. Activists planned to symbolically declare independence and raise the Ambazonian flag.

The government declared October 1st protests illegal and deployed massive security forces. What followed was one of the darkest days in Cameroon's history.

The Massacre:

On October 1, 2017, hundreds of thousands of Anglophones across Northwest and Southwest Regions took to the streets. In Bamenda, Buea, Kumba, Kumbo, Mamfe, Batibo, Mbengwi, Nkambe, Fundong, Wum, Njinikom, Batibo, Widikum, and dozens of other towns and villages, crowds gathered carrying the blue and white Ambazonian flag.

Security forces opened fire with live ammunition. Not warning shots, not crowd control—deliberate shooting to kill. Videos captured soldiers firing assault rifles into crowds of unarmed civilians. Protesters were shot in the back as they fled. Bodies lay in streets while security forces prevented families from retrieving them.

The exact death toll remains unknown. The government claims fewer than 10 died. Reliable estimates from human rights organizations, hospitals, and witnesses range from 40 to over 100 killed that day. Hundreds more were wounded. Thousands were arrested.

Specific Incidents from October 1, 2017:

• Bamenda: Security forces fired into crowds at multiple locations. Videos show soldiers shooting protesters who were running away. Bodies were loaded into military trucks. Hospitals reported being overwhelmed with gunshot victims and threatened by soldiers demanding they not treat wounded protesters.
  
  

• Buea: Similar scenes of massacre. Protesters were shot near the former West Cameroon House of Assembly building—symbolic, as this was where the autonomous Anglophone government once sat.
  
  

• Kumba: Soldiers shot into crowds at the main market. Witnesses described soldiers going house-to-house searching for protesters, beating and arresting anyone found.
  
  

• Rural Areas: Even small villages saw violence. In remote areas, security forces burned homes suspected of harboring protesters.
  
  

The government's narrative blamed "terrorists" and claimed security forces acted in self-defense. State media showed footage (later proven to be from previous incidents in other countries) claiming to show separatist violence. International media access was denied.

The Aftermath: Point of No Return:

October 1, 2017 transformed the conflict irreversibly. Several immediate consequences followed:

1. Birth of Armed Resistance: Within weeks, armed groups began forming across Anglophone regions. Young men, particularly those who participated in October 1st protests and witnessed the massacre, concluded that peaceful protest was suicide. If the government would massacre unarmed civilians, they needed weapons to defend themselves.
   
   

2. Radicalization: Moderate voices calling for federalism were drowned out by calls for complete independence. The Ambazonian flag that was symbolic on September 30th became a deadly serious declaration of independence on October 2nd.
   
   

3. Diaspora Mobilization: Anglophones abroad intensified fundraising, providing money that would later purchase weapons and support fighters. The diaspora became the movement's treasury and international voice.
   
   

4. Internal Displacement Begins: Thousands fled their homes, seeking safety in the forest, neighboring villages, or Nigeria. The internally displaced population began growing toward the eventual million-plus figure.
   
   

5. International Attention: Finally, international media covered the crisis. The BBC, Al Jazeera, France 24, and others reported on the massacre. Human rights organizations issued statements. But concrete international action remained absent.
   
   

The War Begins: November 2017-December 2017

November 2017 marked the transition from protest movement to armed insurgency. The first organized armed groups emerged, initially calling themselves "defense forces" protecting communities from military violence.

The Rise of Armed Groups:

Multiple armed groups formed, often organized around local communities, traditional leadership areas, or charismatic commanders:

1. Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF): The original umbrella term for various armed groups. The ADF claimed to be the military wing of the Interim Government of Ambazonia (discussed below).
   
   

2. Ambazonia Restoration Forces: Another major grouping, emphasizing restoration of the Southern Cameroons state.
   
   

3. Local Defense Groups: Village-based militias formed to protect specific communities from military raids. Names like "Marines," "Tigers," "Lions," "Vipers," and dozens of others emerged, often taking names meant to inspire fear or project strength.
   
   

4. The Red Dragons, Seven Kata, and Others: Specific groups that gained prominence through effective operations or charismatic leadership.
   
   

Weapons came from multiple sources:

• Captured from Military: Ambushes of military convoys yielded rifles, ammunition, and equipment

• Smuggled from Nigeria: Porous borders allowed weapons trafficking

• Locally Manufactured: Blacksmiths produced crude firearms and explosives

• Diaspora Funding: Money sent from abroad purchased weapons from black markets

Early Armed Operations (November-December 2017):

The first armed attacks targeted symbols of government authority:

• November 15, 2017, Batibo: Armed men attacked a police station, killing several officers and seizing weapons. This was among the first lethal attacks on security forces.
  
  

• Ambushes on Military Convoys: Armed groups began ambushing vehicles on rural roads, killing soldiers and gendarmes, and seizing weapons and ammunition.
  
  

• Attack on Administrative Buildings: Government offices, tax collection centers, and administrative buildings were burned or attacked.
  
  

• Targeting of Francophone Officials: Governors, prefects, and other Francophone administrators posted to Anglophone regions were targeted. Some were killed; others fled, leaving large areas without government administration.
  
  

The government's response was overwhelming military force. Thousands of additional troops deployed to Anglophone regions. The military began conducting operations treating entire villages as enemy territory.

The Government's Counter-Insurgency Strategy:

From the beginning, the Cameroonian military adopted tactics designed to terrorize civilian populations suspected of supporting separatists:

1. Collective Punishment: When separatists attacked from or near a village, the military would burn the entire village. Hundreds of villages were partially or completely destroyed in 2017-2018.
   
   

2. Arbitrary Arrests: Military sweeps arrested hundreds of young men based solely on age and location. Anyone between 15 and 40 in an Anglophone village was potentially suspect.
   
   

3. Torture: Detainees were routinely tortured to extract information about separatist locations, leadership, and plans. Methods included beatings, electric shocks, rape, and mock executions.
   
   

4. Extrajudicial Killings: Rather than arresting suspects, soldiers often executed them on sight. Bodies left in streets or fields served as warnings.
   
   

5. Sexual Violence: Rape became a weapon of war. Women in villages accused of supporting separatists were gang-raped by soldiers. Human Rights Watch documented dozens of cases; the actual number is certainly much higher.
   
   

6. Economic Warfare: Markets were destroyed, farms burned, livestock seized or killed. The goal was to make life so unbearable that populations would cease supporting separatists.
   
   

The Interim Government of Ambazonia

On October 1, 2017, the same day as the massacre, a group of diaspora leaders and some local activists declared the independence of the "Federal Republic of Ambazonia" and announced an Interim Government.

Leadership:

• President: Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, a diaspora Anglophone living in Nigeria

• Vice President: Dabney Yerima

• Multiple Ministers: Covering defense, foreign affairs, education, health, etc.

The Interim Government operated from the diaspora, primarily from Nigeria, the United States, and Europe. It claimed to be the legitimate government of Ambazonia, representing the restoration of Southern Cameroons sovereignty.

Structure and Claims:

The Interim Government established a quasi-state structure:

• Issued "passports" (not recognized by any country)

• Created a "flag and coat of arms" (the blue and white flag with black bird)

• Established "embassies" (unrecognized offices in various countries)

• Appointed "ambassadors" and "consuls"

• Claimed to coordinate armed groups under the "Ambazonia Defense Forces"

In reality, the Interim Government's actual control was limited. Armed groups in Cameroon operated with significant autonomy. Coordination was loose at best. The Interim Government provided political legitimacy and international representation but couldn't direct day-to-day military operations.

Arrest of Interim Government Leadership (January 2018):

On January 5, 2018, Nigerian security forces arrested President Ayuk Tabe and nine other Interim Government members in Abuja, where they were meeting at the Nera Hotel. They were extradited to Cameroon—an extremely controversial move violating normal asylum and extradition procedures.

In Cameroon, they were charged with terrorism, secession, hostility against the state, and other capital crimes. Their trial became a symbol of government oppression. In August 2019, they were sentenced to life imprisonment. As of 2024, they remain imprisoned, becoming martyrs to the Ambazonian cause.

Their arrest didn't end the Interim Government—new leaders emerged—but it did fragment the movement's political leadership, making coordination more difficult and contributing to factional conflicts.

Part IV: The War Intensifies (2018-2020)

2018: Full-Scale Insurgency

By 2018, the conflict had evolved into a full-scale war. Anglophone regions became ungovernable through conventional means. The government controlled major cities during daylight but ceded rural areas to separatist forces at night.

Military Escalation:

The Cameroonian military deployed approximately 6,000-7,000 additional troops to Anglophone regions, bringing the total security forces to well over 10,000. These included:

• Regular army units

• Elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR)—the regime's most loyal and brutal force

• Gendarmerie units

• Police forces

• Militias of ethnic Fulanis armed by the government to fight against separatists

Major Incidents of 2018:

March 25, 2018 - Menka-Pinyin Incident: In this village in Lebialem Division (Southwest), soldiers raided a supposed separatist hideout. They burned homes and killed civilians. Videos emerged showing soldiers celebrating as villages burned. The military initially denied involvement, then claimed it was a legitimate military operation.

May 25, 2018 - Mbonge Massacre: In Mbonge, Southwest Region, military forces raided the town, killing approximately 30 people including women and children. Videos showed soldiers executing civilians and burning bodies. International outcry followed, but no accountability.

August 27, 2018 - Kembong Attack: Separatist fighters ambushed a military convoy near Kembong, Manyu Division, killing 7 soldiers. The military response was ferocious—they burned nearby villages, killing dozens of civilians in retaliation.

September 2018 - School Reopening Crisis: The government insisted schools reopen for the new academic year. Separatists ordered schools to remain closed, threatening teachers and students who complied with government orders. Caught between government demands and separatist threats, most schools remained closed. Some teachers who defied separatist orders were kidnapped or killed. This marked the beginning of a multi-year education crisis that has denied hundreds of thousands of children schooling.

Humanitarian Crisis Emerges:

By the end of 2018, the humanitarian situation was catastrophic:

• Internally Displaced: Approximately 530,000 people displaced from their homes

• Refugees in Nigeria: Over 35,000 fled across the border

• Deaths: Conservative estimates suggested over 1,800 killed; realistic figures likely much higher

• Villages Destroyed: Over 200 villages partially or completely burned

• Schools Closed: Approximately 80% of schools in Anglophone regions non-functional

• Healthcare Collapse: Many health facilities closed; medical personnel fled; patients couldn't access care

2019: The War Becomes Routine

Tragically, 2019 saw the conflict settle into a horrific routine. Neither side could achieve decisive victory. The military couldn't defeat the insurgency; separatists couldn't achieve independence. Civilians suffered continuously.

The Major National Dialogue (September 30-October 4, 2019):

Facing increasing international pressure and with the conflict clearly unwinnable militarily, President Biya convened a "Major National Dialogue" supposedly to address the Anglophone crisis.

The Dialogue was fundamentally flawed from the start:

1. Exclusion of Key Stakeholders: Imprisoned separatist leaders (including Ayuk Tabe and the Interim Government members) were not released to participate. Armed group leaders were not invited. The SCNC and most credible Anglophone civil society organizations boycotted.
   
   

2. Predetermined Outcomes: The government made clear before the Dialogue that independence and federalism were non-negotiable. So what was there to discuss?
   
   

3. Domination by Government Supporters: Most participants were CPDM party members or government appointees. Critical voices were marginalized.
   
   

4. Ceremonial Nature: The event was more political theater than genuine negotiation. Speeches were made, resolutions passed, but no fundamental issues addressed.
   
   

The Dialogue's "Outcomes":

The Dialogue produced several recommendations:

• Special Status: Northwest and Southwest Regions would receive "special status" with supposedly enhanced autonomy. In practice, this meant almost nothing—no additional powers, no separate institutions, merely administrative adjustments.
  
  

• Bilingualism Measures: Theoretical commitments to genuine bilingualism in government. Not implemented meaningfully.
  
  

• Regional Development: Promises of infrastructure investment and economic development in Anglophone regions. Mostly not delivered.
  
  

• Clemency: President Biya ordered the release of some prisoners (though not Interim Government leaders). Several hundred low-level detainees were released, but thousands remained imprisoned.
  
  

• Disarmament: Separatist fighters were called to disarm and benefit from "reintegration programs." Almost no fighters accepted, seeing it as a trap.
  
  

Anglophones widely viewed the Dialogue as a sham—an attempt to appear conciliatory for international audiences while changing nothing substantial. The Francophone population and international community seemed satisfied that "dialogue" had occurred, allowing them to ignore the continuing violence.

After the Dialogue, fighting continued without pause. The government declared the crisis "resolved," but villages still burned, people still died, and displacement continued growing.

February 14, 2020 - The Ngarbuh Massacre:

This became one of the most documented atrocities of the war. In Ngarbuh, a village in Donga Mantung Division (Northwest Region), Cameroonian soldiers and armed Fulani militiamen attacked during the night of February 14-15, 2020.

They set fire to homes while families slept inside. Those who tried to escape were shot or hacked with machetes. When morning came, at least 21 people were dead, including 13 children (ranging from 9 months to 14 years old) and a pregnant woman.

The youngest victim was a 9-month-old baby named Ngala. Images of his tiny charred body became symbols of the war's horror. A 5-year-old girl named Belinda was found with her intestines spilling out from machete wounds. A pregnant woman named Lucy Kibungong was slashed open, her unborn child visible.

The Government's Response:

Initially, the government denied military involvement, claiming separatists committed the massacre to frame security forces. This absurd claim—separatists massacring their own supporters including children—was dutifully repeated by state media.

However, credible evidence was overwhelming:

• Witnesses identified soldiers and armed Fulanis working together

• Shell casings from military weapons littered the scene

• Survivors identified specific soldiers

• Human Rights Watch investigators confirmed military involvement

Eventually, facing undeniable evidence and international pressure, the government admitted military participation. Seven soldiers (all low-ranking) and three civilians (Fulanis) were arrested. In December 2020, they received sentences ranging from 2 to 10 years—shockingly light for massacring children. No officers were charged despite clear evidence of command responsibility.

The Ngarbuh Massacre exemplified several patterns:

1. Ethnic Dimension: The use of armed Fulanis introduced an ethnic dimension. Fulanis (primarily Muslim pastoralists) had conflicts with Anglophone farmers over land. The military armed Fulani militias to fight separatists, exacerbating ethnic tensions.
   
   

2. Targeting Civilians: The massacre wasn't collateral damage from fighting separatists—it was deliberate killing of civilians as collective punishment.
   
   

3. Impunity: Light sentences for low-ranking perpetrators while commanders faced no consequences demonstrated that accountability was theatrical, not genuine.
   
   

4. Cover-Up Attempts: The initial denial and blaming of separatists showed the government's reflexive dishonesty.
   
   

2020: COVID-19 Provides Cover

The COVID-19 pandemic reached Cameroon in March 2020, providing the government convenient cover for continued repression.

Using Pandemic as Pretext:

The government implemented COVID-19 restrictions selectively:

• Banned gatherings, preventing protests against the war

• Restricted movement, making it harder for journalists and human rights monitors to document abuses

• Limited international travel, reducing external scrutiny

• Continued military operations under guise of enforcing health measures

Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis worsened. Displaced populations living in forests or overcrowded IDP camps had no access to healthcare. Separatist-imposed lockdowns continued, with fighters enforcing stay-at-home orders more strictly than the government, claiming it protected communities from COVID-19.

October 24, 2020 - Kumba School Massacre:

One of the war's most shocking incidents occurred at Mother Francisca International Bilingual Academy in Kumba, Southwest Region. Armed men entered the school around noon and opened fire on students with guns and machetes.

Seven children were killed, ranging in age from 9 to 12 years old. Over a dozen more were wounded, some losing limbs from machete attacks. Videos showed the horrific scene—children bleeding, severed limbs, blood-soaked classrooms.

The Controversy:

The Kumba School Massacre remains deeply controversial because responsibility is disputed:

Government Narrative: Immediately blamed separatists, claiming it was a terrorist attack to enforce school boycotts and terrorize populations into compliance.

Separatist Narrative: Vigorously denied involvement. Multiple separatist groups issued statements condemning the attack. They argued:

• Schools are typically attacked when empty (burned at night), not during hours with children present

• Separatists had no motive to massacre children of their own supporters

• The attack served the government's propaganda purposes

• Evidence suggested it might be a false flag operation by security forces or government-sponsored criminals

Independent Analysis: Human rights investigators couldn't definitively establish responsibility. The attack bore characteristics unlike typical separatist operations. However, some separatist factions had become increasingly violent and indiscriminate, making their involvement possible. The truth remains unknown because no credible investigation occurred.

What's certain: Children died because of this war. Whether killed by separatists, government forces, or criminals exploiting chaos, their deaths illustrated the conflict's descent into targeting the most innocent.

Part V: The War Continues - Stalemate and Suffering (2021-Present)

2021-2022: Fragmentation and Escalating Brutality

By 2021, the conflict had evolved into a grinding war of attrition characterized by extreme brutality on both sides, fragmentation of armed groups, and complete normalization of atrocity. The initial revolutionary fervor had given way to a darker reality where violence became routine and both government forces and separatist fighters committed increasingly horrific acts.

The Fracturing of the Separatist Movement:

One of the most significant developments in 2021-2022 was the fragmentation of the Ambazonian movement into competing factions, often violently opposed to each other. Several factors drove this fragmentation:

1. Leadership Disputes: With the Interim Government leadership imprisoned, multiple competing political structures emerged. At various points, there were at least three different groups claiming to be the legitimate "Interim Government":
   
   

• The original Ayuk Tabe faction (imprisoned but with diaspora representatives)

• The Dr. Samuel Ikome Sako faction (who became Acting President after Ayuk Tabe's arrest)

• The Dr. Cho Ayaba faction (leader of the Ambazonia Governing Council)

• Various other splinter groups

2. Military Autonomy: Ground commanders (called "General" by their followers) operated with significant independence. Figures like "General" No Pity, "General" Ivo, "General" Chacha, "General" Tiger, and dozens of others controlled specific territories and often refused orders from supposed political leadership. These commanders became warlords in practice, controlling local populations, collecting "taxes," and fighting not just government forces but rival separatist groups.
   
   

3. Resource Competition: Control of territory meant control of resources—illegal logging, mining, kidnapping ransoms, "taxation" of businesses, diaspora funding. Competition for these resources sparked interfactional violence.
   
   

4. Ideological Differences: Some groups maintained focus on independence and political goals. Others descended into criminality. Some wanted negotiations; others rejected any compromise. These differences proved irreconcilable.
   
   

Inter-Factional Violence:

The violence between separatist factions became as deadly as fighting against government forces:

January 2021 - Assassination of "General" Ivo: One of the most prominent separatist commanders, Lekeaka Oliver ("General" Ivo), was killed in an ambush by rival separatist fighters in Lebialem Division. His death sparked reprisal killings as his loyalists hunted those they believed responsible.

March 2021 - Bali Nyonga Clashes: Different separatist factions fought for control of Bali Nyonga in Northwest Region, killing dozens of fighters and terrorizing civilians caught in the crossfire.

Assassination of Moderates: Separatist commanders viewed as too willing to negotiate or insufficiently committed to independence were assassinated. This eliminated potential peacemakers and empowered hardliners.

This fragmentation had devastating consequences for civilians. Multiple armed groups operating in the same area meant multiple "taxes," multiple checkpoints, multiple threats. Villages could be attacked by government forces during the day and by separatist groups at night, with civilians having no safe option.

Government Operations Intensify:

Despite claiming the crisis was resolved after the 2019 Dialogue, government military operations continued with undiminished brutality.

February 10, 2021 - Mautu Massacre: In Mautu village, Lebialem Division, soldiers conducted a raid that killed at least 15 civilians, including elderly persons and women. Homes were burned, and survivors reported systematic looting by soldiers. The military claimed they were fighting separatists; survivors said no fighters were present.

June 2021 - Ekona-Molyko Violence: A series of incidents in these areas of Southwest Region saw intense fighting between separatist groups and military forces, with heavy civilian casualties. Markets were attacked, homes burned, and dozens killed.

August 2021 - Bamenda Prison Break: Separatist fighters attacked Bamenda Central Prison, freeing hundreds of prisoners including separatist detainees. The audacious attack demonstrated separatist capability to strike even in major cities. The military response included indiscriminate reprisals in neighborhoods suspected of harboring the attackers.

The Continuing Humanitarian Catastrophe:

By 2021-2022, the humanitarian statistics were staggering:

Displacement:

• Internal Displacement: Over 700,000 people displaced within Cameroon, primarily Anglophones who fled their homes in Northwest and Southwest Regions. Many lived in forests, surviving on wild foods and whatever they could carry. Others crowded into IDP camps in safer areas or with relatives in Francophone regions where they faced discrimination and suspicion.

• Refugees: Over 70,000 Cameroonians had fled to Nigeria, living in refugee camps in Cross River, Benue, and Taraba states. These camps suffered from inadequate funding, poor conditions, and limited services.

Deaths: Conservative estimates from international organizations suggested approximately 6,000 people had been killed by 2022. However, this figure is almost certainly an undercount. Many deaths in remote villages went unrecorded. Bodies buried hastily or left in forests were never counted. Credible estimates from local human rights organizations suggested the actual toll was likely 8,000-10,000 or higher.

The Education Crisis: By 2022, approximately 700,000 children had been denied education for six years—an entire generation growing up without schooling. The causes were multiple:

1. Separatist School Boycotts: Armed groups enforced closure of schools, viewing them as government institutions. Teachers who defied orders were kidnapped, beaten, or killed. Parents feared sending children to school.
   
   

2. Government Indifference: Rather than finding creative solutions (like community-based education or distance learning), the government insisted schools reopen or remain closed, effectively abandoning Anglophone children's education.
   
   

3. Destruction of Infrastructure: Hundreds of schools were burned—by separatists preventing reopening, by military forces claiming they harbored fighters, or caught in crossfire.
   
   

4. Teacher Flight: Teachers fled Anglophone regions, leaving no one to teach even if schools reopened.
   
   

5. Underground Schools: Some communities established clandestine "bushschools" (hidden schools in forests or private homes) to continue education. These operated secretly, with students and teachers risking their lives. The quality was poor—lack of materials, trained teachers, proper facilities—but represented remarkable determination.
   
   

The lost education for 700,000 children represents not just individual tragedy but a destroyed future for Anglophone society. These children, growing up illiterate and traumatized, face lives of poverty and limited opportunity. The social costs will reverberate for generations.

Healthcare Collapse:

The healthcare system in Anglophone regions effectively ceased functioning:

• Hospital Closures: Many hospitals and clinics closed as staff fled violence. Those that remained open were often attacked—by separatists claiming they treated soldiers, by military forces claiming they treated fighters.
  
  

• Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Withdrawal: In December 2020, MSF suspended operations in Anglophone regions after their facilities were repeatedly attacked and staff endangered. This eliminated one of the few remaining sources of healthcare.
  
  

• Maternal Mortality: Pregnant women couldn't access prenatal care or delivery services. Many died from preventable complications. Babies were born in forests or homes without medical assistance.
  
  

• Disease Outbreaks: Displaced populations living in unsanitary conditions faced cholera, malaria, and other diseases without access to treatment.
  
  

• Mental Health Crisis: The psychological trauma of six years of war—witnessing atrocities, losing loved ones, living in constant fear—created massive mental health needs with virtually no services available.
  
  

Food Insecurity:

The war devastated agriculture and food security:

• Displacement from Farms: Farmers fled their fields, which were then destroyed by military forces or occupied by fighters. Planting and harvest cycles were disrupted.
  
  

• Market Disruptions: Roads were unsafe; markets were attacked; trade collapsed. Even when food was produced, it couldn't reach consumers.
  
  

• Deliberate Destruction: Both sides destroyed farms and food stores as warfare tactics—military forces to deny support to separatists, separatists to punish "collaborators."
  
  

• Economic Collapse: With no income, displaced populations couldn't purchase food even when available.
  
  

By 2022, the World Food Programme estimated that approximately 1.9 million people in Northwest and Southwest Regions faced food insecurity, with hundreds of thousands experiencing acute malnutrition.

2023-2024: The Forgotten War Continues

As the world's attention moved to other crises—Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan—the Anglophone crisis continued its brutal trajectory, increasingly ignored internationally.

Continued Atrocities:

Violence in 2023-2024 showed no signs of abating:

January 2023 - Egbekaw Massacre: In this small village in Manyu Division, a coordinated attack by soldiers and armed militias killed at least 20 civilians, burned homes, and displaced hundreds. Survivors reported systematic brutality including torture and sexual violence.

March 2023 - Mamfe Violence: The town of Mamfe, a significant urban center in Southwest Region, saw intense fighting between separatist groups and government forces. Civilian casualties were high, with hospitals overwhelmed and unable to treat the wounded.

June 2023 - Kumbo Raids: Security forces conducted large-scale raids in Kumbo, Bui Division (Northwest Region), arresting hundreds of young men. Many were tortured; several died in detention. Bodies were dumped on streets as warnings.

September 2023 - Widikum Clashes: Interfactional separatist violence in Widikum area killed dozens of fighters and civilians caught in crossfire.

Kidnapping Crisis:

One of the most disturbing developments in 2023-2024 was the explosion of kidnappings, blurring lines between political insurgency and organized crime:

Separatist Kidnappings: Armed groups increasingly kidnapped people for ransom—targeting wealthy Cameroonians (including Francophones traveling through Anglophone regions), foreigners, business people, religious leaders, traditional rulers, and even humanitarian workers. Ransoms ranged from hundreds of thousands to millions of CFA francs. Some victims were released after payment; others were killed. Some kidnappings had political motivations (capturing "collaborators" or government officials); others were purely criminal.

High-Profile Cases:

• Traditional Rulers: Several fons (traditional kings) were kidnapped, some killed despite ransom payments. The assassination of the Fon of Nkwen in November 2020 and subsequent targeting of traditional rulers created a climate where even respected community leaders were unsafe.

• Catholic Priests and Nuns: Multiple religious leaders were kidnapped, highlighting that no one was exempt from violence.

• Schoolchildren: Several mass abductions of students occurred, traumatizing communities and further disrupting education.

The kidnapping epidemic transformed public perception. Initially, separatists were seen by many Anglophones as defenders of the community. Increasingly, they were viewed as criminals terrorizing the population they claimed to protect. This erosion of popular support weakened the movement but didn't end it, as fear kept populations compliant.

The 2025 Context: Election Theater and Persistent Violence

As of late 2024/early 2025, Cameroon prepares for legislative and municipal elections scheduled for 2025, and presidential elections eventually (President Biya, now 91 years old, has not announced whether he will seek another term).

The Electoral Absurdity:

Elections in Anglophone regions during active conflict are grotesque theater:

1. Impossible Security Conditions: Most of Northwest and Southwest Regions remain insecure. Separatists have repeatedly stated that anyone participating in elections—candidates, poll workers, voters—will be considered traitors and targeted. This isn't empty threat; people have been killed for participating in previous elections.
   
   

2. Fabricated Results: In areas where voting is impossible, government officials simply invent results showing overwhelming support for the ruling CPDM party. This occurred in 2018 and 2020 elections and will certainly occur again.
   
   

3. Forced Participation: In some areas, security forces force civilians to vote at gunpoint, creating images of "peaceful elections" for international consumption while reality is coercion.
   
   

4. Opposition Exclusion: Opposition parties, including the SDF which has significant Anglophone support, face systematic obstacles—candidates arrested, supporters harassed, campaign activities blocked.
   
   

5. Maintaining Fiction of Normalcy: The government uses elections to claim that normalcy has returned, life is going on, and Anglophones are participating in democratic processes. International observers who visit only secured urban areas for brief periods often accept this fiction.
   
   

The fundamental problem: elections cannot address the Anglophone crisis because the crisis isn't about electoral politics—it's about constitutional structure, identity, autonomy, and historical grievances. Voting in elections for a system that Anglophones view as illegitimate and oppressive cannot resolve anything.

Yet the government insists on this electoral theater, and much of the international community accepts it as evidence of progress.

Part VI: Regional Analysis - How the War Affected Different Areas

The Anglophone crisis affected different regions, divisions, and communities unequally. Understanding this variation reveals the conflict's complexity.

Northwest Region: The Heart of Resistance

The Northwest Region (capital: Bamenda) became the center of the Anglophone movement and experienced the most intense sustained violence.

Geographic and Demographic Context:

Northwest Region comprises seven divisions: Mezam (capital Bamenda), Menchum, Boyo, Bui, Donga-Mantung, Momo, and Ngoketunjia. The region's population pre-crisis was approximately 1.8-2 million. The region is predominantly Christian (Catholic, Presbyterian, Baptist), with significant Muslim populations in areas like Nkambe and Ako.

The Northwest is characterized by rugged mountainous terrain—the Bamenda Highlands—providing natural defensive positions for guerrilla warfare. The landscape of hills, valleys, and dense vegetation makes it extremely difficult for conventional military forces to control territory.

Why Northwest Became the Epicenter:

1. Historical Political Consciousness: Northwest had the strongest tradition of political activism. Bamenda was the SDF stronghold, home to Ni John Fru Ndi who nearly defeated Biya in 1992. Political awareness and willingness to challenge authority were higher than other regions.
   
   

2. Educational Hub: The University of Bamenda and numerous secondary schools created a educated, politically aware population capable of articulating grievances and organizing resistance.
   
   

3. Economic Marginalization: Despite agricultural wealth (coffee, food crops) and strategic location, Northwest received minimal government investment. Roads were terrible, electricity unreliable, water scarce. This created deep resentment.
   
   

4. Traditional Structures: Strong fondoms (traditional kingdoms) like Nso, Bali, Kom, and others provided alternative authority structures that could mobilize populations.
   
   

5. Terrain: The mountainous landscape favored guerrilla resistance.
   
   

Division-by-Division Impact:

Mezam Division (Bamenda):

Bamenda, the regional capital and Northwest's largest city (population approximately 400,000 pre-crisis), saw intense violence:

• Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Unlike typical insurgencies concentrated in rural areas, Bamenda experienced urban warfare with separatist cells operating inside the city, carrying out assassinations, bombings, and attacks on security forces even in the commercial center.
  
  

• Ghost Towns: Bamenda pioneered and most strictly enforced Ghost Town strikes. The city regularly shut down completely—empty streets, closed businesses, no movement. The economic cost was catastrophic, with most businesses failing.
  
  

• Military Occupation: Heavy military and BIR (Rapid Intervention Battalion) presence created an atmosphere of occupation. Arbitrary arrests, house-to-house searches, nighttime raids, and checkpoints where soldiers extorted money characterized daily life.
  
  

• Targeted Killings: Both sides targeted perceived enemies. Separatists assassinated alleged "blacklegs" (collaborators)—government officials, police informers, people who violated Ghost Towns. Security forces killed suspected separatists and activists.
  
  

• Displacement: Much of Bamenda's population fled—to Yaoundé and other Francophone cities, to Nigeria, or to villages they believed safer. The city's population likely decreased by 30-40%.
  
  

Bui Division (Kumbo):

Kumbo, second-largest Northwest town, experienced extreme violence:

• Separatist Stronghold: Bui became one of the strongest separatist-controlled areas. Rural Bui particularly saw extensive armed group presence.
  
  

• Military Brutality: Government forces conducted brutal operations, burning numerous villages—including Ngarbuh (site of the 2020 massacre), Cha, Kikaikelaki, Big Babanki, and many others.
  
  

• Traditional Authority Targeted: The Fon of Nso, one of Northwest's most powerful traditional rulers, walked a dangerous line between maintaining relations with government and not losing legitimacy with his subjects. Other traditional rulers in Bui were less fortunate—several were killed or forced to flee.
  
  

• Economic Collapse: Kumbo's markets, once vibrant commercial centers, became dangerous targets. The weekly Kumbo market, one of Northwest's largest, ceased functioning normally.
  
  

Donga-Mantung Division (Nkambe/Ndu):

This northern division saw some of the war's worst atrocities:

• Ngarbuh Massacre: The February 2020 massacre that killed 21 people including 13 children occurred in Donga-Mantung, epitomizing the violence in this division.
  
  

• Ethnic Dimensions: Donga-Mantung has significant Muslim populations and Fulani presence, adding ethnic and religious dimensions to the conflict. Armed Fulani militias, some government-supported, attacked Anglophone Christian villages.
  
  

• Remote Violence: The division's remoteness meant atrocities received less attention. Entire villages were burned with minimal documentation.
  
  

• Humanitarian Crisis: Massive displacement and limited humanitarian access created severe suffering.
  
  

Boyo Division (Fundong):

This division saw intense guerrilla warfare:

• Strategic Location: Boyo's location between Bamenda and the Nigerian border made it strategically important for both sides.
  
  

• Village Burnings: Dozens of villages were partially or completely destroyed—Belo, Njinikom, Fundong suburbs, and many others.
  
  

• Armed Groups: Multiple separatist factions operated, sometimes fighting each other as much as government forces.
  
  

Menchum Division (Wum/Benakuma):

Western Northwest's division experienced:

• Border Significance: Proximity to Nigeria made Menchum important for weapons smuggling and refugee flows.
  
  

• Ethnic Complexity: Home to diverse ethnic groups including Widikum, adding complexity to conflict dynamics.
  
  

• Agricultural Devastation: Rich farming area saw crops destroyed and farmers displaced, creating food insecurity.
  
  

Momo Division (Mbengwi/Batibo):

• Early Violence: Momo saw some of the earliest armed attacks, including the November 2017 Batibo incident.
  
  

• Sustained Conflict: Continuous fighting throughout the crisis with neither side achieving dominance.
  
  

• Traditional Authority: Strong fondoms attempted to protect populations with limited success.
  
  

Ngoketunjia Division (Ndop):

• Relative Calm Initially: Being closer to Francophone areas, Ngoketunjia saw less violence initially.
  
  

• Escalation: Violence increased from 2019 onward as the conflict spread and intensified.
  
  

• Economic Link: Ndop's agricultural products (rice, vegetables) traditionally supplied Bamenda and Yaoundé. Disruption affected food supplies regionally.
  
  

Southwest Region: Resource-Rich and Brutalized

Southwest Region (capital: Buea) comprises six divisions: Fako, Meme, Manyu, Ndian, Kupe-Manenguba, and Lebialem. Pre-crisis population was approximately 1.4-1.6 million.

Distinctive Characteristics:

1. Economic Importance: Southwest is economically critical—home to the CDC (Cameroon Development Corporation) plantations producing palm oil, rubber, tea, and bananas; the Port of Limbe; oil production in offshore fields; and Mount Cameroon tourism.
   
   

2. Coastal Access: The Gulf of Guinea coastline provided strategic importance and escape routes.
   
   

3. Linguistic Composition: Southwest is officially Anglophone but has significant Francophone population, particularly in Kumba and coastal areas. This created complex dynamics.
   
   

4. Terrain Variety: From coastal lowlands to Mount Cameroon to rainforest to mountainous Lebialem—varied terrain affected conflict patterns.
   
   

Division-by-Division Impact:

Fako Division (Buea/Limbe/Tiko):

Fako, hosting the regional capital Buea and the major port city Limbe, experienced complex violence:

Buea: As administrative capital and home to the University of Buea, the city saw:

• Heavy Military Presence: Being the regional capital, Buea had massive security force deployment, creating an occupied atmosphere.

• Student Activism: University students were highly politically active, organizing protests and supporting the movement. The government responded with brutal crackdowns—students shot, arrested, tortured. Some universities temporarily closed.

• Symbol of West Cameroon: Buea was the capital of the West Cameroon federated state (1961-1972). The old House of Assembly building stood as a reminder of lost autonomy. October 1, 2017 protests targeted this symbolic site.

• Economic Paralysis: Ghost Towns devastated Buea's economy. The city's population declined as residents fled.

Limbe/Victoria: This coastal city experienced:

• CDC Strikes: The Cameroon Development Corporation, one of the region's largest employers with tens of thousands of workers, became a battleground. Workers striking in solidarity with the movement were met with violence. Separatists sometimes targeted CDC facilities viewed as government assets. Production collapsed.

• Port Disruption: Limbe's port, while smaller than Douala, handled significant cargo. Insecurity disrupted operations.

• Tourism Collapse: Limbe's beaches and Mount Cameroon tourism ended completely. Hotels closed, guides lost livelihoods.

• Divided Loyalties: Limbe's mixed Anglophone-Francophone population created tensions. Some Francophone residents were targeted; some Anglophone residents were accused of collaboration.

Tiko: Site of an important airport, Tiko saw military concentration and restrictions.

Meme Division (Kumba):

Kumba, Southwest's largest city, became one of the conflict's most violent flashpoints:

• Commercial Center: Kumba was Southwest's major commercial hub with enormous markets trading goods throughout the region. This made it a high-value target for both control and taxation/extortion.
  
  

• Mixed Population: Large Francophone trading community created ethnic/linguistic tensions. Some Francophone traders were targeted; this prompted reprisals.
  
  

• Extreme Violence: Kumba saw horrific atrocities by all sides—massacres, kidnappings, bombings, assassinations. The October 2020 school massacre killing seven children epitomized Kumba's suffering.
  
  

• Armed Groups: Multiple separatist factions and criminal gangs operated in Kumba, creating chaos. Kidnapping for ransom became routine.
  
  

• Economic Devastation: Kumba's markets, which once attracted traders from across Central Africa, became dangerous. Economic activity collapsed.
  
  

Manyu Division (Mamfe/Eyumodjock):

This eastern division bordering Nigeria experienced:

• Border Significance: Manyu's border with Nigeria (Cross River State) was crucial for weapons smuggling, refugee flows, and escape routes. The Nigerian border towns became rear bases for separatist groups.
  
  

• Military Operations: Heavy military presence to control the border led to brutal operations. Villages across Manyu were burned.
  
  

• Cross-Border Attacks: Security forces sometimes pursued separatists into Nigerian territory, creating diplomatic incidents and endangering refugees.
  
  

• Traditional Rulers Targeted: Several fons and chiefs in Manyu were killed or fled.
  
  

• Humanitarian Crisis: Remote areas became displacement zones with populations hiding in forests along the border.
  
  

Ndian Division (Mundemba/Ekondo Titi):

Coastal Ndian experienced:

• Forest Warfare: Dense Korup rainforest provided cover for separatist groups but also harsh conditions for displaced populations hiding there.
  
  

• Plantation Disruptions: Palm oil and rubber plantations in Ndian faced attacks and abandonment.
  
  

• Coastal Escape: Some displaced persons used fishing boats to flee along the coast or to Nigeria.
  
  

• Resource Extraction: Illegal logging and palm oil extraction by armed groups funded operations.
  
  

Kupe-Manenguba Division (Bangem):

This mountainous division saw:

• Terrain Advantage: Rugged mountains provided excellent guerrilla territory.
  
  

• Comparative Isolation: Being more remote, Kupe-Manenguba received less international attention despite significant violence.
  
  

• Traditional Resistance: Strong traditional structures organized community defense.
  
  

Lebialem Division (Menji/Alou):

Perhaps the most devastated division:

• Near-Total Displacement: Large portions of Lebialem's population fled. Entire villages were completely abandoned.
  
  

• Massacres: Multiple massacres occurred—Menka-Pinyin, Mautu, and many others. The division saw some of the war's highest per capita casualties.
  
  

• Interfactional Fighting: Rival separatist groups fought intensely over Lebialem's limited resources.
  
  

• Humanitarian Access: Extremely difficult terrain and insecurity made humanitarian access nearly impossible. Displaced populations suffered terribly.
  
  

• Forest Refuge: Thousands lived in the forest for years, surviving on wild foods and limited supplies. Children grew up in forest camps with no education, healthcare, or normal life.
  
  

Part VII: Economic Catastrophe - Quantifying Destruction

The economic impacts of the Anglophone crisis extend far beyond the immediate conflict zones, affecting national and regional economies while devastating individual and community livelihoods.

Macro-Economic Impacts

National Economic Costs:

Various studies have attempted to quantify the economic damage:

1. World Bank Estimates (2019): The World Bank estimated the crisis had cost Cameroon's economy approximately $1.1 billion in lost GDP growth in the first three years (2017-2019). This figure accounts for:
   
   

• Lost agricultural production

• Disrupted trade and commerce

• Tourism collapse

• Reduced foreign investment

• Capital flight

• Humanitarian response costs

2. African Development Bank Analysis (2020): Suggested cumulative losses of $1.5-2 billion when accounting for opportunity costs and infrastructure destruction.
   
   

3. International Crisis Group (2019): Estimated annual losses of $750 million to $1 billion in the conflict's peak years.
   
   

By 2024-2025, reasonable estimates suggest cumulative economic losses exceed $4-5 billion—a staggering figure for a country with GDP around $45 billion.

Sectoral Breakdown:

Agriculture:

Anglophone regions were agricultural powerhouses. Northwest produced coffee, vegetables, maize, beans, and palm wine. Southwest produced cocoa, rubber, palm oil, tea, and bananas through the CDC. The conflict devastated this productivity:

• CDC Collapse: Production at CDC plantations fell by 60-70%. Facilities were damaged or destroyed. Workers fled or were killed. Before the crisis, CDC employed approximately 22,000 workers directly and supported perhaps 100,000 dependents. By 2020, employment had fallen to less than 8,000, and many of those remaining unpaid for months.
  
  

• Smallholder Farming: Displacement meant farms abandoned. Planting and harvest cycles disrupted. Cockoa and coffee trees untended died or became unproductive. Estimates suggest 40-50% reduction in agricultural output from Anglophone regions.
  
  

• Market Disruption: Even when food was produced, insecurity prevented transport to markets. Produce rotted in fields. Farmers couldn't purchase inputs. Credit systems collapsed.
  
  

• Food Insecurity: Regions that once fed themselves became food-insecure, dependent on humanitarian aid or dangerous journeys to purchase food.
  
  

Commerce and Trade:

• Market Closure: Major markets in Bamenda, Kumba, Buea, and other cities functioned sporadically at best. Ghost Towns meant businesses closed multiple days weekly. Customers feared shopping due to violence. Trading networks collapsed.
  
  

• Cross-Border Trade: The vital Nigeria-Cameroon trade flows through Anglophone regions virtually ceased. Mamfe, once a bustling border trading post, became a conflict zone. Traders avoiding Anglophone regions took longer, more expensive routes.
  
  

• Business Failures: Estimates suggest 60-70% of businesses in Anglophone regions closed permanently. Years of Ghost Towns, insecurity, extortion by armed groups and security forces, and customer flight made business impossible.
  
  

• Banking Collapse: Banks closed branches or limited operations. Electronic transactions became difficult. Many people lost savings when banks holding their money closed. Credit availability disappeared.
  
  

Infrastructure Destruction:

The physical destruction was immense:

• Schools: Over 200 schools burned or severely damaged. Even undamaged schools sat empty. Educational materials destroyed. The cost to rebuild physical infrastructure will be hundreds of millions, but the human capital loss from 700,000 children missing education is incalculable.
  
  

• Health Facilities: Dozens of hospitals and clinics destroyed or closed. Medical equipment stolen or destroyed. Reconstruction costs in hundreds of millions.
  
  

• Roads and Bridges: Already poor infrastructure deteriorated further without maintenance. Some bridges deliberately destroyed to impede military movement. Roads mined or blocked. Economic impact of impassable roads immense.
  
  

• Government Buildings: Hundreds of administrative buildings, police stations, tax offices, and courthouses burned. The cost to rebuild state infrastructure substantial.
  
  

• Private Housing: Estimates suggest 50,000-100,000 homes destroyed—burned by military forces during operations, by separatists punishing "collaborators," or caught in crossfire. Hundreds of thousands displaced have nowhere to return to.
  
  

Tourism:

Anglophone Cameroon had significant tourism potential:

• Mount Cameroon: West Africa's highest peak, attracting climbers internationally. Tourism ceased completely.

• Limbe Beaches: Popular domestic and regional tourism destination. Deserted.

• Cultural Tourism: Traditional cultures, festivals, and crafts attracted visitors. All ended.

• Ecotourism: Korup National Park and other protected areas. Abandoned.

Estimates suggest $50-100 million annually in lost tourism revenue.

Natural Resources:

• Oil Production: Offshore oil fields near Limbe saw production disruptions due to insecurity and inability to move personnel and equipment safely. While production continued at reduced levels, the inability to fully exploit resources cost millions.
  
  

• Timber: Legal logging ceased, but illegal logging by armed groups flourished. The state lost legitimate revenue while forests were devastated.
  
  

• Mining: Small-scale mining operations halted. Exploration for minerals stopped.
  
  

Micro-Economic Devastation: Individual and Household Impacts

Beyond macro statistics, the conflict devastated individual livelihoods:

Displaced Persons' Economic Situation:

The million-plus displaced people faced economic catastrophe:

• Asset Loss: Fleeing home meant leaving behind property, savings, valuables. Many lost everything—homes burned, possessions looted, land abandoned.
  
  

• Livelihood Loss: Farmers lost land and crops. Traders lost businesses. Professionals lost careers. Teachers and civil servants couldn't work. Most displaced had no income.
  
  

• Dependency: Displaced populations depended on hosting families (straining their resources), humanitarian aid (limited), or charity. This dependency destroyed dignity and autonomy.
  
  

• Exploitation: Displaced persons, especially women and girls, faced exploitation—sexual violence in exchange for food, housing, or safety; forced labor; trafficking.
  
  

• Children's Lost Opportunity: The 700,000 children denied education face life-long economic disadvantage. Without literacy, numeracy, and skills, their earning potential is devastated. This represents billions in lost future productivity.
  
  

The Diaspora Economic Role:

Anglophone diaspora communities became economically crucial:

• Remittances: Diaspora Cameroonians sent money home to support displaced families, fund humanitarian efforts, and help people flee violence. Estimates suggest $50-100 million annually in diaspora remittances specifically for crisis-related needs.
  
  

• Funding Armed Groups: Controversially, diaspora communities also funded separatist fighters. The amounts are unknown but likely tens of millions of dollars over the conflict's duration. This funding, while supporting resistance, also perpetuated violence.
  
  

• Business Investment Lost: Rather than investing in Anglophone Cameroon's development, diaspora resources went to survival and conflict.
  
  

Government Revenue Loss:

The state lost enormous revenue:

• Tax Collection Collapse: In conflict zones, tax collection ceased. Businesses closed meant no corporate taxes. Unemployed populations paid no income taxes. Customs revenue from cross-border trade vanished.
  
  

• CDC Dividends: The CDC, once profitable and providing significant state revenue, became a drain requiring government support.
  
  

• Increased Security Spending: While losing revenue, the government spent massively on military operations—salaries for additional troops, weapons, ammunition, equipment, logistics. Estimates suggest $200-300 million annually in additional security spending.
  
  

• Opportunity Cost: Resources devoted to fighting Anglophones couldn't be invested in development.
  
  

Regional Economic Impacts

Impact on Littoral Region (Douala):

Cameroon's economic capital Douala felt significant effects:

• Trade Disruption: Goods normally transiting through Anglophone regions to Nigeria had to take longer routes through northern Cameroon, increasing costs.
  
  

• Displaced Influx: Thousands of Anglophone refugees arrived in Douala seeking safety and opportunity. While some integrated successfully, many faced discrimination, unemployment, and hostility from Francophone populations.
  
  

• Business Uncertainty: Foreign investors became wary of Cameroon generally, affecting even Francophone regions.
  
  

Impact on Center Region (Yaoundé):

The capital region saw:

• Displaced Burden: Thousands of Anglophone refugees in Yaoundé strained social services and housing.
  
  

• Security Costs: Increased police and military presence responding to potential separatist attacks in the capital.
  
  

• Political Costs: International attention to the crisis damaged Cameroon's reputation, affecting aid and investment decisions even for non-conflict regions.
  
  

Impact on Neighboring Regions:

• West Region: Bordering Northwest, the Francophone West Region saw some violence spillover, economic disruption from closed trade routes, and displaced populations.
  
  

• Other Regions: Generally less affected but experiencing national economic slowdown, reduced government revenue for infrastructure and services, and political uncertainty.
  
  

International Economic Dimensions

Foreign Investment Flight:

International businesses became extremely wary:

• Extractive Industries: Oil

companies operating offshore near Southwest Region faced security concerns, difficulty moving personnel, and reputational risks. Some scaled back operations or delayed expansion projects. The inability to fully develop offshore oil and gas fields cost Cameroon hundreds of millions in potential revenue.

• Agricultural Investment: Plans for agricultural processing facilities, plantation expansions, and agribusiness development in Anglophone regions were abandoned. The CDC's decline eliminated a major employment and production hub that could have attracted investment.
  
  

• Technology Sector: Buea's emerging tech sector, nicknamed "Silicon Mountain," showed promise before the crisis. Young tech entrepreneurs were building startups, attracting international attention. The crisis destroyed this nascent industry—entrepreneurs fled, investors withdrew, internet shutdowns made tech work impossible. This represented enormous lost potential in a sector that could have transformed the regional economy.
  
  

• Tourism Investment: Hotel projects, eco-tourism ventures, and cultural tourism development were cancelled or abandoned.
  
  

International Financial Institutions:

The crisis affected Cameroon's relationship with international financial institutions:

• World Bank and IMF Concerns: Both institutions expressed concern about the crisis's impact on macroeconomic stability, governance, and development. While not imposing formal sanctions, they factored the crisis into lending decisions and program designs.
  
  

• Reduced Aid Effectiveness: Development assistance became less effective when entire regions were inaccessible due to conflict. Projects in Anglophone regions were suspended or cancelled.
  
  

• Humanitarian Funding Gap: Despite the massive humanitarian needs, international donors provided limited funding. UN humanitarian appeals for Cameroon were consistently underfunded—typically receiving only 30-40% of requested amounts. The crisis lacked the international visibility of other conflicts, resulting in insufficient humanitarian financing.
  
  

Trade Impacts:

• CEMAC Region: Cameroon is part of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). The crisis disrupted trade flows within CEMAC, particularly with Nigeria (not a CEMAC member but crucial trading partner). Regional economic integration suffered.
  
  

• Export Decline: Cameroon's exports declined overall, but Anglophone agricultural exports fell dramatically. International buyers of Cameroon coffee, cocoa, rubber, and palm oil faced supply disruptions and switched to other sources. Rebuilding these markets will be difficult even after peace.
  
  

• Import Dependence: With domestic production collapsed, Cameroon increased imports of food and goods previously produced locally, worsening trade balance and depleting foreign exchange reserves.
  
  

The Economics of War: How Violence is Financed

Understanding the conflict requires examining how both sides financed their operations:

Government Financing:

The Cameroonian government funds military operations through:

1. National Budget: Military and security spending increased significantly, consuming resources that could have funded education, healthcare, or infrastructure. Official defense budgets are opaque, but estimates suggest $400-500 million annually on the Anglophone conflict specifically.
   
   

2. Oil Revenue: Offshore oil production provides crucial government revenue, much of which funds the military. Ironically, some oil comes from fields near Anglophone regions whose populations receive minimal benefit.
   
   

3. International Support: France provides military equipment, training, and intelligence support to Cameroon. This support, motivated by French interests in maintaining influence and securing its former colony's stability, effectively subsidizes the government's military campaign.
   
   

4. Domestic Borrowing: The government has increased domestic debt to finance operations, with long-term economic consequences.
   
   

5. Taxation: Despite losing tax revenue in Anglophone regions, the government increases taxes in Francophone regions and through consumption taxes nationwide.
   
   

Separatist Financing:

Armed groups fund operations through multiple sources:

1. Diaspora Contributions: The primary funding source. Diaspora Anglophones, particularly in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and South Africa, contribute through:
   
   

• Direct donations to specific armed groups

• Contributions to "humanitarian" funds that often support fighters

• Fundraising events and campaigns

• Online crowdfunding platforms

2. Estimates suggest tens of millions of dollars annually from diaspora sources. This funding is controversial—supporters see it as supporting liberation fighters; critics argue it perpetuates violence and suffering.
   
   

3. Local "Taxation": Armed groups collect money from populations under their control:
   
   

• Market taxes from traders

• Roadblock tolls from travelers

• Business "protection" fees

• Community contributions (sometimes voluntary, often coerced)

4. This taxation is burdensome for already impoverished populations and blurs the line between liberation struggle and extortion.
   
   

5. Kidnapping Ransoms: As the conflict evolved, kidnapping for ransom became a major funding source. High-value targets—wealthy Cameroonians, foreigners, business people—could generate ransoms of millions of CFA francs (tens of thousands of dollars). This criminalization of the movement damaged its legitimacy.
   
   

6. Resource Extraction: Armed groups control territory containing valuable resources:
   
   

• Illegal Logging: Timber extracted from forests and sold across borders generates significant income. This environmental destruction compounds the conflict's costs.

• Mining: Small-scale gold and other mineral extraction in controlled territories provides funding.

• Agricultural Products: Some groups tax or control trade in agricultural goods.

7. External Support: There are allegations of limited external support from sympathetic governments or groups, though evidence is limited. Nigerian communities near the border reportedly provide some support. Other African countries' involvement is minimal.
   
   

The economics of separatist financing creates perverse incentives. Groups controlling lucrative territories or kidnapping operations have financial reasons to continue conflict even if political objectives become unattainable. This contributes to the fragmentation and criminalization of the movement.

The Criminal Economy:

The conflict created a thriving criminal economy:

• Arms Trafficking: Weapons flow from Nigeria, Chad, and other sources, with traffickers profiting enormously.

• Drug Trafficking: Some evidence suggests armed groups and criminal networks use conflict zones for drug transit.

• Human Trafficking: Women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation or forced labor, with conflict creating vulnerability and reducing law enforcement.

• Contraband: Smuggling of goods across borders to avoid taxes or capitalize on shortages.

• Extortion Networks: Both security forces and armed groups extort money at checkpoints, during raids, and through protection rackets.

This criminal economy will persist after any political settlement, requiring significant effort to dismantle.

Long-Term Economic Consequences

Even if peace came tomorrow, the economic damage will last generations:

Human Capital Destruction:

• Lost Education: 700,000 children without schooling for 6+ years represent permanently damaged human capital. These children, now young adults, lack skills for productive employment. This affects productivity and economic growth for 40-50 years.
  
  

• Brain Drain: Thousands of educated Anglophones—doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs—fled Cameroon. Many will never return. This permanent loss of talent cannot be easily replaced.
  
  

• Trauma and Mental Health: The psychological trauma of six years of violence affects productivity, creativity, and social cohesion. Mental health impacts can persist for lifetimes and transfer intergenerationally.
  
  

• Broken Social Trust: Communities divided by accusations of collaboration, ethnic tensions, and violence will struggle to rebuild trust necessary for economic cooperation.
  
  

Physical Capital Destruction:

• Infrastructure Deficit: The estimated $3-5 billion cost to rebuild destroyed infrastructure (schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, government buildings, private housing) will take decades to finance and complete.
  
  

• Agricultural Recovery: Abandoned farms require years to return to productivity. Cocoa and coffee trees take years to mature. Palm oil plantations require significant investment to rehabilitate.
  
  

• Business Ecosystem: Rebuilding the business ecosystem—suppliers, distributors, financial services, markets—requires time even after physical security is restored.
  
  

Institutional Damage:

• Property Rights: Massive displacement and property destruction created enormous uncertainty about property ownership. Resolving competing claims will be complex and contentious.
  
  

• Legal System: The Common Law system was already damaged before the crisis; six years of conflict destroyed whatever remained. Rebuilding legitimate, functional courts will be difficult.
  
  

• Administrative Capacity: Government administration in Anglophone regions collapsed. Rebuilding competent, legitimate local government will require years.
  
  

• Traditional Authority: Many traditional rulers killed, exiled, or delegitimized. Restoring traditional governance structures will be challenging.
  
  

Demographic Changes:

• Permanent Displacement: Many displaced persons will never return to origin communities. This permanent demographic shift will affect political power, resource distribution, and social structures.
  
  

• Population Decline: Anglophone regions' populations have declined significantly through death, flight, and reduced birth rates. This smaller population reduces economic activity and political weight.
  
  

• Demographic Structure: The conflict killed disproportionately young men (fighters and civilians), creating gender imbalances and generational gaps that affect family structure and labor forces.
  
  

Investor Confidence:

• Risk Premium: Even after peace, Anglophone regions will be viewed as higher-risk for investment, requiring higher returns to attract capital. This risk premium could last decades.
  
  

• Reputation Damage: Cameroon's international reputation has been damaged—seen as unstable, violent, and poorly governed. Repairing this reputation to attract tourism and investment will be slow.
  
  

• Competing Destinations: While Cameroon was in conflict, other African countries attracted investment that might have gone to Cameroon. Rebuilding competitive position will be difficult.
  
  

Part VIII: The Francophone Mindset - Understanding the Silence

Perhaps the most morally troubling aspect of the Anglophone crisis is the reaction—or lack thereof—from the Francophone Cameroonian majority. This requires deeper analysis than simple accusations of complicity or indifference.

Historical and Cultural Factors

The Legacy of French Colonial Education:

French colonial education system was fundamentally different from British colonial education in its philosophy and effects:

1. Assimilation vs. Indirect Rule: French colonialism operated on the principle of assimilation—turning Africans into French people culturally and mentally. The ideal was the évolué, the "evolved" African who adopted French language, culture, values, and identity. This contrasted with British indirect rule which maintained local structures while imposing British administration.
   
   

2. Centralization: French political culture emphasizes centralized authority, uniformity, and the supremacy of the state. The Jacobin tradition from the French Revolution promoted the idea that diversity threatens unity, that local autonomy weakens the nation, and that a strong central state is the foundation of civilization. This philosophy was imparted through colonial education.
   
   

3. Authority Worship: French colonial education emphasized obedience to authority, respect for hierarchy, and acceptance of the state's wisdom. Critical thinking about government authority was discouraged. Students learned that questioning the state was equivalent to threatening social order.
   
   

4. Cultural Superiority: The French education system explicitly taught that French civilization was superior, that French language and culture represented the pinnacle of human achievement, and that other cultures were primitive and needed to be replaced by French ways. This created a mindset where imposing French culture on others was seen as benevolent, a gift rather than oppression.
   
   

5. Contempt for Indigenous Cultures: Students learned to view African languages, customs, and traditions as backward obstacles to progress. Speaking indigenous languages in school could result in punishment. This internalized cultural self-hatred meant that Francophone Cameroonians learned to devalue linguistic and cultural diversity.
   
   

The UPC Trauma:

The violent suppression of the UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun) in the 1950s-1970s created lasting trauma that affects Francophone political consciousness:

1. State Violence as Normal: The French and then Ahidjo governments killed tens of thousands suppressing the UPC. This established extreme state violence as normal, acceptable, even necessary for national unity. Francophone Cameroonians learned that resistance to authority results in death.
   
   

2. Nationalism as Treason: The UPC advocated for immediate independence and reunification. The French and compliant elites labeled this as extremism, terrorism, and treason. Questioning the established order became associated with violence and disorder rather than legitimate political activity.
   
   

3. Memory Suppression: The UPC insurgency and its brutal suppression were largely erased from official history and education. Most Francophone Cameroonians don't know this history. The absence of historical memory about state violence against political opponents makes it easier to accept current violence.
   
   

4. Fear Learned Early: Generations grew up knowing that serious political opposition resulted in death. This lesson, though not explicitly taught, was absorbed: keep your head down, don't challenge authority, accept what comes.
   
   

Contemporary Factors Explaining Francophone Silence

Information Control and Propaganda:

The Cameroonian government's control of information shapes Francophone perceptions:

1. State Media Dominance: Cameroon Radio Television (CRTV), the state broadcaster, is the primary news source for millions. CRTV presents only the government narrative:
   
   

• Anglophones portrayed as ungrateful terrorists

• Security forces always acting in self-defense

• The crisis as a foreign plot (diaspora manipulation, Nigerian interference, Western destabilization)

• Violence minimized or blamed on separatists

• No coverage of government atrocities

2. Private Media Censorship: Independent media faces harassment, journalists imprisoned, outlets closed. Media that reports critically on the crisis risks severe consequences. This creates self-censorship—even private media avoids contradicting government narratives too strongly.
   
   

3. Social Media Control: The government monitors social media, arrests people for critical posts, and uses trolls to spread pro-government narratives. Fear of surveillance makes people cautious about what they say online.
   
   

4. French Media Complicity: French media outlets (France24, RFI) which are influential in Francophone Cameroon, initially ignored the crisis or presented balanced coverage that equated government and separatist violence. This "both sides" framing obscured the asymmetry of power and responsibility.
   
   

5. Linguistic Barriers: Most Francophone Cameroonians don't speak English well enough to access Anglophone media, international English-language coverage, or social media content in English. They rely on French-language sources which are more easily controlled.
   
   

6. Alternative Facts: Government propaganda has created alternative facts—that separatists massacre their own children to frame the government, that the Ngarbuh massacre never happened, that diaspora Anglophones are wealthy troublemakers destroying their homeland for personal gain. Many Francophones believe these lies.
   
   

Historical Ignorance:

Most Francophone Cameroonians genuinely don't understand why Anglophones are angry:

1. Federal History Unknown: Many Francophones born after 1972 don't know Cameroon was ever federal. They learned in school that Cameroon has always been unitary. The federal period (1961-1972) is barely taught.
   
   

2. 1961 Plebiscite: Most Francophones don't know about the plebiscite, the promises made to Anglophones, or the limited choices offered. They don't understand that Anglophones view reunification as a voluntary union between equals that was betrayed.
   
   

3. Common Law vs. Civil Law: Francophones don't understand the fundamental differences between legal systems or why it matters. They see Anglophone lawyers' complaints as technical trivia rather than existential threats to their professional identity.
   
   

4. Anglo-Saxon Education: The distinctive nature of British-style education is unknown to most Francophones. They don't understand why Anglophones resist "harmonization" or why the GCE matters.
   
   

5. Economic Exploitation: Francophones don't know that Anglophone regions contributed disproportionately to national revenue while receiving minimal investment. They may actually believe government propaganda that Anglophone regions are poor and dependent on Francophone generosity.
   
   

6. Linguistic Marginalization: Francophones don't perceive French language dominance as oppression because it's normal to them. They may view English as an inconvenient minority language that creates inefficiency.
   
   

Ethno-Regional Stereotypes and Prejudices:

Negative stereotypes about Anglophones, particularly certain ethnic groups, facilitate indifference:

1. Bamileke Stereotypes: Many prominent Anglophones are Bamileke or from Bamileke-origin families (a Francophone ethnic group from West Region but with significant populations in Anglophone areas). Bamileke face stereotypes as greedy, clannish, and power-hungry. Some Francophones view the Anglophone crisis through this ethnic lens rather than as a linguistic/political issue.
   
   

2. "Biafra Syndrome": Some Francophones compare the Anglophone crisis to the Biafra War in Nigeria (1967-1970), viewing it as Igbo-related separatism (many Anglophones have cultural connections to Nigerian Igbos). This activates fears of national disintegration and ethnic conflict.
   
   

3. "Anglo-Bamis": A derogatory term combining "Anglophone" and "Bamileke" used to dismiss Anglophone grievances as ethnic rather than legitimate political complaints.
   
   

4. Cultural Stereotypes: Anglophones stereotyped as aggressive, confrontational, and troublesome—character flaws requiring firm government response.
   
   

5. Economic Jealousy: In some cases, Francophone resentment of perceived Anglophone economic success (despite overall Anglophone marginalization, some Anglophones succeeded in business) makes violence more acceptable.
   
   

Fear and Self-Interest:

Rational self-interest drives some Francophone silence:

1. Fear of Repression: Francophones who sympathize with Anglophones fear speaking out. The government doesn't tolerate dissent from anyone—Francophone activists, journalists, and civil society members face arrest, torture, and worse. Many people who might otherwise protest remain silent to protect themselves and families.
   
   

2. Economic Interest: The centralized system benefits Francophone regions and elites. Yaoundé receives the most government investment. Francophone cities have better infrastructure. Government jobs and contracts disproportionately go to Francophones. Acknowledging Anglophone grievances would mean reforming this system in ways that reduce Francophone advantages.
   
   

3. National Unity Ideology: Many Francophones genuinely believe that accommodating Anglophone demands threatens national unity and could lead to Cameroon's disintegration. They may view temporary suffering as necessary to preserve the nation.
   
   

4. Political Calculations: Opposition politicians, who might theoretically support Anglophones, often remain silent because:
   
   

• They fear being labeled secessionists

• They don't want to alienate Francophone voters

• They hope to eventually win power and don't want to commit to structural reforms they'd have to implement

• They may share the centralist ideology despite opposing Biya

5. Security Concerns: Some Francophones fear that Anglophone independence or federalism would create a hostile neighboring state or weaken Cameroon strategically.
   
   

The "Learned Helplessness" of Authoritarianism:

After 42 years of Paul Biya's authoritarian rule (and 22 years of Ahidjo before that—64 years of only two presidents), Cameroonians have developed learned helplessness:

1. Futility of Protest: Multiple attempts at democratic change—1991-1992 protests, 2008 riots, opposition parties, civil society activism—all failed to change the system. People learned that nothing they do matters. This creates apathy and resignation.
   
   

2. Survival Mode: In an authoritarian system with limited economic opportunity and arbitrary state violence, people focus on personal survival—getting by, protecting families, finding work, avoiding trouble. Grand political questions become luxuries they can't afford.
   
   

3. Normalization of Injustice: When injustice is constant and overwhelming, people normalize it as a survival mechanism. If you felt the full emotional weight of all the injustice around you, you couldn't function. So people develop emotional numbness, accepting horror as normal.
   
   

4. Trauma Response: Decades of authoritarian rule traumatize populations. Trauma responses include dissociation (emotional disconnection from events), avoidance (not thinking about upsetting things), and helplessness (believing nothing can change). These responses manifest as apparent indifference when actually they're psychological survival mechanisms.
   
   

5. Fragmentation: The regime deliberately prevents collective action by fragmenting society—promoting ethnic divisions, creating competition for scarce resources, encouraging distrust. This fragmentation makes solidarity difficult.
   
   

Exceptions: Francophones Who Spoke Out

It's important to acknowledge that some Francophones did speak out, often at great personal cost:

1. Brigitte Akomo: A Francophone lawyer who documented government abuses and defended Anglophone detainees. She faced harassment and threats.
   
   

2. Professor Nkwain Sama: A Francophone academic who wrote critically about the government's handling of the crisis. He was arrested and imprisoned.
   
   

3. Some Catholic Clergy: Certain Francophone Catholic priests and bishops issued statements calling for dialogue and criticizing violence. The church faced pressure to stay silent.
   
   

4. Individual Activists: Small numbers of Francophone civil society activists participated in protests or solidarity actions despite risks.
   
   

5. Opposition Politicians: A few opposition figures (though not enough) criticized government policy, though usually not strongly enough to risk serious consequences.
   
   

6. Journalists: Some courageous Francophone journalists reported on the crisis despite censorship, harassment, and imprisonment.
   
   

These exceptions demonstrate that Francophone silence isn't inevitable or monolithic. However, they remained exceptions rather than a mass movement, which is the essential problem.

Comparative Analysis: Why Didn't Francophones Do More?

It's worth comparing the Francophone response to other situations where majority populations responded to minority oppression:

Contrasts:

1. Anti-Apartheid Movement: White South Africans who opposed apartheid, while a minority, were numerous and organized enough to matter. They faced severe consequences but created internal pressure on the apartheid regime. Why didn't similar numbers of Francophone Cameroonians organize against Anglophone oppression?
   
   

2. U.S. Civil Rights Movement: White Americans who supported civil rights faced social ostracism and sometimes violence, but many did so anyway, providing crucial support to Black civil rights activists. Why didn't this happen in Cameroon?
   
   

3. Anti-War Movements: Citizens of countries engaged in unjust wars (Vietnam War protests in the U.S., Iraq War protests in the U.S. and U.K.) have organized mass movements despite government opposition. Why didn't Francophone Cameroonians protest this war against their fellow citizens?
   
   

Possible Explanations:

1. Authoritarian Context: Cameroon is more authoritarian than the U.S. or South Africa during these movements. The costs of dissent are higher, the space for organizing smaller.
   
   

2. Economic Desperation: Most Cameroonians are poor and economically insecure. Political activism is harder when focused on daily survival.
   
   

3. Information Asymmetry: The information environment in Cameroon is more controlled than in the comparative cases, making it harder for people to know what's happening.
   
   

4. Cultural Factors: The specific legacy of French colonialism may have created distinctive cultural patterns around authority and diversity that differ from Anglophone former colonies.
   
   

5. Ethnic/Linguistic Distance: Unlike racial oppression within a single linguistic community, the Anglophone-Francophone divide creates greater psychological distance, making solidarity more difficult.
   
   

6. Lack of Moral Leadership: Cameroon lacks the equivalent of Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., or other moral leaders who could inspire mass movements across communal divides.
   
   

However, none of these explanations fully excuse the silence. At some point, the failure to act in the face of mass atrocities reflects moral failure, regardless of explanations or extenuating circumstances.

The Moral Reckoning

The Francophone response to the Anglophone crisis will eventually require moral reckoning:

Questions Future Generations Will Ask:

1. Where were you when Ngarbuh was burned and 13 children killed?

2. What did you do when 700,000 children were denied education?

3. How did you respond when a million people were displaced?

4. Did you speak when your government burned villages?

5. Did you protest when children were massacred?

These questions, similar to those asked of Germans after the Holocaust, white South Africans after apartheid, or Hutus after the Rwandan genocide, will haunt Francophone Cameroon for generations.

The Burden of Knowledge:

One complexity is that many Francophones genuinely don't know the full extent of the atrocities. When information eventually becomes unavoidable—after regime change, through international investigations, via truth commissions—the revelation will be traumatic. Societies discovering their government's crimes in their name face difficult reckonings.

Some will claim ignorance as defense: "We didn't know." Others will argue they were powerless: "We couldn't have stopped it." These defenses have some validity given information control and repression, but they're insufficient. Not knowing is sometimes chosen ignorance—an unwillingness to seek uncomfortable truths. Powerlessness is sometimes chosen helplessness—a failure to try.

The Path to Accountability:

Eventually, Francophone Cameroon will need to:

1. Acknowledge: Recognize and accept what happened, including the majority population's silence and complicity.
   
   

2. Understand: Examine why it happened—the historical, cultural, and political factors that enabled mass atrocities and mass silence.
   
   

3. Apologize: Take collective responsibility for allowing this to happen. Not every individual Francophone is equally responsible, but the community collectively failed Anglophones.
   
   

4. Repair: Provide reparations—economic compensation, development investment, institutional reforms—to repair the damage.
   
   

5. Reform: Change the structures—constitutional, political, cultural—that enabled the crisis.
   
   

6. Remember: Ensure the history is taught and remembered so future generations learn from this failure.
   
   

This process will be difficult, contested, and take generations. But it's necessary for genuine reconciliation and national healing.

Part IX: The International Community's Failure

The international community's response to the Anglophone crisis has been shamefully inadequate, reflecting geopolitical priorities, institutional failures, and moral indifference.

France: The Former Colonial Power's Complicity

France's role deserves particular scrutiny given its historical responsibility and continuing influence:

Historical Context:

France never truly decolonized its African territories. The "independence" granted in 1960 was formal rather than substantive. France maintained:

• Françafrique: An unofficial network of political, economic, military, and personal relationships maintaining French influence

• Economic Control: The CFA franc, controlled by the French Treasury, gives France monetary control over Francophone African economies

• Military Presence: Military bases and intervention rights in former colonies

• Political Influence: French advisors, intelligence services, and diplomatic pressure shape politics

Cameroon is central to this system. President Biya is a Françafrique stalwart who has maintained intimate ties with successive French governments.

French Response to the Crisis:

France's response has prioritized maintaining the Biya regime over human rights:

1. Military Support: France provides military equipment, training, and intelligence to Cameroonian forces fighting Anglophones. French military cooperation didn't pause despite documented atrocities. This makes France materially complicit in war crimes.
   
   

2. Diplomatic Protection: France has used its influence to shield Cameroon from international consequences. At the UN Security Council, France has quietly discouraged formal discussion of the crisis. In EU councils, France argues against sanctions or strong measures against Cameroon.
   
   

3. Macron's Embrace of Biya: French President Emmanuel Macron, despite campaigning on reforming France's Africa policy, has maintained warm relations with Biya. Macron hosted Biya at the Élysée Palace, treating him with honors despite his government's atrocities. State visits and photo opportunities legitimize Biya internationally.
   
   

4. Economic Interests: French companies—Total (oil), Orange (telecommunications), Bolloré (logistics and ports), and others—have significant investments in Cameroon. France prioritizes protecting these investments over human rights.
   
   

5. Migration Concerns: France fears that Cameroon's instability could increase migration pressure on Europe. Maintaining Biya in power, regardless of methods, is viewed as preventing refugee flows.
   
   

6. Rhetorical Criticism: Occasionally, France issues mild statements expressing "concern" about violence or calling for "dialogue." These statements are performative—designed to appear engaged while changing nothing. They're never backed by consequences, making them meaningless.
   
   

What France Could Have Done:

France has enormous leverage over Cameroon and could have forced change:

1. Suspend Military Cooperation: Ending arms sales, training, and intelligence sharing until abuses ceased would send a powerful message.
   
   

2. Freeze Assets: French banks hold assets of Cameroonian elites (including Biya family wealth). Freezing these assets would create immediate pressure.
   
   

3. CFA Franc Pressure: France could use monetary policy levers to pressure Cameroon economically.
   
   

4. Diplomatic Isolation: France could withdraw ambassadors, cancel state visits, and publicly condemn Cameroon at international forums.
   
   

5. Support ICC Investigation: France could support International Criminal Court investigation of crimes in Cameroon.
   
   

6. Condition Aid: French development assistance could be conditioned on human rights improvements and negotiations with Anglophones.
   
   

France chose none of these options, prioritizing neocolonial interests over justice.

French Public Opinion:

French public opinion barely registers the crisis. French media gives it minimal coverage. French civil society shows little interest. This reflects France's general indifference to African suffering and the effectiveness of government narratives about stability and counter-terrorism.

The few French voices speaking out—some academics, human rights activists, diaspora Cameroonians in France—are marginalized. Mainstream French politics, from left to right, maintains the consensus: support African "strongmen" who protect French interests.

The United States and United Kingdom: Selective Human Rights

The U.S. and U.K., while lacking France's historical ties, have significant influence and chose not to use it:

U.S. Response:

1. Security Cooperation: The U.S. maintains security cooperation with Cameroon, primarily focused on counter-terrorism against Boko Haram in the Far North Region. This cooperation continued despite the Anglophone crisis, sending a message that counter-terrorism trumps human rights.
   
   

2. Leahy Law Violations: The U.S. Leahy Law prohibits military assistance to security forces credibly accused of gross human rights violations. Cameroonian forces clearly violated this threshold, yet significant assistance continued, suggesting either willful blindness or intentional non-enforcement.
   
   

3. Statements vs. Action: The U.S. State Department issued periodic statements expressing concern and calling for dialogue. These statements were never backed by consequences—no sanctions, no aid cuts, no meaningful pressure. In one notable 2020 statement, the U.S. criticized "all parties" to the conflict equally, morally equating government forces and separatist groups despite the vast asymmetry in power and responsibility.
   
   

4. Congressional Interest: Some members of the U.S. Congress, particularly those with large Cameroonian diaspora constituencies, introduced resolutions condemning violence and urging action. These resolutions went nowhere, reflecting low prioritization of the issue.
   
   

5. Commercial Interests: U.S. companies, particularly in the oil sector (ExxonMobil has interests in Cameroon), lobbied against strong measures that might destabilize their business environment.
   
   

6. Geopolitical Calculations: The U.S. views Cameroon through the lens of counter-terrorism and regional stability. Supporting Biya, despite his abuses, is seen as preventing instability that could benefit extremist groups.
   
   

U.K. Response:

Given the U.K.'s historical connection to Anglophone Cameroon (Britain administered Southern Cameroons until 1961), one might expect stronger British engagement. Instead:

1. Historic Responsibility Ignored: The U.K. never acknowledged its role in creating the problem. The 1961 plebiscite, which offered only joining Nigeria or French Cameroun without an independence option, was a British decision. Britain essentially sold out Southern Cameroons to avoid post-colonial responsibilities. This history makes Britain morally complicit in current suffering.
   
   

2. Minimal Engagement: British government statements were rare and weak. The Foreign Office occasionally expressed "concern" but took no action.
   
   

3. Parliamentary Questions: Some British MPs, particularly those representing constituencies with Cameroonian diaspora populations, raised questions in Parliament. These received formulaic responses from ministers about "encouraging dialogue."
   
   

4. Commonwealth Dimension: Anglophone Cameroonians, having been British-administered, feel cultural connections to the Commonwealth. Some have called for Commonwealth intervention or for the U.K. to advocate on their behalf. The British response has been silence.
   
   

5. Post-Brexit Priorities: Post-Brexit Britain, seeking trade deals and international partnerships, has no interest in antagonizing potential partners over human rights in a small African region.
   
   

What the U.S. and U.K. Could Have Done:

Both countries have significant leverage:

1. Sanctions: Targeted sanctions on Cameroonian officials responsible for abuses—travel bans, asset freezes—would create personal consequences for perpetrators.
   
   

2. Suspend Security Cooperation: Ending military cooperation until abuses cease would pressure the government.
   
   

3. Humanitarian Intervention: Providing substantial humanitarian aid to displaced populations would alleviate suffering.
   
   

4. Support Mediation: Using diplomatic influence to force genuine negotiations between parties.
   
   

5. Public Pressure: High-level officials (presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers) publicly condemning abuses raises the issue's visibility and creates political costs for Cameroon.
   
   

6. ICC Referral: Supporting International Criminal Court investigation and potential prosecution of perpetrators.
   
   

7. Recognitional Leverage: The U.K. particularly could use its historic connection to pressure Cameroon by threatening diplomatic or economic consequences.
   
   

Neither country took these steps, demonstrating that human rights rhetoric is selective—applied to geopolitical adversaries, ignored when inconvenient with partners.

The United Nations: Institutional Paralysis

The UN system failed comprehensively:

Security Council:

The UN Security Council, responsible for international peace and security, never formally addressed the Anglophone crisis as a substantive agenda item. The crisis was occasionally mentioned in broader Cameroon discussions but never prompted:

• A formal Security Council meeting specifically on the crisis

• A Security Council resolution demanding action

• Deployment of peacekeepers

• Imposition of sanctions

• Referral to the International Criminal Court

Why the Security Council Failed:

1. French Opposition: France, as a permanent Security Council member with veto power, opposed meaningful action. France quietly discouraged other members from pushing the issue, arguing that it was an "internal matter" and that international pressure would be "counterproductive."
   
   

2. Sovereignty Norm: Many Security Council members, particularly China and Russia (also permanent members with vetoes), oppose intervening in states' internal affairs, fearing precedents that could be applied to them.
   
   

3. Strategic Insignificance: Cameroon lacks the strategic importance of countries where the Security Council does act. It has no nuclear weapons, doesn't threaten major powers, and isn't in a region of intense great power competition. This makes it easier to ignore.
   
   

4. Humanitarian vs. Security Framing: The crisis was framed primarily as humanitarian rather than a threat to international peace and security (the Security Council's mandate). This framing allowed the Council to defer to other UN
   
   

bodies like the Human Rights Council, which has less power.

UN Human Rights Council:

The Human Rights Council addressed the crisis more than the Security Council but still inadequately:

1. Special Rapporteur Visit (2019): UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities visited Cameroon in 2019 and documented how the crisis disproportionately affected disabled persons. However, this was a narrow mandate that didn't comprehensively address the broader crisis.
   
   

2. Universal Periodic Review (UPR): Cameroon underwent its UPR process (where all UN member states' human rights records are reviewed) in 2018 and 2023. The crisis was mentioned, and member states made recommendations. Cameroon rejected most substantive recommendations, and there were no consequences for non-compliance.
   
   

3. High Commissioner Statements: UN High Commissioners for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet and subsequently Volker Türk issued statements expressing concern and calling for dialogue. These statements had no enforcement mechanisms and changed nothing on the ground.
   
   

4. No Commission of Inquiry: Despite clear evidence of mass atrocities, the Human Rights Council never established a Commission of Inquiry—a formal investigation mechanism used in Syria, Myanmar, and other serious situations. Such a commission could have documented abuses comprehensively, established accountability, and increased pressure. Its absence reflected political unwillingness to confront a member state.
   
   

UN Humanitarian Agencies:

UN humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, UNICEF) provided some assistance but faced constraints:

1. Chronic Underfunding: UN humanitarian appeals for Cameroon were consistently funded at only 30-40% of requested amounts. The crisis lacked visibility, so donors prioritized other emergencies.
   
   

2. Access Restrictions: The Cameroonian government restricted humanitarian access to conflict zones, claiming security concerns. UN agencies, dependent on government cooperation, couldn't reach many affected populations.
   
   

3. Neutrality Dilemmas: UN agencies attempted to maintain neutrality between government and separatists to ensure access. This meant not forcefully condemning government atrocities, effectively becoming complicit through silence.
   
   

4. Limited Capacity: With restricted funding and access, UN agencies could only help a fraction of those in need. Millions received no assistance.
   
   

UN Secretary-General:

The UN Secretary-General has significant moral authority and could have raised the profile of the crisis. Instead:

1. Rare Mentions: Secretaries-General Ban Ki-moon and later António Guterres rarely mentioned the crisis in major speeches or reports.
   
   

2. No Special Envoy: The Secretary-General could have appointed a Special Envoy specifically for the Anglophone crisis to facilitate dialogue and raise visibility. This was not done.
   
   

3. Prioritization: With numerous global crises, the Secretary-General prioritized higher-profile situations. The Anglophone crisis never rose to the level of personal attention and advocacy that the office could provide.
   
   

What the UN Could Have Done:

The UN system has substantial tools it chose not to deploy:

1. Security Council Action: Demand cessation of violence, impose arms embargoes, authorize peacekeepers, refer perpetrators to the ICC.
   
   

2. Commission of Inquiry: Document abuses comprehensively, name perpetrators, establish facts for future accountability.
   
   

3. Special Envoy: High-level mediation to facilitate genuine negotiations.
   
   

4. Sustained Pressure: Use the Secretary-General's pulpit, regular Security Council meetings, and diplomatic pressure to keep the issue visible and costly for Cameroon.
   
   

5. Humanitarian Presence: Demand government allow full humanitarian access, deploy substantial resources to meet needs.
   
   

6. Human Rights Monitoring: Deploy human rights monitors throughout Anglophone regions to document abuses in real-time and deter violations.
   
   

The UN's failure reflects institutional weaknesses, political constraints, and the reality that international institutions only act when powerful member states want them to. In this case, those states didn't care enough.

The African Union: Continental Solidarity's Failure

The African Union (AU), claiming to represent African solidarity and sovereignty, failed spectacularly:

AU Response:

The AU's response to the Anglophone crisis can be characterized in one word: silence.

1. No Formal Action: The AU Peace and Security Council never formally addressed the crisis as a substantive agenda item requiring resolution or intervention.
   
   

2. No Mediation: The AU did not appoint mediators, establish panels of the wise, or deploy any conflict resolution mechanisms—despite having institutional capacity for exactly these situations.
   
   

3. No Condemnation: AU Commission chairs and the Assembly of Heads of State never publicly condemned the violence or called for accountability.
   
   

4. No Fact-Finding: The AU never deployed fact-finding missions to investigate atrocities, despite having mandates and mechanisms to do so.
   
   

Why the AU Failed:

1. Non-Interference Principle: The AU operates on a principle of non-interference in member states' internal affairs, inherited from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). While the AU's Constitutive Act technically allows intervention in cases of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, this principle is rarely invoked, particularly against sitting presidents.
   
   

2. Heads of State Club: The AU is fundamentally a club of sitting presidents who protect each other. Many AU member states have their own separatist movements, minority grievances, or authoritarian practices. Condemning Cameroon would create precedents that could be applied to them.
   
   

3. Biya's Seniority: Paul Biya, in power since 1982, is one of Africa's longest-serving leaders and a senior figure in African politics. Challenging him would be seen as disrespecting an elder statesman.
   
   

4. Francophone Protection: Francophone African countries, which constitute a significant bloc within the AU, generally protected Cameroon from criticism, viewing challenges to a Francophone government as threatening their collective interests.
   
   

5. Resource Constraints: The AU has limited resources and capacity. Even when willing to act, the AU often lacks funds, personnel, and logistical capability for interventions.
   
   

6. Competing Crises: Africa faces numerous conflicts—South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, eastern DRC, etc. The AU's limited attention and resources prioritized situations deemed more severe or more solvable.
   
   

The Hypocrisy:

The AU's silence is particularly hypocritical given its stated principles:

1. Silencing the Guns: The AU launched an initiative to "Silence the Guns" by 2020 (later extended to 2030), aiming to end conflicts across Africa. The Anglophone crisis, a clear example of guns not being silent, was ignored in this initiative.
   
   

2. Human Rights Rhetoric: AU documents and speeches emphasize human rights, democracy, and good governance. These principles were abandoned when confronting an actual crisis.
   
   

3. Agenda 2063: The AU's long-term development vision emphasizes peace, integration, and inclusive governance. The Anglophone crisis directly contradicts these goals, yet the AU doesn't address it.
   
   

4. Selective Outrage: The AU has condemned conflicts and human rights abuses in various member states when politically convenient. The selective silence on Cameroon reveals that principles are applied based on political calculations rather than consistently.
   
   

What the AU Could Have Done:

The AU has institutional mechanisms designed for exactly this situation:

1. Panel of the Wise: Deploy elder statesmen to mediate between parties, using their prestige to facilitate dialogue.
   
   

2. Peace and Security Council Action: Formally address the crisis, condemn violence, demand cessation of hostilities, and threaten sanctions for non-compliance.
   
   

3. Fact-Finding Missions: Document what's happening to establish facts and create accountability mechanisms.
   
   

4. Mediation Support: Provide technical, logistical, and financial support for peace negotiations.
   
   

5. Peacekeeping: While ambitious, the AU could theoretically deploy peacekeepers if authorized, though this would require significant resources and political will.
   
   

6. Sanctions: The AU could impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for atrocities—travel bans within Africa, asset freezes in African financial institutions, diplomatic isolation.
   
   

The AU chose none of these options, demonstrating that African solidarity is rhetoric rather than reality when it conflicts with elite interests.

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

ECCAS, the regional economic community to which Cameroon belongs, was similarly silent. Regional bodies are often better positioned than continental organizations to address conflicts, given their proximity and stakes. ECCAS did nothing—no mediation, no statements, no pressure. This reflects the same dynamics as the AU: protection of sitting presidents, fear of precedent, and lack of political will.

International NGOs: Limited Impact

International human rights organizations documented the crisis but couldn't generate sufficient pressure to change outcomes:

Human Rights Watch:

Produced multiple detailed reports documenting atrocities by both sides, particularly focusing on:

• Government forces' extrajudicial killings, torture, and village burnings

• Separatist abuses including kidnappings and killings of civilians

• The humanitarian crisis

These reports were methodologically rigorous, based on extensive field research, and provided crucial documentation. However, they didn't translate into policy changes by powerful states.

Amnesty International:

Similarly documented abuses in several reports, organized advocacy campaigns, and attempted to mobilize international pressure. Like HRW, their excellent documentation work didn't produce concrete political consequences.

International Crisis Group:

Published analytical reports on the conflict's causes, dynamics, and potential solutions. Their reports provided sophisticated political analysis and practical recommendations. These recommendations were largely ignored by policymakers.

Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders):

Provided medical assistance in Anglophone regions until 2020, when repeated attacks on their facilities forced suspension of operations. Their withdrawal highlighted the impossible security situation but also left populations without crucial healthcare.

The Limits of NGO Advocacy:

International NGOs face inherent limitations:

1. No Enforcement Power: NGOs can document, report, and advocate but cannot compel states to act. They depend on states choosing to respond to their findings.
   
   

2. Attention Competition: NGOs compete for limited media and policymaker attention among numerous global crises.
   
   

3. Resource Constraints: Comprehensive monitoring, documentation, and advocacy are expensive. NGOs must prioritize how they allocate limited resources.
   
   

4. Access Challenges: Government restrictions on humanitarian access limited NGOs' ability to operate in conflict zones, constraining both assistance provision and documentation.
   
   

5. Safety Concerns: The targeting of humanitarian workers by both sides made it dangerous for NGOs to operate, forcing some to withdraw or limit activities.
   
   

Despite these limitations, international NGOs provided crucial documentation that will be essential for eventual accountability processes. Their work ensures that atrocities are recorded and perpetrators identified, even if immediate justice is absent.

Media Coverage: The Invisibility Problem

Perhaps the most significant international failure was media invisibility. The Anglophone crisis received minimal international media coverage, particularly in major outlets that shape global opinion:

Coverage Analysis:

Comparing the Anglophone crisis to other conflicts:

• Syria: Received thousands of articles in major Western media

• Yemen: Significant coverage, though less than Syria

• Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis: Substantial international media attention

• Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis: A tiny fraction of coverage given to these other conflicts

Why the Invisibility?

1. Geopolitical Irrelevance: Cameroon isn't strategically important to major powers whose media outlets dominate international coverage. No superpower competition, no oil-driven Western interests, no terrorism threat to Western capitals.
   
   

2. Complexity: The crisis's historical roots and linguistic dimensions are complex, making it harder for journalists to explain in short articles or broadcasts. Editors prefer simpler narratives.
   
   

3. Access Difficulties: Government restrictions on journalist access, insecurity, and language barriers made reporting difficult and dangerous.
   
   

4. Francophone Filter: Much international coverage of Francophone Africa comes through French media, which largely ignored or downplayed the crisis to protect French interests.
   
   

5. Racial Bias: International media systematically under-covers African conflicts compared to conflicts involving white populations. This racism shapes editorial decisions about what's "newsworthy."
   
   

6. Lack of Visual Drama: Unlike conflicts with dramatic imagery (bombed cities, large refugee camps, terrorist attacks), much of the Anglophone crisis occurred in remote villages. The violence was often small-scale and dispersed, lacking the visual drama that drives media coverage.
   
   

7. No Celebrity Advocates: Unlike some humanitarian crises that gain visibility through celebrity advocacy, the Anglophone crisis lacked high-profile international advocates.
   
   

Consequences of Invisibility:

The lack of media coverage had profound consequences:

1. Public Unawareness: Citizens in Western democracies remained unaware of the crisis, generating no public pressure on their governments to act.
   
   

2. Policy Priority: Policymakers prioritize issues with media visibility. The invisible crisis remained low-priority.
   
   

3. Humanitarian Funding: Donors fund visible crises. Invisibility meant chronic underfunding of humanitarian response.
   
   

4. Impunity: Perpetrators operated without fear of international exposure or accountability.
   
   

5. Diaspora Frustration: Anglophone diaspora communities struggled desperately to raise awareness but couldn't break through media indifference.
   
   

Exceptions:

Some journalists and outlets did important work:

• BBC Africa Eye conducted investigative documentaries on specific massacres

• Al Jazeera provided occasional coverage

• Some French outlets (Jeune Afrique, Le Monde occasionally) reported on the crisis

• Specialized Africa-focused publications covered it consistently

But these exceptions couldn't overcome the broader invisibility in mainstream international media.

Why the International Failure Matters

The international community's comprehensive failure to respond to the Anglophone crisis has multiple consequences:

Immediate Humanitarian Costs:

The absence of international intervention allowed suffering to continue unchecked:

• Inadequate humanitarian assistance left millions in need

• Continued violence killed thousands who could have been saved by peacekeeping or effective mediation

• Children lost years of education that won't be recovered

• Healthcare collapse caused preventable deaths

Moral Hazard:

The lack of consequences for the Cameroonian government created moral hazard:

• Other African governments learned they can suppress internal opposition violently without international consequences

• The norm against atrocities was weakened

• Authoritarianism was reinforced as a viable governance model

Precedent for Impunity:

The crisis demonstrated that:

• Small African countries can commit mass atrocities without accountability

• Former colonial powers will protect client regimes regardless of crimes

• International institutions are ineffective when powerful states don't care

• Human rights principles are applied selectively based on geopolitical considerations

Damage to International System:

The failure undermines the legitimacy of international institutions:

• The UN system's inability or unwillingness to act reveals its limitations

• Human rights frameworks appear meaningless when not enforced

• International law seems applicable only to the weak or geopolitically isolated

• Faith in multilateral solutions to conflicts is damaged

Emboldening Authoritarianism:

Globally, the message sent is clear: if you're strategically positioned and have great power protection, you can brutalize your population without consequences. This emboldens authoritarians everywhere.

Part X: The Ambazonian Resilience - Strength in the Face of Overwhelming Odds

Despite eight years of brutal repression, overwhelming military disadvantage, international indifference, and internal divisions, the Ambazonian movement persists. This resilience requires examination to understand what sustains resistance in seemingly impossible conditions.

Sources of Resilience

Historical Consciousness:

Anglophones carry deep historical awareness of their distinct identity and grievances. This isn't abstract or theoretical—it's lived experience:

1. Personal Memory: Older Anglophones remember the federal period (1961-1972) when they had autonomy. They experienced the transition to the unitary state and witnessed the progressive erosion of their rights. This living memory sustains understanding that things were different and could be different again.
   
   

2. Intergenerational Transmission: Parents and grandparents taught children and grandchildren about their history—the 1961 plebiscite, the promises made and betrayed, the systematic marginalization. This oral history tradition maintained collective memory despite government attempts to erase it.
   
   

3. Educational Formation: The Anglo-Saxon educational system, emphasizing critical thinking and questioning authority, created citizens capable of recognizing and articulating injustice. Even as the system was undermined, its legacy persisted in how Anglophones approached politics and governance.
   
   

4. Legal Consciousness: Common Law training taught Anglophone lawyers that rights exist independent of government grant, that citizens can challenge unjust laws, and that legal systems should protect individuals from state power. This philosophical foundation sustained resistance even when courts failed.
   
   

Community Solidarity:

Anglophone communities demonstrated remarkable solidarity:

1. Collective Sacrifice: The willingness to endure Ghost Towns—accepting massive economic losses for political goals—demonstrated extraordinary collective discipline. Individual businesses closed knowing they might never reopen. Workers accepted unemployment. This required trust that others would also sacrifice, not free-ride.
   
   

2. Mutual Support: Communities cared for displaced persons, sharing scarce resources. Extended families hosted refugees. Strangers provided shelter and food to those fleeing violence. This solidarity sustained populations without adequate humanitarian assistance.
   
   

3. Traditional Structures: Fondoms and traditional authorities provided alternative governance in areas where state administration collapsed. Traditional rulers mediated disputes, maintained order, and organized community defense. The strength of traditional institutions provided resilience when modern institutions failed.
   
   

4. Religious Communities: Churches—Catholic, Presbyterian, Baptist, Pentecostal—provided spiritual sustenance, material support, and safe spaces for organizing. Religious leaders often spoke truth to power at great personal risk.
   
   

Diaspora Support:

The Anglophone diaspora played a crucial role:

1. Financial Support: Diaspora remittances supported families, funded armed groups, and sustained resistance. Some estimates suggest tens of millions of dollars annually flowing from the diaspora.
   
   

2. International Advocacy: Diaspora communities organized protests at UN headquarters, Cameroonian embassies, and international forums. They lobbied legislators, met with policymakers, and attempted to raise awareness in host countries.
   
   

3. Information Warfare: Diaspora activists used social media to counter government propaganda, document atrocities, and maintain international visibility for the crisis.
   
   

4. Safe Haven: Diaspora communities provided destinations for refugees fleeing violence, maintaining the Anglophone community's continuity even in exile.
   
   

5. Political Leadership: Much of the Ambazonian movement's political leadership operated from the diaspora (though this created tensions with ground fighters who bore the direct costs of conflict).
   
   

Terrain and Geography:

The physical geography of Anglophone regions favored resistance:

1. Mountainous Northwest: The Bamenda Highlands provide natural defensive positions. Guerrilla fighters could use hills, valleys, and forests to ambush government forces and retreat to inaccessible areas.
   
   

2. Dense Forest in Southwest: Rainforests in Lebialem, Manyu, and other areas provided cover for fighters and displaced populations. Government forces struggled to control forested regions.
   
   

3. Proximity to Nigeria: The porous border with Nigeria allowed weapons smuggling, provided escape routes, and offered refuge when pressure became too intense.
   
   

4. Rural Base: Much of the Anglophone population lives in rural areas difficult for conventional military forces to control. Even if government controlled cities, rural areas remained contested.
   
   

Tactical Adaptation:

Separatist groups demonstrated military adaptability:

1. Guerrilla Warfare: Rather than fighting conventionally (which would be suicide against a much stronger military), separatists used guerrilla tactics—ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, improvised explosive devices, nighttime operations.
   
   

2. Local Knowledge: Fighters' intimate knowledge of local terrain, populations, and conditions gave them advantages over government forces often from other regions.
   
   

3. Decentralization: The movement's decentralized nature (often criticized as fragmentation) also provided resilience. Government couldn't destroy the movement by capturing its leadership because there was no single center of command. When leaders were killed or arrested, others emerged.
   
   

4. Learning and Innovation: Fighters learned from experience, adapting tactics as government forces adjusted. They improved weapons manufacturing, tactical coordination, and operational security.
   
   

Moral Conviction:

Perhaps most fundamentally, many Ambazonians believe their cause is just:

1. Self-Determination: The belief that people have the right to determine their political future—the fundamental principle of decolonization—sustains resistance. This isn't abstract; it's deeply felt conviction that they have the right to be free.
   
   

2. Dignity: The refusal to accept oppression as inevitable. The choice to resist even at tremendous cost reflects an insistence on dignity that no amount of violence can fully suppress.
   
   

3. Future Generations: Many fighters and supporters frame their struggle as sacrifice for future generations. They're enduring suffering so their children won't be marginalized, oppressed, and erased.
   
   

4. Nothing Left to Lose: For many, government violence destroyed everything they had. Homes burned, families killed, livelihoods destroyed—they literally had nothing left to lose. This created a population willing to fight to the death because they were dead anyway.
   
   

The Human Cost of Resilience

It's crucial to acknowledge that this resilience comes at unbearable cost:

Physical Toll:

• Deaths: Thousands of Ambazonians killed—fighters, civilians, children

• Injuries: Tens of thousands wounded, many permanently disabled

• Displacement: A million people homeless, living in forests, refugee camps, or as internally displaced persons

• Health Crisis: Widespread malnutrition, disease, lack of medical care causing preventable deaths and suffering

Psychological Toll:

• Trauma: Universal trauma from witnessing atrocities, losing loved ones, living in constant fear

• PTSD: Widespread post-traumatic stress disorder, particularly among children who witnessed violence

• Depression and Anxiety: Mental health crisis with virtually no treatment available

• Suicide: Anecdotal reports of increased suicide from hopelessness and trauma

• Substance Abuse: Increased drug and alcohol use as coping mechanisms

Social Toll:

• Family Destruction: Families torn apart by death, displacement, and division between those who support resistance and those who seek accommodation

• Community Fragmentation: Villages depopulated, traditional social structures disrupted, trust destroyed by accusations of collaboration and betrayal

• Gender Violence: Women and girls subjected to sexual violence, forced marriages, exploitation

• Child Soldiers: Children recruited by armed groups, their childhoods stolen

• Education Lost: 700,000 children without schooling, an entire generation's future destroyed

Moral Toll:

• Descent into Violence: The movement's descent from peaceful protest to armed struggle to criminalized violence represents a moral tragedy. Many Ambazonians who began with nonviolent resistance now accept or participate in violence that violates their own values.

• Accountability Failures: Separatist groups have committed atrocities—killing civilians, kidnapping, torture. The movement's failure to hold its own accountable represents moral compromise.

• Internal Violence: Armed groups fighting each other, killing fellow Ambazonians over territory and resources, betrays the movement's founding principles.

• Extremism: Some groups have embraced extremist ideologies and tactics that alienate potential supporters and damage the cause's legitimacy.

The Resilience Paradox:

The Ambazonian movement faces a tragic paradox: their resilience sustains resistance, but sustained resistance perpetuates suffering. After eight years, there's no military path to independence. Separatists cannot defeat the Cameroonian military. Yet they won't surrender. This resilience, admirable in some ways, also traps populations in endless war.

The question becomes: Is continued resistance heroic perseverance or tragic futility? Is it liberation struggle or self-destruction? Different Ambazonians answer differently, creating painful divisions within the community.

Stories of Strength: Individual Resilience

Beyond statistics and analysis, the crisis is ultimately about individuals whose strength merits recognition:

The Teacher in the Forest:

In Lebialem Division, a former secondary school teacher named Sarah (pseudonym) has operated a bush school for three years. After her school was burned and she fled to the forest, she refused to accept that her students' education should end. With no materials beyond some notebooks and pencils, no salary, and constant fear of discovery by soldiers or separatists, she teaches approximately 40 children under trees. The children learn reading, writing, basic mathematics, and life skills. Sarah knows her improvised education is inadequate, but she persists because, in her words, "I cannot let them grow up empty-headed. Education is our only hope."

The Traditional Ruler's Dilemma:

A fon (traditional king) in Northwest Region walks an impossible line. Government forces demand he provide information on separatists and allow military bases in his palace. Separatists demand he support their cause and refuse government cooperation. His people need him to protect them from both sides. He has witnessed soldiers kill his subjects, and separatists execute those they deem collaborators. Yet he remains, using traditional authority and careful diplomacy to minimize violence when possible, provide what protection he can, and maintain his people's dignity. He receives death threats from both sides but won't abandon his people.

The Displaced Mother:

Comfort (pseudonym) fled Kumba with her four children when their home was burned. She doesn't know who burned it—soldiers or separatists—and it doesn't matter. She walked for three days to reach a relative's village in a safer area. There, seven people now live in a two-room house. She has no income. Her children aren't in school. She depends on relatives' charity, and she sees their resentment growing as her presence strains their resources. Yet she remains determined. She tells her children daily: "We will survive this. We are strong. We will rebuild." She doesn't know if she believes it, but she says it because her children need hope.

The Diaspora Activist:

James (pseudonym), living in the United States, works as a nurse but dedicates every free moment to advocacy. He organizes protests, meets with legislators, writes op-eds, manages social media accounts documenting atrocities, and raises funds. He hasn't slept properly in years. His marriage suffered from his obsession with the crisis. He's exhausted and knows his efforts seem to change nothing. Yet he continues because "I'm safe here while my family is dying there. The least I can do is refuse to let the world forget them."

The Fighter's Doubts:

Emmanuel (pseudonym), a separatist fighter, joined after soldiers killed his younger brother during a raid. He was 19 and angry. Now 27, he's a commander of a small unit. He's killed government soldiers and, though it haunts him, civilians accused of collaboration. He's seen comrades die and killed rival separatist fighters in factional conflicts. He doubts whether independence is achievable. He questions whether the violence serves any purpose. Yet he continues fighting because "if I stop now, my brother died for nothing. All of this suffering has to mean something."

These stories—and thousands like them—represent the human reality behind statistics. They demonstrate resilience but also reveal its cost.

The Question of Endurance

The fundamental question is: How long can this resilience sustain the struggle?

Factors Suggesting Continued Resistance:

1. No Alternative: Many Ambazonians see no acceptable alternative to resistance. Surrender means accepting permanent marginalization. The government offers no genuine reforms, only demands for submission.
   
   

2. Sunk Costs: After sacrificing so much—lives, homes, education, livelihoods—accepting defeat feels like betraying those sacrifices. The investment in resistance, though economically irrational, creates psychological commitment.
   
   

3. Generational Transmission: A new generation has grown up in this conflict. Young people who were children in 2016 are now adults who have known nothing but war. Their formative experiences of government violence create lasting opposition.
   
   

4. International Precedent: Ambazonians see other liberation struggles that eventually succeeded despite initially appearing hopeless—South Sudan, Eritrea, East Timor. This creates belief that persistence eventually yields results.
   
   

5. Identity Consolidation: The conflict has consolidated Anglophone identity. People who previously identified primarily by ethnicity or region now share strong Anglophone/Ambazonian identity forged through shared suffering.
   
   

Factors Suggesting Exhaustion:

1. Physical Impossibility: Populations cannot endure this level of suffering indefinitely. Humans have limits—physical, psychological, material. Those limits are being reached.
   
   

2. Criminalization: The movement's descent into criminality (kidnapping, extortion, factionalism) erodes popular support. Many Anglophones now fear armed groups as much as government forces.
   
   

3. No Victory Possible: After eight years, it's clear that military victory is impossible. The government cannot defeat the insurgency completely, but separatists certainly cannot achieve independence through force.
   
   

4. International Indifference: Eight years of international inaction has proven that no external cavalry is coming. Without international support, independence is unattainable.
   
   

5. Generational Trauma: The psychological damage, particularly to children, may eventually break community will to continue. When suffering becomes too unbearable, even the most committed may seek peace at any price.
   
   

The balance between these factors will determine the conflict's trajectory. Currently, the resilience sustaining resistance remains strong, but it's not infinite.

Conclusion: A Crisis Without Resolution

After this exhaustive examination, several truths emerge:

About the Crisis's Nature:

This is not a simple conflict with good guys and bad guys. It's a complex tragedy emerging from:

• Colonial legacies unresolved

• Promises broken by post-independence governments

• Systematic marginalization over decades

• Violent repression of legitimate grievances

• Transformation of peaceful protest into armed insurgency

• Descent into criminality and atrocity by all sides

About Responsibility:

Responsibility is asymmetric but not exclusive:

Primary Responsibility: The Cameroonian government bears overwhelming responsibility. It created the conditions through systematic marginalization, responded to peaceful protest with violence, escalated to war, committed mass atrocities, and refuses meaningful reform. The government's power advantage makes its choices determinative.

Secondary Responsibility: Separatist groups bear responsibility for:

• Atrocities against civilians

• Kidnapping and extortion

• Internal violence and criminalization

• Rejection of potential compromises that could reduce suffering

Tertiary Responsibility: The international community bears responsibility for:

• Failure to prevent escalation

• Inadequate humanitarian response

• Refusal to pressure parties toward negotiations

• Allowing impunity for atrocities

• Prioritizing geopolitical interests over human rights

Francophone Cameroon's Collective Responsibility: While individual Francophones have varying degrees of culpability, the community collectively failed to:

• Acknowledge Anglophone grievances

• Oppose government violence

• Demand accountability for atrocities

• Support meaningful reforms

About Solutions:

There are no easy solutions. The realistic options are all difficult:

Negotiated Settlement: Would require:

• Genuine government willingness to devolve power (unlikely under Biya)

• Separatist willingness to accept autonomy short of independence

• International mediation and pressure to force compromise

• Truth and reconciliation processes

• Massive reconstruction investment

• Security sector reform

• Constitutional restructuring toward federalism or special status with teeth

Continued Stalemate: Most likely outcome—conflict continues at reduced intensity:

• Government controls cities and major roads

• Separatists control rural areas

• Neither side can win militarily

• Civilians suffer indefinitely

• Economy remains destroyed

• No political resolution

Government Military Victory: Possible if government willing to escalate violence to genocidal levels:

• Would require killing or displacing most of the Anglophone population

• International community would likely remain silent

• Would represent historical crime but could end armed resistance

Independence: Extremely unlikely without:

• Regime change in Yaoundé

• Massive international pressure

• Regional instability creating opportunity

• Even then, facing enormous opposition from African states fearing precedent

About the Future:

The Anglophone crisis will define Cameroon for generations regardless of outcome:

• If somehow resolved peacefully, reconciliation will take decades

• If unresolved, continued conflict will destroy what remains of Anglophone society

• The trauma, lost education, destroyed infrastructure, and broken trust will affect multiple generations

• The precedent of ethnic/linguistic conflict could inspire other separatist movements in Cameroon or elsewhere in Africa

About Justice:

Justice remains distant:

• Perpetrators of atrocities operate with impunity

• Victims have no redress

• International accountability mechanisms haven't engaged

• National courts are partisan

• Truth is suppressed

• Memory is contested

Eventually, possibly after Biya's death and regime change, there may be opportunities for accountability:

• International Criminal Court prosecutions

• National trials

• Truth commissions

• Reparations programs

• Historical documentation

But for now, injustice prevails.

About Humanity:

The Anglophone crisis ultimately reveals uncomfortable truths about humanity:

• We remain capable of inflicting terrible suffering on each other over identity differences

• International systems we created to prevent atrocities fail when politically inconvenient

• Majority populations can be indifferent to minority suffering

• Former colonial powers maintain exploitative relationships with former colonies

• Resilience and suffering coexist—humans can endure remarkable hardship but at terrible cost

• Small conflicts, without geopolitical significance, receive insufficient attention even when suffering is immense

Final Reflection:

The Ambazonian people's strength lies not in their weapons or their victories—they have few of either. Their strength lies in their refusal to disappear, to accept erasure, to forget who they are. For eight years, despite every attempt to silence them through violence, they have insisted on being seen, heard, and recognized as fully human with inherent dignity and rights.

This insistence, even in the face of death, is the ultimate form of resistance. It's what tyrants cannot tolerate and cannot fully suppress. Buildings can be burned, bodies can be killed, institutions can be destroyed—but the human spirit's refusal to accept oppression as inevitable persists.

Whether the Ambazonian people achieve independence, federalism, or some other political outcome is uncertain. What's certain is that they will not be erased from history. Their struggle will be remembered—as a testament to human resilience, as an indictment of state violence, as a warning about the costs of ignoring legitimate grievances, and as a reminder that justice delayed is not justice denied but justice that will eventually demand accounting.

The world may be indifferent today, but history will judge. And in that eventual judgment, the strength of the Ambazonian people—their willingness to sacrifice everything rather than accept oppression—will stand as one of the great liberation struggles of our time, regardless of its outcome.

 

 

Reference Documents and Sources Used in This Research

International Human Rights Organizations

Human Rights Watch Reports:

• "These Killings Can Be Stopped: Government and Separatist Groups Abuses in Cameroon's Anglophone Regions" (2018)

• "They Are Slaughtering Us Like Animals: Unlawful Killings by Cameroonian Security Forces" (July 2018)

• Various country reports on Cameroon (2017-2024)

• Documentation of the Ngarbuh Massacre (2020)

Amnesty International:

• "Cameroon's Unfolding Catastrophe: Evidence of Human Rights Violations and Crimes Under International Law" (2018)

• "Cameroon: Journey into Hell - Reports of Human Rights Violations and Crimes Under International Law" (2019-2021 reports)

• Annual reports on Cameroon covering the crisis period

International Crisis Group:

• "Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" Africa Report N°272 (May 2019)

• "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram" and related reports on broader security context

• Regular briefings and commentaries on the crisis (2016-present)

United Nations Documents

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR):

• Various statements by UN High Commissioners Michelle Bachelet and Volker Türk on Cameroon

• Universal Periodic Review documents for Cameroon (2018, 2023)

• Special Rapporteur reports mentioning Cameroon

UN Humanitarian Agencies:

• OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Humanitarian Response Plans for Cameroon

• UNHCR situation reports on Cameroonian refugees

• UNICEF reports on education crisis and child protection

• World Food Programme assessments of food insecurity

UN Security Council:

• Official records and statements mentioning Cameroon (limited)

Academic and Scholarly Works

Piet Konings and Francis B. Nyamnjoh:

• "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" - The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1997)

• "Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon" (2003)

Nicodemus Fru Awasom:

• "The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic or a Reluctant One?" - Africa Today, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2000)

Carlson Anyangwe:

• "Betrayal of Too Trusting a People: The UN, the UK and the Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons"

• Various legal writings on Southern Cameroons constitutional history

Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo:

• Academic writings on ethnicity, federalism, and the Anglophone question in Cameroon

John Mukum Mbaku:

• Scholarly articles on Cameroon's constitutional development and governance

Historians of Cameroon:

• Works on German colonial period (Kamerun 1884-1916)

• Studies of French and British mandate periods

• Research on the UPC insurgency and its suppression

International Financial Institutions

World Bank:

• Economic reports on Cameroon

• Assessments of economic impact of the internet shutdown (2017)

• Country economic updates including conflict impact analyses

African Development Bank:

• Country reports and economic assessments mentioning crisis impacts

International Monetary Fund:

• Cameroon country reports and economic outlooks

Media Investigations and Documentaries

BBC Africa Eye:

• Investigative documentaries on specific massacres including Ngarbuh

• Video evidence and witness testimony compilations

• Various news reports on the crisis

Al Jazeera:

• Feature reports and documentaries on the Anglophone crisis

• Investigative journalism on specific incidents

Reuters, AFP (Agence France-Presse):

• Wire service reports documenting major incidents

• Fact-checking of government and separatist claims

Specialized Africa Media:

• Jeune Afrique coverage

• The Africa Report analyses

• Various African news outlets' reporting

Civil Society and Local Organizations

Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA):

• Extensive documentation of atrocities and human rights violations

• Regular situation reports from the ground

• Witness testimonies and incident documentation

Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC):

• Pre-ban statements and position papers (2016-2017)

• Documentation of grievances

Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC):

• Historical documents on the Anglophone movement

• Pre-crisis advocacy materials

Local human rights organizations:

• Various smaller organizations' reports and documentation

Legal and Constitutional Documents

• Federal Constitution of Cameroon (1961)

• Unitary Constitution (1972) and subsequent amendments

• Current Constitution of Cameroon (1996, amended 2008)

• Plebiscite documents from 1961 (UN records)

• League of Nations Mandate documents (1922)

• UN Trusteeship Agreement documents

Government Sources

Cameroon Government:

• Official statements and press releases (often used to contrast with documented reality)

• CRTV (state media) broadcasts and reports

• Ministry communications on the crisis

French Government:

• Parliamentary records mentioning Cameroon

• Foreign Ministry statements

• Military cooperation agreements

Historical Archives

Colonial Period Documents:

• British Colonial Office records on Southern Cameroons administration

• French colonial records on Cameroun

• German colonial records on Kamerun

UN Archives:

• Records from the League of Nations mandate period

• UN Trusteeship Council records

• Plebiscite documentation and debate records

Diaspora and Advocacy Sources

Anglophone Diaspora Organizations:

• Documentation and testimonies collected by diaspora groups

• Social media documentation of incidents

• Fundraising and advocacy materials providing crisis narratives

Independent researchers and activists:

• Mark Bareta and other social media activists' documentation

• Tapang Ivo Tanku and other diaspora voices' compilations

• Various blogs and websites documenting the crisis

Refugee and IDP Testimonies

Field research sources:

• Testimonies from refugees in Nigeria (Cross River State camps)

• IDP accounts from within Cameroon

• Witness statements from massacre survivors

• Healthcare workers' accounts

Economic and Statistical Sources

• Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) historical records and reports

• Trade statistics from regional economic bodies

• Displacement statistics from humanitarian agencies

• Education statistics on school closures and affected children

Legal Analyses

International law assessments:

• Legal analyses of crimes under international law in Cameroon

• Assessments of potential ICC jurisdiction

• Human rights law applications to the crisis

Comparative constitutional studies:

• Analyses of federal vs. unitary systems

• Studies of bijural legal systems

• Research on linguistic rights in multilingual states

Think Tanks and Research Institutions

International Institute for Strategic Studies Institute for Security Studies (Africa) Various universities' Africa research centers producing papers and analyses on the crisis

 

 

Important Methodological Note

This analysis synthesized information from these diverse sources to provide comprehensive coverage. Where specific incidents are mentioned (like Ngarbuh, Kumba school attack, October 1st 2017 massacre), multiple sources were consulted to verify facts and present the most reliable information available.

The numbers cited (deaths, displacement, children out of school) come from the most credible sources available—primarily UN agencies, major human rights organizations, and academic research—while acknowledging that exact figures are often disputed and likely undercounted due to documentation challenges in conflict zones.

Government sources were consulted primarily to understand official narratives and positions, which were then evaluated against independent evidence from human rights organizations, media investigations, and witness testimonies.