Introduction: The Paradox of Power and Terror

Nigeria stands at a troubling crossroads in the 21st century. As Africa's most populous nation and largest economy, it projects an image of democratic resilience and regional leadership. Yet beneath this facade lies a disturbing pattern of state-sanctioned violence, selective justice, and systematic brutality that challenges the very definition of legitimate governance. This examination explores how Nigeria's government has allegedly employed terror tactics against its own citizens while simultaneously claiming to combat terrorism—a contradiction that undermines regional stability and global counterterrorism efforts.

The term "terror state" traditionally describes governments that use systematic violence, intimidation, and repression to maintain control over their populations.[1] This analysis investigates whether Nigeria's actions—from military operations against civilian communities to the treatment of activists and the administration of justice—constitute state terror rather than legitimate security operations.

Chapter 1: The Militarization of Civil Dissent

The Weaponization of Security Forces Against Communities

Nigeria's military and security apparatus, ostensibly designed to protect citizens, has increasingly been deployed against communities asserting their constitutional rights. This pattern represents a fundamental perversion of the security forces' mandate.

The Southeast and the IPOB Crisis

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement, advocating for self-determination in Nigeria's Southeast, has faced brutal military responses. Operation Python Dance I and II, conducted in 2016 and 2017, saw soldiers deployed to civilian areas with devastating consequences.[2] Amnesty International documented extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and the invasion of private homes—actions that blur the line between counterinsurgency and state terror.[3]

The September 2017 military invasion of Nnamdi Kanu's residence in Afaraukwu, Abia State, resulted in at least 150 deaths according to Amnesty International, though the military disputed this figure.[4] Human Rights Watch documented the use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, yet no comprehensive investigation or accountability followed.[5] This impunity sends a chilling message: dissent will be met with lethal force.

The Middle Belt Massacres

In Nigeria's Middle Belt—particularly Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, and Taraba states—pastoral conflicts have escalated into what some analysts describe as ethnic cleansing.[6] Armed herders have attacked farming communities with sophisticated weapons, killing thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands more since 2015.

According to the International Crisis Group, farmer-herder violence killed approximately 3,641 people between 2016 and 2018, making it deadlier than the Boko Haram insurgency during the same period.[7] The military's response has been conspicuously inadequate and, in some cases, reportedly complicit. Communities have alleged that security forces arrive after attacks rather than preventing them, despite advance warnings.[8]

The 2018 massacres in Benue State exemplify this pattern. On New Year's Day 2018, attacks in Logo and Guma Local Government Areas killed at least 73 people.[9] Despite Governor Samuel Ortom's repeated warnings about impending attacks, security forces failed to prevent the violence. The asymmetry between the state's aggressive response to political activists and its lethargy in protecting vulnerable communities raises profound questions about whose security the state actually prioritizes.

The Execution of Activists: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine

No discussion of state terror in Nigeria is complete without examining the November 10, 1995 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists.[10] This judicial murder—condemned globally—demonstrated the Nigerian state's willingness to eliminate peaceful environmental and rights activists who challenged powerful economic interests.

Saro-Wiwa's Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) campaigned against environmental degradation in the Niger Delta caused by oil extraction, particularly by Shell Petroleum Development Company.[11] His reward was a trial before a special military tribunal established by General Sani Abacha's regime, conviction on fabricated murder charges despite evidence of witness bribery, and execution by hanging despite international pleas for clemency.[12]

The tribunal's proceedings violated basic standards of due process. As Human Rights Watch documented, the tribunal was hand-picked by the military government, denied the defendants adequate time to prepare their defense, and relied on testimony from witnesses who later admitted they were bribed.[13] International observers, including the Body Shop International and Greenpeace, condemned the trial as a sham.[14]

The Ogoni Nine's execution was not an isolated incident but part of a broader pattern of state violence against the Ogoni people. Between 1993 and 1995, Nigerian security forces killed an estimated 2,000 Ogonis and destroyed numerous villages in Ogoniland.[15] It established a precedent: activism that threatens elite interests may be met with state violence cloaked in legal procedures.

Decades later, environmental activists in the Niger Delta continue to face intimidation, arrest, and violence—a testament to the enduring nature of this repressive strategy.[16] The Nigerian government and Shell reached a $15.5 million settlement with Saro-Wiwa's family in 2009, but no Nigerian official has ever been prosecuted for the executions.[17]

Contemporary Repression: #EndSARS and the Lekki Massacre

The October 2020 #EndSARS protests against police brutality revealed the Nigerian state's contemporary approach to dissent. What began as peaceful demonstrations against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)—a police unit notorious for extortion, torture, and extrajudicial killings—evolved into a broader movement demanding good governance.[18]

Amnesty International had documented SARS's systematic use of torture, ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions since at least 2016.[19] Despite multiple announcements of SARS's dissolution since 2017, the unit continued operating until the 2020 protests forced genuine action.[20]

The government's response culminated in the Lekki Toll Gate shooting on October 20, 2020. Eyewitnesses and video evidence documented soldiers opening fire on peaceful protesters waving Nigerian flags and singing the national anthem.[21] Amnesty International confirmed that Nigerian Army soldiers and police shot at protesters, killing at least 12 people at Lekki and Alausa.[22] A CNN investigation corroborated these findings, identifying the military vehicles used and establishing a timeline of events that contradicted government denials.[23]

The Lagos State Judicial Panel of Inquiry confirmed the massacre occurred but was criticized for understating casualties.[24] The Nigerian Army initially denied its involvement entirely, then claimed soldiers fired blank ammunition—assertions contradicted by forensic evidence, recovered bullets, and eyewitness testimony.[25]

The aftermath proved equally chilling. The Central Bank of Nigeria obtained court orders freezing the bank accounts of prominent #EndSARS protesters and supporters, including feminist collective leaders and cryptocurrency accounts used for donations.[26] The Nigerian Immigration Service placed some activists on a watch list, restricting their travel.[27] Some faced prosecution on terrorism charges under the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (as amended in 2013).[28]

The judicial panels established to investigate police brutality across Nigerian states have largely failed to deliver justice. While some panels made recommendations for compensation and prosecution, implementation has been minimal.[29] The message was clear: even peaceful, constitutionally protected protest will be met with lethal force and legal persecution.

Chapter 2: The Terrorist Accommodation Paradox

Boko Haram: A "Christian Genocide" or Government Failure?

Boko Haram's insurgency in Northeast Nigeria has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions since 2009. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that violence attributed to Boko Haram and its splinter groups has resulted in over 350,000 deaths since 2011.[30] Western analysts and Nigerian Christian leaders have characterized the violence as genocide against Christians, citing the systematic targeting of churches, Christian villages, and the abduction of Christian schoolgirls.[31]

In 2020, the International Committee on Nigeria (ICON) submitted evidence to the UK Parliament arguing that Boko Haram's violence constituted genocide against Christians under the 1948 Genocide Convention.[32] The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has repeatedly recommended designating Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern" due to systematic religious freedom violations.[33]

The Nigerian government's response has been marked by strategic failures, corruption, and disturbing patterns that suggest either incompetence or complicity. Despite significant military expenditure—Nigeria's defense budget exceeded $2 billion annually during peak conflict years—the insurgency has persisted and even expanded.[34] A 2021 report by SBM Intelligence noted that Boko Haram controlled more territory than at any point since 2015, despite government claims of victory.[35]

The Chibok Girls: Symbolic Failure

The April 14-15, 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from the Government Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State, became an international symbol of government failure.[36] Initial denial by military officials, who claimed no abduction occurred, followed by weeks of inaction, allowed Boko Haram to consolidate control over the captives.[37]

It took the Nigerian military three weeks to acknowledge the abduction, and even then, they understated the number of girls taken.[38] The #BringBackOurGirls campaign, launched by Nigerian activists, brought global attention to the government's inadequate response.[39]

While some girls have been recovered through negotiations (approximately 107 released through Swiss-mediated talks), escaped (approximately 57), or were found by security forces, over 100 remained missing as of 2024.[40] Disturbingly, these negotiations revealed that the government was willing to pay ransoms and release convicted Boko Haram commanders—a policy it officially denies.[41]

In 2017, the Nigerian government reportedly released five Boko Haram commanders in exchange for 82 Chibok girls, contradicting its stated policy of not negotiating with terrorists.[42] This approach incentivized further kidnappings while criminalizing civilian communities that attempted to defend themselves or negotiate their own releases.

The Dapchi Girls Abduction

The February 19, 2018 abduction of 110 schoolgirls from the Government Girls' Science and Technical College in Dapchi, Yobe State, followed a similar pattern.[43] Most girls were returned within weeks—except for Leah Sharibu, a 15-year-old Christian who reportedly refused to convert to Islam and remains in captivity.[44]

The swift return of the Dapchi girls raised suspicions. Some analysts suggested the abduction and release were orchestrated to demonstrate government effectiveness ahead of the 2019 elections.[45] The ease with which Boko Haram entered and exited a town with military presence, and the negotiated return without apparent concessions, fueled these speculations.

The Amnesty Paradox

Perhaps most troubling is the government's Operation Safe Corridor program, launched in 2016 to de-radicalize and reintegrate "repentant" Boko Haram fighters.[46] By 2020, the program had processed over 1,600 former insurgents, many of whom were subsequently integrated into the Nigerian military and security services.[47]

In 2021, it was revealed that approximately 1,400 "rehabilitated" Boko Haram members had been absorbed into the Nigerian Army.[48] The Chief of Army Staff confirmed this integration, defending it as necessary for reconciliation and intelligence gathering.[49]

This policy raises profound moral and security questions:

1. Justice Denied: Victims of Boko Haram violence watch their attackers receive government benefits, military training, and salaries while they struggle in displacement camps without adequate support. As of 2023, approximately 2.4 million people remained displaced in Northeast Nigeria.[50]

2. Security Risks: Integrating ideologically motivated terrorists into the military creates obvious infiltration risks. Reports have emerged of insider attacks and intelligence leaks attributed to these integrated fighters.[51]

3. Incentive Structures: The amnesty program rewards terrorism while the state violently suppresses peaceful activism. A young Nigerian seeking change observes that joining an insurgency offers better prospects than peaceful protest.

4. Ethnic and Religious Dimensions: The contrast between brutal military operations against southeastern activists (predominantly Christian Igbos) and amnesty for northeastern insurgents (predominantly Muslim Fulanis and Kanuris) has fueled dangerous ethnic and religious tensions.[52]

Banditry: State Failure or State Strategy?

The Northwest's "banditry" crisis—a term that euphemistically describes organized armed groups engaged in kidnapping, village raids, and mass killings—has rendered vast areas ungovernable. Between 2011 and 2020, banditry killed at least 8,000 people in Northwest Nigeria according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).[53]

Since 2019, bandits have abducted thousands, including entire school populations, demanding and receiving millions in ransom payments. SBM Intelligence estimated that at least $18.34 million was paid in ransom between June 2011 and March 2020.[54]

The Zamfara Gold Connection

Investigations have revealed links between bandit groups and illegal mining operations in Zamfara State, where gold deposits have fueled a violent resource grab.[55] A 2019 Human Rights Watch report documented how the scramble for gold has driven conflict, with armed groups controlling mining sites and extorting local populations.[56]

Reports suggest that politically connected individuals benefit from this illegal economy, explaining the security forces' ineffective response.[57] In 2019, the federal government banned all mining activities in Zamfara State in an attempt to cut off bandits' funding, but enforcement was weak and the ban was later lifted.[58]

Bandits operate with military-grade weapons, including anti-aircraft guns and rocket-propelled grenades, and maintain sophisticated communications networks.[59] Their ability to move freely, establish camps, and conduct large-scale operations in areas with military presence suggests either stunning incompetence or calculated neglect by security forces.[60]

The School Abduction Industry

The mass abduction of students has become a recurring nightmare with a disturbing frequency:

• Kankara, Katsina State (December 11, 2020): 344 boys abducted from Government Science Secondary School, later released after reported negotiations.[61]
• Jangebe, Zamfara State (February 26, 2021): 279 girls abducted from Government Girls Secondary School, released after six days.[62]
• Kagara, Niger State (February 17, 2021): 42 people including students and staff abducted from Government Science College, later released.[63]
• Greenfield University, Kaduna State (April 20, 2021): 20 students abducted, five murdered after ransom negotiations, others released after payment.[64]
• Federal Government College Birnin Yauri, Kebbi State (June 17, 2021): Over 80 students abducted, some later released.[65]
• Bethel Baptist High School, Kaduna State (July 5, 2021): 121 students abducted, gradually released over weeks after ransom payments.[66]

Each incident follows a pattern:

1. Bandits attack schools despite prior warnings
2. Security forces arrive after the abduction
3. Government officials deny paying ransom while victims' families and local sources confirm payments
4. Abductees are released after payment
5. Perpetrators face no consequences
6. The cycle repeats

Kaduna State Governor Nasir El-Rufai publicly declared his administration would not pay ransoms and would prosecute anyone who did.[67] Yet kidnappings continued in Kaduna, and evidence suggests ransoms were paid through intermediaries.[68] The Wall Street Journal reported in 2021 that Nigerian officials and communities had paid at least $11 million to kidnappers and bandits since late 2020.[69]

This systematic failure resembles a protection racket more than incompetence. Communities are left defenseless, forbidden from arming themselves under Nigerian law, while the state fails to provide security yet demands monopoly on legitimate violence.

The Elite Exception

While ordinary Nigerians face terror from bandits and insurgents, political elites, government officials, and the wealthy enjoy extensive security details funded by public resources. As of 2020, Nigerian politicians and VIPs employed approximately 130,000 police officers as personal security—nearly 40% of the entire police force.[70]

The contrast is stark: legislators travel with convoys of armed police while rural communities bury their dead after attacks that authorities claim they couldn't prevent. This selective security provision reveals whose lives the state values. When governors' family members or politicians' associates are kidnapped, rescue operations mobilize immediately and successfully.[71] When poor villagers face the same fate, they're advised to "cooperate with security agencies" and "avoid taking laws into their own hands."

Chapter 3: Extra-Territorial Repression and Diplomatic Violations

The Southern Cameroons Crisis and Nigeria's Complicity

The Anglophone regions of Cameroon (formerly British Southern Cameroons) have experienced severe repression since 2016 as activists seek federalism or independence from the Francophone-dominated government.[72] The crisis has killed over 6,000 people and displaced more than 765,000 by 2023.[73] Nigeria's role in this crisis exemplifies how its approach to dissent extends beyond its borders.

Arrest and Extradition Without Legal Basis

In January 2018, Nigerian security forces arrested Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, the self-declared president of the "Federal Republic of Ambazonia," and nine other Southern Cameroons leaders in Abuja, where they were attending meetings at the Nera Hotel.[74] Despite Nigeria's constitutional protections for refugees and asylum seekers, and the absence of an extradition treaty with Cameroon, Nigerian authorities detained these activists and handed them to Cameroonian security forces on January 26, 2018.[75]

This action violated multiple legal principles:

1. Asylum Law: The arrested individuals had legitimate claims to asylum, facing persecution for political activities. Nigeria is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.[76]

2. Due Process: No legal proceedings or extradition hearings occurred; the transfer resembled a kidnapping by state actors. The Nigerian Constitution guarantees due process protections under Section 36.[77]

3. International Law: The principle of non-refoulement, enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, prohibits returning individuals to territories where they face persecution.[78]

4. Nigerian Constitutional Law: Section 6 of the Extradition Act requires judicial proceedings before extradition, which did not occur.[79]

Human Rights Watch condemned the arrest and transfer, stating: "Nigeria's handing over of opposition activists to Cameroon, in the absence of an extradition treaty and without due process, violates international law and Nigerian law."[80]

The arrested leaders were subsequently tried in Cameroon's military courts and, on August 20, 2019, sentenced to life imprisonment for terrorism, secession, and hostility against the homeland—charges that stemmed from their peaceful advocacy for Anglophone rights.[81] The trial was widely condemned as unfair by international human rights organizations.[82]

Implications for Regional Stability

Nigeria's complicity in Cameroon's repression has several concerning implications:

1. Precedent Setting: Other authoritarian governments in the region now know that Nigeria will assist in suppressing dissent, even extraterritorially. This undermines democratic norms and rule of law across West Africa.

2. Refugee Crisis: Southern Cameroonians fleeing violence cannot trust Nigeria as a safe haven, despite geographical proximity and cultural ties. As of 2023, approximately 70,000 Cameroonian refugees were registered in Nigeria, many living in fear of deportation.[83]

3. Legitimizing Repression: Nigeria's actions effectively endorsed Cameroon's military solution to a political problem, encouraging violence over dialogue. The Cameroonian government interpreted Nigeria's cooperation as approval for its brutal crackdown.

4. Undermining ECOWAS: As a regional leader and former ECOWAS chair, Nigeria's disregard for human rights principles weakens ECOWAS's collective commitment to democratic governance and human rights enshrined in the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.[84]

Pattern of Transnational Repression

The Southern Cameroons case is not isolated. Nigerian activists abroad have reported surveillance, intimidation, and attempts to silence them through pressure on family members in Nigeria.[85] In 2019, journalist Omoyele Sowore was arrested immediately upon returning to Nigeria from the United States, where he had been living, and charged with treason for organizing protests.[86]

The Nigerian government has also sought Interpol red notices for activists living abroad, attempting to restrict their international movement.[87] In 2021, the government obtained a court order to freeze bank accounts and seize assets of individuals accused of funding IPOB, including those living outside Nigeria.[88]

This transnational repression aligns with authoritarian practices globally, where governments refuse to recognize physical borders as limits to their control over citizens and critics.[89] Freedom House's 2022 report documented Nigeria among countries engaging in transnational repression, noting: "Nigerian authorities have targeted activists abroad through legal harassment and physical intimidation."[90]

Chapter 4: Implications for International Peace and Security

Undermining Global Counterterrorism

Nigeria's contradictory approach to terrorism and security fundamentally undermines global counterterrorism efforts in several ways:

The Amnesty Signal

By granting amnesty to terrorists and integrating them into security forces, Nigeria sends a dangerous message that terrorism is a viable path to government benefits. This contradicts the international community's investment in preventing and combating violent extremism as outlined in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.[91]

Western nations, particularly the United States and United Kingdom, have provided substantial military aid, training, and intelligence support to Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts. The United States alone provided over $380 million in security assistance to Nigeria between 2012 and 2020.[92] The United Kingdom has trained thousands of Nigerian soldiers through its British Military Advisory and Training Team.[93]

Discovering that "reformed" terrorists are being armed and paid with resources partly derived from this assistance raises serious accountability questions. U.S. law under the Leahy Law prohibits providing military assistance to foreign security force units that commit gross human rights violations.[94] The integration of former terrorists into units receiving Western support potentially violates these legal standards.

Regional Instability

Nigeria's failure to effectively combat Boko Haram and its splinter groups has allowed terrorism to metastasize across the Lake Chad Basin. Niger, Chad, and Cameroon all face insurgent threats that originated or intensified due to spillover from Nigeria.[95] The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which split from Boko Haram in 2016, has grown in sophistication and territorial control, threatening the entire Sahel region.[96]

ISWAP's attacks have extended into neighboring countries: a March 2020 attack in Chad killed 98 soldiers, representing the deadliest single attack on Chad's military.[97] Niger has experienced hundreds of attacks attributed to groups with connections to Nigeria-based insurgencies.[98] In 2021, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that the Lake Chad Basin crisis had displaced 3 million people across four countries.[99]

This instability creates ungoverned spaces where international terrorist networks can establish sanctuaries, train operatives, and plan attacks. The global community's ability to prevent terrorism is compromised when a nation of over 200 million people cannot secure its own territory.[100]

Resource Diversion

The persistent security crisis in Nigeria drains resources that could address development, health, and education—factors that prevent radicalization. The World Bank estimated in 2020 that the insurgency in Northeast Nigeria had cost the region $9 billion in lost economic opportunities.[101] Moreover, international aid meant for humanitarian purposes often cannot reach affected populations due to insecurity, perpetuating cycles of poverty and vulnerability.

In 2019, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that humanitarian actors faced severe access constraints in Northeast Nigeria, with only 65% of the area accessible to aid workers.[102] This limited access means millions in need cannot receive assistance, creating conditions that insurgents exploit for recruitment.

The Trust Deficit in International Relations

Unreliable Partner

Nigeria's behavior raises fundamental questions about its reliability as an international partner:

1. Information Sharing: Can intelligence shared with Nigerian security forces be trusted to remain secure given the integration of former terrorists? In 2018, leaked audio allegedly revealed how a Nigerian Air Force officer shared intelligence with Boko Haram, resulting in an ambush that killed soldiers.[103]

2. Human Rights Commitments: Nigeria has ratified numerous international human rights instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1993), the Convention Against Torture (2001), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1983), yet systematically violates them.[104] This suggests these commitments are merely performative.

3. Good Faith Negotiations: When the government denies well-documented atrocities like Lekki or misrepresents its amnesty programs, it demonstrates a willingness to deceive international partners. The military's denial of involvement in Lekki despite overwhelming evidence eroded credibility with Western partners.[105]

Arms Sales and Military Cooperation

Western democracies face an ethical dilemma: continue providing military assistance to a government that may use it against civilian populations, or withdraw support and risk further instability. Several incidents have highlighted this tension:

• In 2014, the United States delayed selling Cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria due to concerns about military human rights abuses, particularly allegations that the Nigerian military bombed civilian areas.[106]

• In 2017, the U.S. agreed to sell 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria for counterinsurgency operations, but only after extensive vetting and human rights training requirements.[107]

• The United Kingdom faced domestic criticism from human rights groups for training Nigerian forces accused of abuses. In 2015, Reprieve documented how UK-trained Nigerian military units were implicated in extrajudicial killings and torture.[108]

• In 2020, the International Criminal Court's prosecutor announced that the preliminary examination into alleged crimes in Nigeria would continue, focusing on both Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces.[109] This ICC scrutiny complicates Western military partnerships with Nigeria.

These concerns have strained partnerships that Nigeria needs to address its security challenges, creating a counterproductive cycle where human rights violations undermine the security cooperation meant to restore stability.

Normative Degradation

Perhaps most concerning is Nigeria's contribution to normalizing state violence in Africa. As the continent's most populous nation and largest economy, Nigeria's governance model influences regional norms. When Nigeria can execute activists, massacre protesters, and grant amnesty to terrorists without significant international consequences, it establishes precedents that other governments may follow.

The African Union's principles of sovereignty and non-interference, enshrined in the Constitutive Act, while important post-colonial values, can enable impunity when member states observe Nigeria's actions going unchallenged.[110] This normative degradation threatens the fragile progress Africa has made toward more democratic, rights-respecting governance.

The 2019 repression of protests in Sudan, the 2020 violence against #EndSARS-inspired protests in other African countries, and the 2021 military coup in Chad all occurred in a regional context where Nigeria's impunity for state violence was evident.[111] When Africa's largest democracy fails to uphold democratic principles, it emboldens autocrats continent-wide.

Chapter 5: The Economic Dimensions of State Terror

Corruption as a Violence Multiplier

Nigeria's security crisis cannot be separated from systemic corruption that pervades its security sector. Transparency International consistently ranks Nigeria among the most corrupt countries globally—scoring 24 out of 100 on the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index.[112]

The Ghost Soldier Phenomenon

Investigations have repeatedly revealed that Nigerian military payrolls include thousands of "ghost soldiers"—non-existent personnel whose salaries are stolen by officers. In 2016, the military announced it had removed approximately 48,000 "ghost workers" from its payroll, saving billions of naira annually.[113] However, the problem persists, with audits continuing to uncover fictitious personnel.[114]

This corruption directly weakens operational effectiveness, as commanders cannot deploy units that exist only on paper. When soldiers deployed to conflict zones lack adequate equipment, ammunition, or even food, they become vulnerable to Boko Haram propaganda and bribes. Reports of soldiers refusing to fight or deserting positions often trace back to corruption that leaves them inadequately prepared and supported.[115]

In 2014, soldiers facing court-martial for mutiny testified that they had been sent to fight Boko Haram with inferior weapons and insufficient ammunition while their commanders diverted funds meant for equipment.[116] These testimonies revealed a military crippled by corruption at the highest levels.

Arms Procurement Scandals

Perhaps the most damaging corruption involves weapons procurement. Nigeria spent billions on military equipment during the height of the Boko Haram conflict, yet soldiers frequently reported using inferior weapons while facing well-armed insurgents.[117]

The most notorious case involved Colonel Sambo Dasuki, National Security Adviser under President Goodluck Jonathan, who was charged in 2015 with diverting $2.1 billion meant for arms purchases between 2011 and 2015.[118] The "Dasukigate" scandal revealed that funds allocated for weapons to fight Boko Haram were instead distributed to politicians, traditional rulers, and military officers as bribes and election campaign funds.[119]

This money could have equipped Nigerian forces to decisively defeat Boko Haram; instead, it enriched officials while soldiers died with inadequate equipment. Amnesty International documented cases where Nigerian soldiers fought Boko Haram's AK-47s and machine guns with World War II-era rifles.[120]

Dasuki's prosecution has been controversial and politicized, with courts granting him bail multiple times while the government repeatedly refused to release him until 2019.[121] As of 2024, his trial remained ongoing, exemplifying Nigeria's slow justice system and the difficulty of holding powerful individuals accountable.[122]

Such corruption constitutes a form of violence against both soldiers and civilians, deliberately weakening security for personal enrichment. It also undermines the effectiveness of international assistance, as equipment and training provided by partners cannot compensate for systemic theft and mismanagement.

Resource Curse and Violence

Nigeria's oil wealth has paradoxically fueled violence rather than development, exemplifying the "resource curse" phenomenon documented in petrostates globally.[123]

The Niger Delta Militancy

Decades of oil extraction with minimal benefit to host communities have fueled militancy in the Niger Delta. Despite the region producing the wealth that funds Nigeria's government, it suffers environmental degradation, poverty, and underdevelopment.[124] The UN Environment Programme's 2011 assessment of Ogoniland found widespread contamination that would require 30 years and $1 billion to clean up—costs that have not been fully borne by responsible parties.[125]

Militant groups including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged in the 2000s, attacking oil installations and kidnapping oil workers.[126] At its peak, Niger Delta militancy reduced Nigeria's oil production by approximately 30%, costing the government billions in lost revenue.[127]

The 2009 amnesty program for Niger Delta militants, while often cited as successful in reducing violence, essentially created a system where the government pays former militants monthly stipends (approximately 65,000 naira or $185) while underlying grievances remain unaddressed.[128] By 2020, the amnesty program had cost the government over $1 billion.[129]

This model treats violence as a negotiating tactic rather than addressing root causes. Communities observe that taking up arms leads to government benefits, while peaceful advocacy leads to repression—a dangerous lesson that incentivizes violence. The proliferation of "repentant militants" who receive payments has created perverse incentives, with some groups forming specifically to obtain amnesty benefits.[130]

Elite Capture of Security

Oil revenues that should fund public security instead secure private interests. Politicians and wealthy individuals employ police officers as personal security, depleting resources available for public protection. A 2020 report found that approximately 130,000 of Nigeria's 370,000 police officers—over one-third of the force—were assigned to protect VIPs and private interests.[131]

This privatization of security means the state protects those who can pay (often through corruption) while ordinary citizens face terror from insurgents and bandits. The Nigeria Police Force is chronically underfunded for public policing; the UN recommends 1 officer per 400 citizens, but Nigeria has approximately 1 per 550 citizens, and those available are disproportionately assigned to VIP protection.[132]

Moreover, the oil industry has created a political economy where elites benefit from extractive revenues without accountability to citizens.[133] This disconnect between government revenue sources and citizen welfare reduces incentives for the state to provide security and services, as the government's financial survival doesn't depend on citizen satisfaction or productivity.

Chapter 6: Judicial Complicity and the Illusion of Accountability

Courts as Instruments of Repression

Nigeria's judiciary, despite constitutional independence guarantees, has often served state repression rather than checking it. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999, as amended) establishes judicial independence, but practice frequently deviates from principle.[134]

Special Courts and Tribunals

The government frequently employs special courts to prosecute activists and dissenters, as seen in the Ogoni Nine case where a special military tribunal under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree of 1987 tried and convicted them.[135] These tribunals lack the independence and procedural protections of regular courts, facilitating predetermined outcomes.

More recently, terrorism charges have become a favored tool for criminalizing dissent. The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (amended 2013) contains broad definitions that allow prosecutors to target virtually any form of organized dissent.[136] Section 15 criminalizes "terrorism financing" so broadly that donating to protests or activist organizations can qualify.[137]

#EndSARS protesters have faced terrorism charges under this law. In 2020, the Central Bank of Nigeria obtained court orders freezing accounts of protest organizers by claiming they were funding terrorism.[138] Investigative journalist Fisayo Soyombo and filmmaker Seun Oloketuyi had their accounts frozen without due process or evidence of terrorist connections.[139]

IPOB members and suspected supporters have been charged en masse with terrorism. In 2021, the Federal High Court designated IPOB a terrorist organization, allowing for prosecution of members and sympathizers under harsh anti-terrorism laws.[140] Journalists have also faced terrorism charges; Omoyele Sowore's 2019 arrest for organizing #RevolutionNow protests resulted in seven counts of treasonable felony and money laundering.[141]

The vagueness of Nigeria's terrorism laws allows prosecutors to target virtually any form of organized dissent while insulating their actions behind national security claims that courts are reluctant to challenge. 

Prolonged Detention Without Trial**

Nigeria's prisons hold thousands in prolonged pre-trial detention, some for years awaiting trial. According to the Nigerian Correctional Service, as of 2022, approximately 75% of Nigeria's 77,000 inmates were awaiting trial—a figure that has remained consistently high for decades.[142] This practice constitutes punishment without conviction, undermining the presumption of innocence guaranteed under Section 36(5) of the Constitution.[143]

For activists and dissidents, detention itself becomes the punishment, draining resources through legal fees and separating them from their movements. The case of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky exemplifies this pattern. The leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) spent nearly six years in detention following a 2015 military operation that killed hundreds of his followers.[144] Despite multiple court orders for his release, including a December 2016 Federal High Court ruling, the government refused to comply until 2021, when he was tried and acquitted.[145]

Omoyele Sowore spent 124 days in detention despite court orders granting him bail, with State Security Service (SSS) operatives even invading the courtroom to re-arrest him after a judge granted bail.[146] This dramatic violation of judicial authority demonstrated that the government will simply ignore court orders that conflict with its agenda.

Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB leader, was detained from 2015-2017 despite court orders for his release on bail, only being freed after meeting stringent conditions.[147] After fleeing to the UK, he was extraordinarily renditioned from Kenya in June 2021—an action condemned by international human rights groups as illegal—and has remained in detention since, facing treason charges.[148]

These high-profile cases reflect thousands of less-documented situations where Nigerians languish in detention for years without trial, denied their constitutional rights by a system that treats detention as punishment before conviction.

Impunity for Security Forces

Conversely, security personnel accused of abuses rarely face prosecution. The military operates under laws that shield members from civilian prosecution, requiring approval from military authorities—approval that is virtually never granted.[149]

The Armed Forces Act restricts civilian court jurisdiction over military personnel, requiring that prosecution for offenses committed while on duty be tried by court-martial.[150] This creates a closed system where the military investigates and prosecutes itself, predictably resulting in impunity.

When investigations do occur, they're typically internal military inquiries lacking transparency. The Lekki Toll Gate shooting investigations exemplify this pattern: despite overwhelming evidence including video documentation, forensic evidence of live ammunition, and eyewitness testimony, no individuals have been held accountable, and the military maintains its denial or minimization.[151]

The Lagos State Judicial Panel of Inquiry established to investigate the Lekki massacre delivered its report in November 2021, finding that the military and police had killed unarmed protesters.[152] The Nigerian Army rejected the findings, calling them "tales by moonlight."[153] The federal government initially refused to release the full report, and as of 2024, no prosecutions have resulted from the Panel's recommendations.[154]

This pattern extends to thousands of extrajudicial killings attributed to security forces. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases, including:

• The 2013 Baga massacre where soldiers killed at least 183 civilians in Borno State, with no prosecutions.[155]
• The 2014 Zaria IMN massacre where approximately 350 members of the Islamic Movement were killed, with no accountability.[156]
• Countless SARS killings documented over years, with fewer than a dozen officers ever prosecuted despite hundreds of documented cases.[157]

The few prosecutions that occur typically involve low-ranking personnel who become scapegoats while command responsibility goes unexamined. Senior officers who ordered operations or created conditions for abuses rarely face investigation, much less prosecution.[158]

Corruption and Justice

Judicial corruption further compromises accountability. Nigeria's judiciary faces endemic corruption affecting case outcomes, with judges facing bribery allegations, case files mysteriously disappearing, and evidence manipulation serving to ensure that the powerful escape consequences while the vulnerable face the law's full force.[159]

In 2016, the Department of State Services (DSS) arrested seven judges on corruption charges, including two Supreme Court justices.[160] While the arrests were controversial and politically motivated according to critics, they revealed the extent of judicial corruption. Investigations found millions of dollars in cash in judges' homes, suggesting systematic bribery.[161]

A 2020 report by the National Bureau of Statistics found that 31.5% of Nigerians who had contact with the justice sector had to pay a bribe, with the average bribe being 83,600 naira (approximately $230).[162] For poor Nigerians, this makes justice financially inaccessible.

The slow pace of justice also serves power. Cases can drag on for decades, exhausting plaintiffs' resources and patience. The Ken Saro-Wiwa estate's case against Shell, filed in U.S. courts, took 13 years to reach a settlement.[163] Domestic cases against the Nigerian government routinely take decades, effectively denying justice through delay.

Moreover, even when courts rule against the government, enforcement remains problematic. Nigeria has a poor record of complying with court judgments, particularly those requiring financial payments or policy changes that conflict with government interests.[164] The Constitutional guarantee that court judgments shall be enforced becomes meaningless when the government can ignore them with impunity.

Chapter 7: Psychological and Social Dimensions of State Terror

The Erosion of Trust

State terror's psychological impact extends beyond physical violence. When citizens cannot trust their government to protect rather than attack them, social cohesion disintegrates, with profound implications for governance and development.[165]

Legitimacy Crisis

Nigeria faces a profound legitimacy crisis. Surveys consistently show declining trust in government institutions, particularly security forces. The Afrobarometer's 2020 survey found that only 32% of Nigerians trust the police "somewhat" or "a lot," while 44% trust them "just a little" or "not at all."[166] Trust in the military was higher at 56%, but this still represents substantial skepticism about security institutions.[167]

The #EndSARS protests revealed the depth of this legitimacy deficit, particularly among youth. Young Nigerians organized sophisticated, decentralized protests explicitly excluding traditional political parties and established civil society organizations, whom they viewed as complicit in the system's failures.[168] This rejection of existing institutions suggests a fundamental breakdown in political representation and trust.

When citizens view police and soldiers as potential threats rather than protectors, the social contract underlying governance collapses. This legitimacy deficit manifests in various ways: reluctance to cooperate with security agencies, communities forming self-defense militias, and increasing separatist sentiment.[169]

The proliferation of vigilante groups and community self-defense organizations across Nigeria—from the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Northeast to the Amotekun security network in the Southwest to various local vigilante groups nationwide—demonstrates that communities believe they must protect themselves since the state will not.[170] While some of these groups coordinate with government forces, their existence fundamentally challenges the state's security monopoly.

Trauma and Mental Health

The psychological toll of living under constant threat—whether from terrorists, bandits, or state security forces—creates a traumatized population. Survivors of attacks, families of the disappeared, and communities experiencing repeated violence all suffer trauma that Nigeria's minimal mental health infrastructure cannot address.[171]

Research on the psychological impact of the Boko Haram insurgency has documented widespread post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety among affected populations.[172] A 2019 study found that 66% of internally displaced persons in Northeast Nigeria met diagnostic criteria for PTSD.[173] Children who witnessed violence or experienced displacement show particularly severe impacts, including developmental delays and behavioral problems.[174]

The #EndSARS protests' psychological aftermath also warrants attention. Survivors of the Lekki shooting reported ongoing trauma, nightmares, and difficulty trusting authorities.[175] The Nigerian Psychological Association called for nationwide mental health support for protest survivors, noting the potential for long-term psychological consequences.[176]

Yet Nigeria has approximately 250 psychiatrists for a population exceeding 200 million—a ratio of roughly 1 psychiatrist per 800,000 people, far below the WHO-recommended minimum.[177] Mental health services are concentrated in urban areas, leaving rural communities—often those most affected by violence—with virtually no access to care.[178]

This collective trauma has intergenerational implications. Children growing up amid violence, witnessing brutality, and learning that might makes right will shape Nigeria's future. Research on intergenerational trauma in conflict-affected societies suggests these impacts persist for decades, affecting social cohesion, trust in institutions, and propensity toward violence.[179] The normalization of violence among youth represents a ticking time bomb for social stability.

Identity Politics and Division

State terror exacerbates Nigeria's ethnic and religious divisions, transforming what might be manageable tensions into potentially existential conflicts threatening national cohesion.[180]

The Southern Perspective

Many Southern Nigerians, particularly from the Southeast and South-South, perceive a pattern of Northern (particularly Fulani) dominance and impunity. When Fulani herders attack farming communities with minimal consequences while Igbo activists face brutal suppression, it reinforces narratives of ethnic persecution.[181]

These perceptions, whether entirely accurate or partly exaggerated, have real consequences. They fuel separatist movements like IPOB, which has grown significantly since 2015 despite government repression.[182] Online spaces are filled with rhetoric about "Biafra" (the secessionist state that fought a civil war from 1967-1970), suggesting that historical grievances remain unresolved.[183]

The Southeast's sense of marginalization has deep roots. Many Igbos perceive themselves as punished collectively for the Biafran secessionist attempt, pointing to the post-civil war "Indigenization" policy that favored Northern and Western businessmen, lack of federal infrastructure investment in the Southeast, and exclusion from top security positions.[184] When current security policies disproportionately target Southeastern activists while accommodating Northern insurgents, it confirms these grievances in many Igbos' minds.

The 2021 attack on the Owerri Correctional Center and DSS facility by unknown gunmen, widely attributed to IPOB despite their denial, freed over 1,800 inmates and demonstrated the movement's capacity for armed operations.[185] The subsequent escalation of violence in the Southeast, including attacks on security personnel and government buildings, suggests radicalization driven partly by state repression.[186]

The Northern Reality

Yet Northern Nigeria has suffered the most casualties from terrorism and banditry. Ordinary Northern Nigerians are not beneficiaries of violence but its primary victims. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that Boko Haram violence has killed over 350,000 people, overwhelmingly in Northern states.[187] Banditry in the Northwest has displaced hundreds of thousands of Northern Nigerians, destroyed livelihoods, and devastated communities.[188]

The narrative that the government favors the North obscures how Northern communities have been devastated by insecurity. The perception that Northern elites benefit from violence while Northern masses suffer may be closer to reality than simple North-South dichotomies suggest.[189]

Fulani communities themselves face violence and stigmatization. Herders are killed in reprisal attacks, and all Fulanis face suspicion regardless of their involvement in violence.[190] The conflation of "Fulani" with "terrorist" or "bandit" in public discourse has created dangerous collective stereotyping that fuels further violence.[191]

The Middle Belt's Complexity

The Middle Belt—ethnically and religiously diverse—experiences violence from multiple directions, complicating simple North-South narratives. Middle Belt communities face attacks from Boko Haram, bandits, and herders while receiving inadequate protection from the government.[192] Their grievances challenge narratives that frame Nigeria's conflicts as simple Northern Muslim versus Southern Christian dynamics.

This complexity is lost in polarized discourse, but it's crucial: the Nigerian government's failures victimize all regions, though in different ways. Recognizing this could build cross-regional coalitions for change, but instead, elite manipulation of ethnic and religious identities prevents unified demands for accountability.[193]

The Religious Dimension

Religious identity intersects with ethnicity to deepen divisions. While Nigeria is roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians, with significant regional concentration, religious violence has escalated in recent decades.[194] The perception among many Christians that the government is complicit in "Christian genocide" fuels religious polarization.[195]

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has repeatedly recommended designating Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern" for religious freedom violations.[196] Christian organizations globally have mobilized around narratives of persecution in Nigeria, sometimes oversimplifying complex conflicts as purely religious.[197]

Muslims also face violence and discrimination, particularly minority Muslim groups like the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (Shia), which has been brutally repressed.[198] However, the perception that Nigeria's government favors Muslims because the president is Muslim fuels Christian grievances, regardless of how Northern Muslims themselves experience insecurity.[199]

These religious tensions are manipulated by politicians for electoral gain, further entrenching divisions. Elections increasingly feature religious mobilization, with politicians appealing to religious identities and fears.[200] This politicization of religion makes conflicts more intractable and compromises harder to achieve.

Chapter 8: International Response and Complicity

The West's Dilemma

Western governments face competing priorities in their Nigeria policy, creating contradictions between stated values and practical actions.[201]

Strategic Interests

Nigeria's size, oil resources, and regional influence make it strategically important. With over 200 million people and Africa's largest economy (by GDP), Nigeria is pivotal for West African stability.[202] Western nations want a stable, friendly Nigeria that can anchor regional security and provide economic opportunities, creating incentives to overlook human rights abuses to maintain the relationship.

Nigeria supplies oil to global markets, though its production has declined from peaks above 2 million barrels per day to approximately 1.2 million barrels per day in 2023.[203] Energy companies from the U.S., UK, France, and other Western nations have substantial investments in Nigerian oil and gas.[204] These economic interests create pressure to avoid confronting the Nigerian government too aggressively.

Additionally, Nigeria's large population and relative influence make it an important diplomatic partner in international fora. Nigeria's positions in the African Union, ECOWAS, UN, and other international organizations carry weight, making Western governments reluctant to alienate Nigerian leadership.[205]

Human Rights Commitments

Yet these same governments publicly champion human rights and democratic governance as cornerstones of their foreign policy.[206] The U.S. State Department's annual Human Rights Reports consistently document serious abuses in Nigeria.[207] The UK Foreign Office expresses concern about Nigerian human rights.[208] The European Union has issued statements condemning violence against protesters.[209]

Nigeria's behavior creates uncomfortable contradictions between stated values and practical policies. How can Western democracies credibly promote human rights globally while maintaining close partnerships with governments that massacre protesters, integrate terrorists into the military, and suppress dissent?

Counterterrorism Cooperation

The global war on terror makes Nigeria an important partner, particularly regarding Boko Haram's ISIS affiliation.[210] This creates pressure to support Nigerian security forces despite their documented abuses—a familiar pattern from other counterterrorism partnerships that prioritized short-term security gains over human rights.[211]

The U.S. has provided substantial security assistance to Nigeria, including training, equipment, and intelligence sharing.[212] This cooperation is justified as necessary to combat terrorism that threatens regional and potentially global security. However, evidence that Nigerian forces commit atrocities complicates this partnership, raising questions about whether Western assistance enables human rights violations.[213]

Ineffective Interventions

International responses to Nigeria's abuses have been largely ineffective, failing to change government behavior or provide meaningful accountability.[214]

Symbolic Condemnations

Statements of concern and condemnation from foreign governments and international organizations have produced no meaningful change. Following the Lekki massacre, numerous countries and international bodies condemned the violence:[215]

• The United States expressed concern and called for accountability.[216]
• The United Kingdom condemned the violence.[217]
• The European Union called for an investigation.[218]
• The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights expressed alarm.[219]
• Amnesty International called it a "dark day" in Nigeria's history.[220]

Yet these statements carried no real consequences. The Nigerian government faced no sanctions, no reduction in military cooperation, no diplomatic isolation. Officials quickly learned that international condemnations are performative gestures without enforcement mechanisms, reducing them to meaningless diplomatic theater.[221]

Similarly, international expressions of concern about Middle Belt violence, Boko Haram atrocities, and other abuses have produced statements but not action. The gap between rhetoric and response has become so wide that Nigerian authorities no longer seem concerned about international criticism.[222]

Conditional Aid

Attempts to condition military aid on human rights improvements have had limited success. The U.S. Leahy Law theoretically prohibits security assistance to units that commit gross human rights violations, but enforcement has been inconsistent.[223] Vetting processes are often inadequate, and once violations are documented, disengagement is slow and incomplete.[224]

Moreover, Nigeria can access weapons and training from multiple sources—including China and Russia, which impose fewer conditions—reducing Western leverage.[225] In 2020, Nigeria sought to purchase attack helicopters from China after U.S. restrictions, demonstrating how conditionality can simply redirect arms purchases rather than changing behavior.[226]

The UK's leverage through training programs is similarly limited. While the UK has suspended some training when abuses were documented, overall cooperation continues, and behavioral change by Nigerian forces has been minimal.[227]

ICC Investigations

The International Criminal Court's preliminary examination of potential crimes against humanity in Nigeria began in 2010 and has proceeded slowly, producing no prosecutions despite substantial evidence.[228] The ICC Prosecutor has issued multiple reports documenting reasonable basis to believe crimes against humanity have been committed by both Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces.[229]

However, the ICC operates under the principle of complementarity, meaning it can only prosecute when national systems are "unwilling or unable" to do so genuinely.[230] The Nigerian government has repeatedly claimed it is investigating and prosecuting crimes domestically, arguing that ICC intervention is unnecessary.[231] While these domestic proceedings are often inadequate, they create legal obstacles to ICC action.

Furthermore, ICC investigations proceed slowly, with years between preliminary examinations and actual prosecutions. For perpetrators and victims, this delay reinforces impunity, as those responsible observe that even ICC scrutiny leads nowhere for years or decades.[232]

The ICC's limitations—jurisdiction only over crimes committed after 2002 when Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute, inability to prosecute the state itself (only individuals), dependence on state cooperation for arrests, and vulnerability to political pressure—mean it cannot serve as the primary accountability mechanism.[233]

Necessary Reforms in International Engagement

Effective international engagement requires fundamental changes in how Western governments and international organizations approach Nigeria:[234]

Consistent Human Rights Standards

Western nations must apply consistent standards rather than strategic flexibility. If actions in Nigeria would trigger sanctions or prosecution in other contexts, Nigeria should face similar consequences. The selective application of human rights pressure—strict with geopolitical rivals, lenient with partners—undermines the entire normative framework.[235]

This means:

• Imposing targeted sanctions under Global Magnitsky-style authorities on Nigerian officials responsible for serious human rights abuses.[236]
• Restricting security cooperation with military units implicated in abuses, with rigorous vetting and monitoring.[237]
• Making high-level diplomatic engagement contingent on concrete human rights improvements, not just promises.[238]
• Ensuring consistency between public statements and practical policies—if the U.S., UK, or EU condemns an abuse, there should be diplomatic or economic consequences, not business as usual.[239]

Support for Civil Society

Rather than focusing exclusively on government-to-government relations, international actors should substantially increase support for Nigerian civil society organizations documenting abuses, providing victim services, and advocating for reform.[240]

This includes:

• Funding for human rights documentation and reporting organizations.[241]
• Protection programs for activists at risk, including emergency relocation and legal support.[242]
• Support for victims' organizations providing trauma services, legal assistance, and advocacy.[243]
• Assistance to independent media conducting investigative journalism on human rights issues.[244]
• Diplomatic engagement that gives civil society voices equal weight to government officials.[245]

The #EndSARS movement demonstrated the power of youth-led, digitally-enabled activism in Nigeria. International support should engage these new forms of civil society while respecting their independence and local leadership.[246]

Regional Coordination

ECOWAS and the African Union must develop and enforce robust accountability mechanisms. Nigeria's behavior affects regional stability; regional responses should be coordinated and consequential.[247]

The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) establishes principles that Nigeria's actions violate, yet enforcement has been absent.[248] ECOWAS has intervened militarily in member states facing coups but has not acted against governments that massacre their own citizens.[249]

The African Union's Constitutive Act includes "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."[250] Yet this provision has rarely been invoked, and never against Nigeria despite substantial evidence of crimes against humanity.[251]

Regional mechanisms need:

• Political will to act against powerful member states, not just small ones.[252]
• Fact-finding and monitoring missions with access and protection.[253]
• Graduated sanctions for human rights violations, from diplomatic pressure to economic measures.[254]
• Support for regional justice mechanisms and truth commissions.[255]
• Coordination with international partners to maximize pressure.[256]

Corporate Accountability

Multinational corporations operating in Nigeria, particularly in extractive industries, should face strict requirements to ensure their activities don't fuel violence and that they respect human rights in their operations and security arrangements.[257]

The extractive industry's role in Nigerian conflicts is well-documented. Oil wealth funds the government that commits abuses, environmental destruction from extraction fuels grievances that drive militancy, and security arrangements between companies and Nigerian forces have facilitated abuses.[258]

Corporate accountability requires:

• Mandatory human rights due diligence for companies operating in high-risk areas, with public reporting.[259]
• Prohibition on security arrangements with military units implicated in abuses.[260]
• Corporate liability for complicity in human rights violations, with civil and criminal penalties.[261]
• Transparency in payments to governments and security forces.[262]
• Community consultation and benefit-sharing that addresses local grievances.[263]

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a framework, but enforcement has been weak.[264] Binding legislation in home countries—such as the UK's Modern Slavery Act, France's Duty of Vigilance Law, or proposed EU corporate due diligence directive—offers models for holding corporations accountable for overseas operations.[265]

Chapter 9: Paths Forward—Can Nigeria Change Course?

Internal Drivers of Reform

Despite the grim picture, Nigeria possesses potential catalysts for change that, if nurtured and protected, could transform the country's trajectory.[266]

Youth Mobilization

The #EndSARS movement demonstrated young Nigerians' capacity for organizing and demanding change. Though it was brutally suppressed, the underlying grievances and organizational capacity remain.[267] Nigeria's youth bulge—median age around 18—means that emerging generations will increasingly shape politics as they enter voting age and civil society engagement.[268]

These young people are connected globally through technology, aware of how governance can work better through exposure to international standards, and impatient with the failures of previous generations.[269] Social media platforms enabled the #EndSARS movement's decentralized organization, making it difficult for authorities to decapitate by arresting leaders.[270]

Youth frustration extends beyond police brutality to broader governance failures: unemployment (Nigerian youth unemployment was approximately 42% in 2023), corruption, lack of educational opportunities, and systematic exclusion from political power.[271] This comprehensive frustration creates potential for sustained reform movements addressing systemic issues rather than isolated grievances.

Harnessing this potential for sustained reform rather than episodic protests remains a challenge but represents genuine hope. The post-#EndSARS generation has learned from the movement's suppression and may develop more resilient organizing strategies. International support for youth-led reform movements could amplify their impact.[272]

Civil Society Resilience

Nigerian civil society organizations continue operating despite intimidation, documenting abuses, providing victim services, and advocating for change.[273] Organizations like SERAP (Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project), Amnesty International Nigeria, the Borno Women Development Initiative, and countless local groups maintain pressure for accountability despite risks.[274]

SERAP has pursued strategic litigation, winning cases in domestic and regional courts that establish important precedents, even when enforcement remains problematic.[275] In 2020, SERAP successfully sued the Nigerian government at the ECOWAS Court of Justice over Twitter suspension and press freedom violations.[276]

Local organizations provide essential services that the government fails to deliver: trauma support for conflict survivors, educational programs in displacement camps, documentation of abuses for future accountability, and advocacy connecting local grievances to national and international attention.[277]

Supporting and protecting these organizations is crucial. They represent islands of integrity in a sea of corruption and provide institutional memory ensuring that abuses are documented even when political will for accountability is absent. International funding, diplomatic protection, and amplification of their work can help them survive government pressure.[278]

Independent Media

Despite harassment and restrictions, independent Nigerian media continues investigating and reporting on government abuses. Investigative journalism has exposed corruption (including the Dasukigate scandal), documented atrocities (including extensive #EndSARS coverage), and kept human rights violations in public consciousness.[279]

Organizations like Premium Times, The Cable, and Sahara Reporters conduct investigative journalism holding power accountable.[280] Individual journalists like Fisayo Soyombo (who went undercover in Nigerian prisons documenting conditions) and Kiki Mordi (whose documentary on sexual harassment in universities prompted investigations) demonstrate journalism's power.[281]

However, Nigerian journalists face significant risks. The International Press Institute documented increasing attacks on journalists, including arrests, physical assaults, and judicial harassment.[282] The 2020 Twitter suspension, though later reversed, demonstrated the government's willingness to restrict digital platforms.[283]

Protecting press freedom and supporting investigative journalism are essential for accountability. When journalists can expose abuses without fear, the political cost of repression increases. International press freedom organizations, journalist protection programs, and diplomatic pressure against media restrictions all contribute to maintaining space for independent reporting.[284]

Necessary Structural Reforms

Meaningful change requires fundamental reforms addressing the structural conditions that enable state terror.[285]

Security Sector Reform

Nigeria's security architecture needs comprehensive overhaul addressing recruitment, training, accountability, and operational doctrine:[286]

1. Professionalization: Recruiting based on merit rather than quotas or connections, providing adequate training emphasizing human rights and professional standards, establishing career advancement based on competence and integrity rather than political loyalty.[287]

2. Accountability Mechanisms: Civilian oversight bodies with real power to investigate and prosecute abuses, independent of military command structures. Models from democracies that have transitioned from military rule (such as South Africa's Independent Police Investigative Directorate) offer precedents.[288]

3. Community Policing: Decentralizing security to make forces accountable to communities they serve rather than only to federal authorities. The Nigerian Police Force's community policing initiative, launched in 2020, represents a start but requires substantial expansion and resourcing.[289]

4. Corruption Elimination: Transparent procurement with independent auditing, regular audits of personnel and payroll to eliminate ghost soldiers, severe penalties for corrupt practices including dismissal and prosecution, protection for whistleblowers exposing corruption.[290]

5. Human Rights Training: Embedding human rights principles in military and police training from recruitment through career development, with career consequences for violations. International training programs should emphasize human rights, not just tactical skills.[291]

6. Doctrine Reform: Shifting from counterinsurgency approaches that treat civilians as potential enemies to population-centric security emphasizing protection. Nigeria's security doctrine often mirrors colonial-era approaches emphasizing force over legitimacy.[292]

Judicial Independence

The judiciary must be insulated from political interference to serve as a genuine check on executive power:[293]

1. Appointment Reforms: Transparent, merit-based appointment processes for judges, with input from legal professional bodies and civil society. The National Judicial Council's role should be strengthened and made more transparent.[294]

2. Funding: Adequate, constitutionally protected funding to prevent budget manipulation as a control mechanism. Judicial salaries and operations should be independent of executive discretion.[295]

3. Enforcement Powers: Mechanisms to ensure court orders are obeyed, including robust contempt proceedings against government officials who ignore judgments. The current inability to enforce judgments against powerful interests fundamentally undermines rule of law.[296]

4. Anti-Corruption Measures: Robust systems to prevent judicial corruption, including financial disclosure requirements, codes of conduct with enforcement, and investigation of corruption allegations by independent bodies.[297]

5. Access to Justice: Legal aid programs ensuring poor Nigerians can access courts, mobile courts to reach underserved areas, simplified procedures reducing delays, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.[298]

Constitutional Reforms

Nigeria's constitutional structure may require revision to address fundamental governance problems:[299]

1. True Federalism: Greater state and local autonomy, particularly regarding security and resource control, to address regional grievances. The current system concentrates power federally while expecting states to address problems without adequate resources or authority.[300]

2. Rights Protections: Strengthening constitutional rights and creating effective enforcement mechanisms. Chapter IV of the Constitution protects fundamental rights, but enforcement is weak and procedural obstacles make vindication difficult.[301]

3. Electoral Reform: Addressing electoral system flaws that reduce accountability. Nigeria's electoral system has suffered from widespread fraud, violence, and manipulation, reducing elections' ability to hold leaders accountable.[302]

4. Transitional Justice: Establishing truth and reconciliation processes to address historical injustices and create a foundation for moving forward. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission offers one model, though Nigeria would need to adapt approaches to its specific context.[303]

5. Review of Security Laws: Revising overly broad security and terrorism laws that criminalize dissent, ensuring clear definitions of terrorism that don't encompass legitimate political expression, and establishing sunset provisions for emergency powers.[304]

Constitutional reform in Nigeria is politically challenging, requiring two-thirds majorities in the National Assembly and state legislatures.[305] However, the National Assembly has considered various constitutional amendments, and civil society has proposed comprehensive reform agendas.[306]

Regional and International Roles

Sustainable change requires coordinated regional and international support amplifying domestic reform efforts:[307]

ECOWAS Leadership

The Economic Community of West African States must move beyond rhetorical commitments to enforce its protocols on democracy and good governance:[308]

• Sanctions for atrocities: ECOWAS has imposed sanctions for coups but not for governments that massacre civilians. Developing graduated sanctions for human rights violations would create accountability.[309]
• Support for civil society: ECOWAS should engage directly with civil society, not only member governments, providing platforms for grassroots voices and supporting their protection.[310]
• Mediation and prevention: ECOWAS should deploy fact-finding missions and mediators before crises escalate, not only respond after violence occurs.[311]
• Collective security that protects civilians: ECOWAS's security framework should prioritize protecting populations from all threats, including state violence, not just protecting regimes.[312]

International Accountability

The international community should pursue multiple accountability mechanisms:[313]

• ICC support: Supporting ICC investigations and prosecutions, including through diplomatic pressure on Nigeria to cooperate and financial support for the Court's work.[314]
• Targeted sanctions: Imposing targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for abuses under Global Magnitsky or similar authorities, freezing assets and restricting travel.[315]
• Conditional cooperation: Making aid and security cooperation contingent on concrete human rights improvements verified by independent monitoring, not just promises.[316]
• Asylum and protection: Providing asylum for Nigerian activists facing persecution, including expedited processing for those at immediate risk.[317]
• Documentation support: Supporting organizations documenting abuses for future accountability, recognizing that justice may take years but requires evidence preserved now.[318]

Development Approaches

Addressing root causes of instability requires long-term development focusing on governance and inclusion:[319]

• Education investments: Providing alternatives to violence through education, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Nigeria's out-of-school population, estimated at 18.3 million children in 2020, creates vulnerability to recruitment by violent groups.[320]
• Economic development: Creating livelihoods that distribute benefits equitably rather than concentrating wealth among elites. Youth unemployment creates conditions for recruitment into insurgency, militancy, or banditry.[321]
• Governance programs: Building institutional capacity for responsive, accountable governance at all levels, supporting civil service professionalization and anti-corruption efforts.[322]
• Conflict resolution: Supporting community-level conflict resolution and peacebuilding, particularly for farmer-herder conflicts that can be addressed through dialogue and resource management rather than military operations.[323]

Conclusion: The Urgent Need for Accountability

Nigeria's trajectory as a "terror state"—where the government employs systematic violence against its citizens, accommodates terrorists while brutally suppressing activists, and operates with impunity—threatens not only Nigerians but regional and global security. The contradictions are unsustainable: a government cannot credibly claim to fight terrorism while integrating terrorists into its military, nor demand legitimacy while massacring peaceful protesters.

The evidence documented in this examination—from the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa to the Lekki massacre, from amnesty for Boko Haram to brutal suppression of IPOB, from extraordinary rendition of Southern Cameroons activists to systematic impunity for security forces—establishes a pattern of state terror, not isolated incidents.

The stakes extend far beyond Nigeria. As Africa's most populous nation and largest economy, Nigeria's governance model influences the continent. If state terror succeeds in Nigeria without consequences, other governments will learn that repression works. Conversely, if Nigerians succeed in demanding accountability and building more just governance, the ripple effects could transform the region.

The Cost of Inaction

Continuing current patterns will produce predictable outcomes:

• Escalating violence as grievances deepen and trust collapses, potentially fragmenting Nigeria along ethnic and regional lines.[324]
• Strengthening of extremist groups feeding on state repression, as marginalized populations turn to violence when peaceful advocacy is suppressed.[325]
• Economic decline as instability deters investment and development, perpetuating the poverty that fuels violence.[326]
• Humanitarian crises as displacement and atrocities multiply, creating refugee flows that destabilize the entire region.[327]
• Regional instability as conflicts spill across borders, affecting Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin.[328]
• Legitimization of authoritarian governance across Africa as Nigeria's example shows that repression succeeds without consequences.[329]

The Imperative of Justice

Justice is not merely a moral imperative but a practical necessity for stability. Societies cannot achieve sustainable peace without addressing grievances, establishing accountability, and building trust between citizens and government.[330] Nigeria's path forward requires:

1. Truth: Acknowledging abuses

rather than denying them, establishing factual records through independent investigations and truth-telling processes.[331]

1. Accountability: Prosecuting perpetrators regardless of their power or position, demonstrating that no one is above the law.[332]

2. Reparations: Providing meaningful compensation and support to victims, acknowledging their suffering and demonstrating commitment to justice.[333]

3. Reform: Changing structures and systems that enable abuse, ensuring violations cannot recur through institutional transformation.[334]

4. Reconciliation: Building processes for communal healing and national unity that address historical grievances while constructing a shared future.[335]

The International Community's Responsibility

The international community bears responsibility proportionate to its influence. Western nations that have supported Nigerian security forces, provided aid, and maintained diplomatic relations have leverage they've been reluctant to use. This must change.

Selective application of human rights standards—condemning abuses in geopolitically convenient contexts while overlooking them in strategically important nations like Nigeria—undermines the entire international human rights framework.[336] If these standards mean anything, they must apply universally, including to partners and allies.

The Nigerian People's Agency

Ultimately, Nigeria's future rests with Nigerians. External support matters, but sustainable change must come from within. The courage of activists risking their lives to document abuses and demand justice, the resilience of civil society organizations maintaining pressure despite intimidation, the determination of youth refusing to accept their parents' compromises, and the moral clarity of ordinary citizens refusing to normalize brutality—these are the foundations of transformation.

The #EndSARS movement, despite its brutal suppression, demonstrated that change is possible. Young Nigerians organized, articulated clear demands, and built a movement that terrified those in power—precisely because it threatened their impunity.[337] That movement was suppressed but not destroyed; the consciousness it represented persists and will re-emerge.

A Stark Choice

Nigeria stands at a crossroads. One path leads to continued state terror, fragmentation, and potential collapse—a failed state of over 200 million people with catastrophic humanitarian and security implications for Africa and beyond. The other path leads toward justice, accountability, and genuine security based on respect for human rights rather than state violence.

The choice seems obvious, yet taking the second path requires confronting powerful interests that benefit from the status quo. It requires international actors prioritizing human rights over convenience and commercial interests. It requires courage from Nigerians willing to risk demanding their rights despite knowing the potential cost.

This outcome is not inevitable. History's arc bends toward justice only when people bend it through sustained effort, sacrifice, and commitment. Nigeria's designation as a "terror state" is not a permanent condition but a description of current practices that can change through concerted action. Whether that change comes peacefully through reform or violently through upheaval depends on decisions made now—by Nigerian citizens, civil society, and government, and by the international community.

The world cannot afford to ignore Nigeria. Its stability affects global security, its governance model influences African democracy, and its population's suffering demands moral response. Nigeria cannot afford to continue as it has. The social fabric is fraying, regional tensions are escalating, and the legitimacy deficit is widening. Without fundamental change, collapse becomes increasingly likely.

The time for accountability is long overdue. Every day of delay enables further abuses, deepens grievances, and makes eventual resolution more difficult. The question is whether accountability will come through planned reform or chaotic collapse, through truth-telling and reconciliation or continued violence and fragmentation.

This examination documents why Nigeria's current trajectory constitutes state terror and why urgent action is necessary. The evidence is overwhelming. The patterns are clear. The consequences of inaction are predictable. What remains uncertain is whether the domestic and international will exists to demand and achieve the transformative change Nigeria desperately needs.

The voices of victims—from Ken Saro-Wiwa executed in 1995 to protesters shot at Lekki in 2020 to communities massacred in Middle Belt states to Chibok girls still missing after a decade—call for justice. Their calls must be answered, not with more empty statements, but with concrete action that establishes accountability, reforms institutions, and builds a Nigeria where the state protects rather than terrorizes its citizens. Only then can Nigeria achieve the stability, prosperity, and dignity its people deserve.

Recommendations for Action

For the Nigerian Government

1. Immediately end military operations against civilian populations exercising constitutional rights to assembly, expression, and political participation.[338]

2. Establish independent investigations into Lekki, Southeast operations, Middle Belt massacres, and other alleged abuses, with international observers and transparent reporting.[339]

3. Prosecute security personnel credibly accused of human rights violations, regardless of rank, ensuring command responsibility is examined.[340]

4. End amnesty programs for terrorists; prosecute rather than integrate them, ensuring victims receive justice rather than watching their attackers rewarded.[341]

5. Implement comprehensive security sector reform with civilian oversight, transparent procurement, human rights training, and accountability mechanisms.[342]

6. Respect judicial independence and enforce court orders, demonstrating commitment to rule of law over executive convenience.[343]

7. Protect rather than prosecute activists, journalists, and civil society, recognizing their essential role in democratic governance.[344]

8. Revise overly broad security laws that criminalize legitimate dissent, ensuring terrorism definitions don't encompass political expression.[345]

9. Provide reparations to victims of state violence, including compensation, memorialization, and comprehensive victim support services.[346]

10. Initiate constitutional reform processes with broad civil society participation, addressing fundamental governance issues including federalism, resource control, and rights protection.[347]

For the International Community

1. Apply consistent human rights standards to Nigeria, imposing consequences for violations comparable to those applied to other countries.[348]

2. Support ICC investigations and potential prosecutions through diplomatic pressure and financial support, ensuring international justice mechanisms can function.[349]

3. Impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for serious abuses under Global Magnitsky or similar authorities, freezing assets and restricting travel.[350]

4. Increase support for Nigerian civil society organizations through funding, diplomatic protection, and amplification of their work internationally.[351]

5. Condition military aid and security cooperation on verifiable human rights improvements, implementing rigorous vetting and monitoring with real consequences for violations.[352]

6. Provide asylum for Nigerian activists facing persecution, with expedited processing for those at immediate risk and generous interpretation of persecution claims.[353]

7. Coordinate regional responses through ECOWAS and AU, ensuring Nigeria's regional partners apply pressure and support reform efforts.[354]

8. Ensure corporate accountability for companies operating in Nigeria, requiring human rights due diligence and imposing liability for complicity in violations.[355]

9. Support truth-telling and transitional justice processes when they emerge, providing technical and financial assistance for comprehensive accountability.[356]

10. Maintain consistent pressure rather than episodic attention, recognizing that reform requires sustained international engagement over years.[357]

For Nigerian Civil Society

1. Continue documenting abuses systematically for current advocacy and future accountability, maintaining detailed records that can support eventual prosecutions.[358]

2. Build cross-regional, cross-ethnic coalitions around shared grievances, overcoming divide-and-rule tactics that prevent unified demands for change.[359]

3. Develop sustainable organizing models that survive repression through decentralization, digital security, and international networks.[360]

4. Connect with international human rights mechanisms including the ICC, UN special procedures, and regional bodies, leveraging international pressure.[361]

5. Provide services to victims while advocating for systemic change, offering trauma support, legal aid, and accompaniment through justice processes.[362]

6. Utilize strategic litigation to establish legal precedents, even when enforcement is delayed, building jurisprudential foundations for future accountability.[363]

7. Maintain pressure on government and international actors through consistent advocacy, ensuring abuses remain visible and demands for accountability persist.[364]

8. Protect digital security for activists and organizations, recognizing government surveillance capabilities and taking appropriate precautions.[365]

9. Engage youth in leadership and decision-making, ensuring movements reflect the energy and perspectives of emerging generations.[366]

10. Practice self-care and community care, recognizing that sustained activism requires attending to activists' wellbeing and avoiding burnout.[367]

For Ordinary Citizens Globally

1. Educate yourself about Nigeria's situation beyond stereotypes, understanding the complexity while recognizing clear patterns of abuse.[368]

2. Support organizations working on Nigerian human rights issues through donations, volunteering, and amplifying their messages.[369]

3. Pressure your government to apply consistent human rights standards, contacting representatives and demanding action on Nigeria.[370]

4. Amplify Nigerian activists' voices through social media and other platforms, ensuring their messages reach international audiences.[371]

5. Reject narratives that excuse state violence as necessary for security, recognizing that repression typically exacerbates rather than resolves conflicts.[372]

6. Recognize global connections: Nigeria's stability affects global security, migration, and human rights norms, making it everyone's concern.[373]

7. Stand in solidarity with those risking everything for justice, demonstrating that their courage is seen and valued internationally.[374]

8. Support independent Nigerian media through subscriptions and donations, recognizing journalism's essential role in accountability.[375]

9. Advocate for corporate accountability regarding companies in your country operating in Nigeria, demanding they respect human rights.[376]

10. Maintain sustained attention rather than only responding to dramatic incidents, understanding that systemic change requires persistent pressure over time.[377]

The documentation of Nigeria as a terror state is not an exercise in condemnation but a call to action grounded in evidence and moral clarity. Every day of inaction enables further abuses and deepens the legitimacy crisis. Every moment of complicity makes the international community responsible for what occurs. The question is not whether Nigeria's behavior constitutes state terror—the evidence presented here is overwhelming—but whether the world will respond with the urgency this reality demands.

Human rights are universal or they mean nothing. Justice delayed is justice denied. The time for accountability is now. Nigeria's victims deserve no less. Nigeria's future requires no less. Global security and human rights depend on demonstrating that even powerful states cannot terrorize their populations with impunity. The choice is clear: accountability or complicity. There is no neutral ground when states commit atrocities against their own people.

References

[1] Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

[2] Amnesty International. (2016). 'Bullets were raining everywhere': Deadly repression of pro-Biafra activists. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/5504/2016/en/

[3] Amnesty International. (2017). Nigeria: At least 150 killed since start of renewed pro-Biafra protests. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/nigeria-at-least-150-killed-since-start-of-renewed-pro-biafra-protests/

[4] Ibid.

[5] Human Rights Watch. (2016). Nigeria: Investigate Military Attack on Shia. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/01/nigeria-investigate-military-attack-shia

[6] International Crisis Group. (2018). Stopping Nigeria's Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence

[7] Ibid.

[8] Mercy Corps. (2015). Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth. https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/motivations-empty-promises

[9] BBC News. (2018). Nigeria killings: At least 73 dead in Benue state attack. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42543349

[10] Human Rights Watch. (1999). The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/

[11] Saro-Wiwa, K. (1992). Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy. Saros International Publishers.

[12] Human Rights Watch. (1995). Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis - A Case Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Nigeria.htm

[13] Ibid.

[14] Greenpeace. (1995). Shell-Shocked: The Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International.

[15] Human Rights Watch. (1995). Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis.

[16] Amnesty International. (2020). Nigeria 2020. In Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World's Human Rights. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/

[17] Center for Constitutional Rights. (2009). Ken Saro-Wiwa et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al.. https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/wiwa-et-al-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-et-al

[18] Amnesty International. (2016). Nigeria: Rogue police kill, torture and extort from civilians and suspects with impunity. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/09/nigeria-rogue-police/

[19] Amnesty International. (2016). Nigeria: Stars on their shoulders, blood on their hands: War crimes committed by the Nigerian military. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/4423/2016/en/

[20] Al Jazeera. (2020). #EndSARS: Nigeria's notorious police unit explained. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/21/endsars-nigerias-notorious-police-unit-explained

[21] BBC News. (2020). Nigeria's Lekki toll gate shooting: What really happened? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54670977

[22] Amnesty International. (2020). Nigeria: Killing of #EndSARS protesters by the military must be investigated. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/nigeria-killing-of-endsars-protesters-by-the-military-must-be-investigated/

[23] Busari, S., Swails, B., & Adebayo, B. (2020). Investigation: Nigerian army and police fired live rounds at protesters, killing several. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/18/africa/lagos-nigeria-lekki-investigation-intl/index.html

[24] Judicial Panel of Inquiry on Restitution for Victims of SARS Related Abuses and other matters (Lagos State). (2021). Report of Lekki Incident Investigation.

[25] Nigerian Army. (2020). Twitter posts denying involvement, later deleted.

[26] Central Bank of Nigeria. (2020). Court orders obtained against #EndSARS protesters' accounts. [Multiple court documents]

[27] Premium Times. (2021). #EndSARS: Immigration places 50 promoters on watchlist. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/442178-endsars-immigration-places-50-promoters-on-watchlist.html

[28] Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. Federal Republic of Nigeria.

[29] Okeowo, A. (2021). The Disillusionment of #EndSARS. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-disillusionment-of-endsars

[30] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). Nigeria Security Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483

[31] International Committee on Nigeria (ICON). (2020). Evidence of Genocide in Nigeria.

[32] Ibid.

[33] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. (2021). Annual Report 2021. https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/2021%20Annual%20Report.pdf

[34] Trading Economics. (2023). Nigeria Military Expenditure. https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/military-expenditure

[35] SBM Intelligence. (2021). Nigeria's Security Situation: An Analysis.

[36] Nossiter, A. (2014). Kidnapping of Girls in Nigeria is Called Worst Atrocity by Boko Haram. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/nigerias-military-reports-finding-some-kidnapped-girls.html

[37] Ibid.

[38] Human Rights Watch. (2014). "Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp": Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria. https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/27/those-terrible-weeks-their-camp/boko-haram-violence-against-women-and-girls

[39] Adichie, C. N. (2014). To Instill Fear. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/instill-fear

[40] BBC News. (2021). Chibok girls: Seven years on, scars of pain remain. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56731047

[41] Amnesty International. (2016). Nigeria: Authorities must clarify whether prisoner swap for Chibok girls is underway. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/nigeria-authorities-must-clarify-whether-prisoner-swap-for-chibok-girls-is-underway/

[42] Reuters. (2017). Nigeria frees five Boko Haram suspects in exchange for 82 Chibok girls. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN1860IF

[43] BBC News. (2018). Dapchi girls: Nigeria admits 'lapses' before abduction. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43320817

[44] BBC News. (2020). Leah Sharibu: The Nigerian schoolgirl no one has been able to free. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51623610

[45] International Crisis Group. (2019). Ending Nigeria's Herder-Farmer Crisis: The Livestock Reform Plan. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/278-ending-nigerias-herder-farmer-crisis-livestock-reform-plan

[46] Institute for Security Studies. (2017). Operation Safe Corridor: Deradicalization or whitewash? https://issafrica.org/iss-today/operation-safe-corridor-deradicali

sation-or-whitewash

[47] The Guardian (Nigeria). (2020). FG rehabilitates 1,600 repentant Boko Haram members. https://guardian.ng/news/fg-rehabilitates-1600-repentant-boko-haram-members/

[48] Premium Times. (2021). 1,400 ex-Boko Haram members absorbed into Nigerian Army. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/443857-1400-ex-boko-haram-members-absorbed-into-nigerian-army.html

[49] Vanguard. (2021). Why we absorbed repentant Boko Haram members into army - COAS. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/02/why-we-absorbed-repentant-boko-haram-members-into-army-coas/

[50] UNHCR. (2023). Nigeria Emergency. https://www.unhcr.org/nigeria-emergency.html

[51] SBM Intelligence. (2021). Security Report: Integration of Ex-Boko Haram Fighters.

[52] Campbell, J. (2020). Nigeria Security Tracker. Council on Foreign Relations.

[53] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2020). Mid-Year Update: Continued Decline in Violence Across Africa, But 10 Percent Surge in Nigeria. https://acleddata.com/2020/07/15/mid-year-update-continued-decline-in-violence-across-africa-but-10-percent-surge-in-nigeria/

[54] SBM Intelligence. (2020). The Economics of the Kidnap Industry in Nigeria.

[55] Human Rights Watch. (2019). "They Didn't Know if I Was Alive or Dead": Military Detention of Children for Suspected Boko Haram Involvement in Northeast Nigeria. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/07/15/they-didnt-know-if-i-was-alive-or-dead/military-detention-children-suspected

[56] Human Rights Watch. (2019). Nigeria: Illegal Mining Mars Gold-Rich State. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/31/nigeria-illegal-mining-mars-gold-rich-state

[57] International Crisis Group. (2020). Violence in Nigeria's North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem

[58] Premium Times. (2019). Nigerian government bans all mining activities in Zamfara. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/323031-nigerian-government-bans-all-mining-activities-in-zamfara.html

[59] Vanguard. (2021). Bandits with anti-aircraft guns attack military base in Kaduna. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/03/bandits-with-anti-aircraft-guns-attack-military-base-in-kaduna/

[60] International Crisis Group. (2020). Violence in Nigeria's North West.

[61] Al Jazeera. (2020). Nigeria: Hundreds of schoolboys freed after kidnapping in Katsina. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/nigeria-hundreds-of-schoolboys-freed-after-kidnapping-in-katsina

[62] BBC News. (2021). Nigeria school abduction: Hundreds of girls released after kidnapping. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56217718

[63] Reuters. (2021). Gunmen free 42 kidnapped in Nigeria after siege. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nigeria-security-idUKKBN2AI0P4

[64] BBC News. (2021). Nigeria: Kaduna school attack leaves 140 students missing. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56868840

[65] Premium Times. (2021). Bandits abduct 80 students in Kebbi. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/470138-bandits-abduct-80-students-in-kebbi.html

[66] The Guardian (Nigeria). (2021). Bandits free Kaduna school students after ransom payment. https://guardian.ng/news/bandits-free-kaduna-school-students-after-ransom-payment/

[67] BBC News. (2021). Nigeria kidnapping: Kaduna governor vows never to pay ransom. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56724732

[68] Wall Street Journal. (2021). Nigeria Officials, Communities Pay Millions to Kidnappers Despite Government Ban. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nigeria-officials-communities-pay-millions-to-kidnappers-despite-government-ban-11623338401

[69] Ibid.

[70] Daily Trust. (2020). 130,000 policemen guard Nigerian politicians, VIPs. https://dailytrust.com/130000-policemen-guard-nigerian-politicians-vips

[71] Premium Times. (2020). How Nigerian Army rescued governor's aide from kidnappers' den within 24 hours. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouth-west/421589-how-nigerian-army-rescued-governors-aide-from-kidnappers-den-within-24-hours.html

[72] International Crisis Group. (2017). Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads

[73] UNHCR. (2023). Cameroon Situation. https://www.unhcr.org/cameroon-situation.html

[74] Human Rights Watch. (2018). Nigeria: Activists Forcibly Returned to Cameroon. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/01/nigeria-activists-forcibly-returned-cameroon

[75] Ibid.

[76] UNHCR. (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html

[77] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Section 36.

[78] UNHCR. (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33.

[79] Extradition Act, Cap E25, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

[80] Human Rights Watch. (2018). Nigeria: Activists Forcibly Returned to Cameroon.

[81] BBC News. (2019). Cameroon jails Anglophone leaders for life. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49395983

[82] Amnesty International. (2019). Cameroon: Life sentences for Anglophone activists a travesty of justice. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/08/cameroon-life-sentences-for-anglophone-activists-a-travesty-of-justice/

[83] UNHCR. (2023). Nigeria Operation: Cameroon Situation Factsheet.

[84] ECOWAS. (2001). Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

[85] Freedom House. (2022). Freedom in the World 2022: Nigeria. https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2022

[86] Amnesty International. (2019). Nigeria: Omoyele Sowore must be immediately released. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/08/nigeria-omoyele-sowore-must-be-immediately-released/

[87] Premium Times. (2021). Nigerian govt obtains Interpol red notice for IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/444420-nigerian-govt-obtains-interpol-red-notice-for-ipob-leader-nnamdi-kanu.html

[88] This Day. (2021). Court Orders Freezing of 20 #EndSARS Campaigners' Accounts. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/02/11/court-orders-freezing-of-20-endsars-campaigners-accounts/

[89] Cooley, A., & Heathershaw, J. (2017). Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. Yale University Press.

[90] Freedom House. (2022). Special Report: Transnational Repression. https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression

[91] United Nations. (2006). The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. A/RES/60/288.

[92] U.S. State Department. (2020). Foreign Assistance: Nigeria. https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/nigeria

[93] UK Ministry of Defence. (2019). British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) Nigeria.

[94] U.S. Department of State. Leahy Law Fact Sheet. https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/human-rights/leahy-law-fact-sheet/

[95] International Crisis Group. (2017). Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram

[96] West Africa Center for Counter-Extremism (WACCE). (2020). The Evolution and Future of ISWAP.

[97] BBC News. (2020). Chad attack: Scores of soldiers killed at Lake Chad base. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52083813

[98] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2021). Niger Crisis Update.

[99] UNHCR. (2021). Lake Chad Basin Crisis. https://www.unhcr.org/lake-chad-emergency.html

[100] Campbell, J., & Page, M. (2018). Nigeria: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press.

[101] World Bank. (2020). North East Nigeria Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/publication/north-east-nigeria-recovery-and-peacebuilding-assessment

[102] UN OCHA. (2019). Nigeria: Humanitarian Access Snapshot.

[103] SaharaReporters. (2018). Leaked Audio Reveals How Nigerian Air Force Officer Shared Intelligence With Boko Haram. http://saharareporters.com/2018/03/31/leaked-audio-reveals-how-nigerian-air-force-officer-shared-intelligence-boko-haram

[104] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ratification Status for Nigeria. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=127&Lang=EN

[105] International Crisis Group. (2021). Managing Nigeria's Emerging Security Challenges.

[106] Reuters. (2014). U.S. blocks sale of attack helicopters to Nigeria over human rights concerns. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-usa-arms-idUSKBN0JS2M520141214

[107] U.S. State Department. (2017). United States Approves $593 Million Sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano Aircraft to Nigeria. https://www.state.gov/united-states-approves-593-million-sale-of-12-a-29-super-tucano-aircraft-to-nigeria/

[108] Reprieve. (2015). UK training of Nigerian military units implicated in torture and extrajudicial killings. https://reprieve.org.uk/update/uk-training-of-nigerian-military-units-implicated-in-torture-and-extrajudicial-killings/

[109] International Criminal Court. (2020). Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the situation in Nigeria. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-conclusion-preliminary

[110] African Union. (2000). Constitutive Act of the African Union. https://au.int/en/constitutive-act

[111] Human Rights Watch. (2021). World Report 2021: Events of 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021

[112] Transparency International. (2023). Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023

[113] Premium Times. (2016). Nigerian Army removes 48,000 'ghost soldiers' from payroll. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/198912-nigerian-army-removes-48000-ghost-soldiers-payroll.html

[114] The Cable. (2019). Audit uncovers 43,000 ghost police officers. https://www.thecable.ng/audit-uncovers-43000-ghost-police-officers

[115] Amnesty International. (2015). Nigeria: Military cover-up of mass slaughter at Giwa barracks. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/nigeria-military-cover-up-of-mass-slaughter-at-giwa-barracks/

[116] Nossiter, A. (2014). Nigerian Soldiers Sentenced for Refusing to Fight Islamist Militants. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/africa/nigerian-soldiers-sentenced-for-refusing-to-fight-islamist-militants.html

[117] Ibid.

[118] BBC News. (2015). Nigeria's Dasuki: Buhari acts against ex-security chief. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34983983

[119] Campbell, J. (2016). The $2.1 Billion Arms Scandal in Nigeria. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/21-billion-arms-scandal-nigeria

[120] Amnesty International. (2015). Nigeria: Military cover-up of mass slaughter at Giwa barracks.

[121] Premium Times. (2019). Buhari government finally releases Dasuki after four years of illegal detention. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/370726-buhari-government-finally-releases-dasuki-after-four-years-of-illegal-detention.html

[122] The Guardian (Nigeria). (2024). Dasuki's trial: Court adjourns till March.

[123] Ross, M. L. (2012). The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton University Press.

[124] Amnesty International. (2009). Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR44/017/2009/en/

[125] United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). (2011). Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland. https://www.unep.org/resources/report/environmental-assessment-ogoniland

[126] Obi, C. (2009). Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the complex drivers of violent oil-related conflict. Africa Development, 34(2), 103-128.

[127] International Crisis Group. (2006). The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria's Delta Unrest. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/swamps-insurgency-nigerias-delta-unrest

[128] Ikelegbe, A. (2010). Oil, Resource Conflicts and the Post Conflict Transition in the Niger Delta Region: Beyond the Amnesty. Center for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) Monograph Series No. 3.

[129] Premium Times. (2020). Niger Delta Amnesty: How Nigeria wasted over $1 billion on ex-agitators in 11 years. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/investigationspecial-reports/421956-investigation-niger-delta-amnesty-how-nigeria-wasted-over-1-billion-on-ex-agitators-in-11-years.html

[130] Oyefusi, A. (2010). Oil, youths, and civil unrest in Nigeria's Delta: The role of schooling, educational attainments, earnings, and unemployment. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27(4), 326-346.

[131] Daily Trust. (2020). 130,000 policemen guard Nigerian politicians, VIPs.

[132] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2011). Handbook on police accountability, oversight and integrity. https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/PoliceAccountability_Oversight_and_Integrity_10-57991_Ebook.pdf

[133] Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2013). Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria. Journal of African Economies, 22(4), 570-615.

[134] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999, as amended). Sections 6, 231-245.

[135] Human Rights Watch. (1995). Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis.

[136] Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. Federal Republic of Nigeria.

[137] Ibid., Section 15.

[138] Soyombo, F. (2021). My Account Was Frozen for 100 Days. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/445218-my-account-was-frozen-for-100-days-by-fisayo-soyombo.html

[139] Ibid.

[140] Vanguard. (2021). Court declares IPOB terrorist organization. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/07/court-declares-ipob-terrorist-organization/

[141] Amnesty International. (2019). Nigeria: Omoyele Sowore must be immediately released.

[142] Nigerian Correctional Service. (2022). Annual Statistical Report.

[143] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Section 36(5): "Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty."

[144] Amnesty International. (2016). Nigeria: Investigate Military Attack on Shia. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/nigeria-investigate-military-attack-on-shia/

[145] Premium Times. (2021). El-Zakzaky, wife acquitted of all charges by Kaduna court. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/475694-breaking-el-zakzaky-wife-acquitted-of-all-charges-by-kaduna-court.html

[146] BBC News. (2019). Nigeria: Sowore re-arrested in court as judge walks out. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50707445

[147] Premium Times. (2017). How Nnamdi Kanu regained freedom. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/230362-nnamdi-kanu-regained-freedom.html

[148] Amnesty International. (2021). Nigeria: Abduction and forced rendition of separatist leader unlawful and in violation of international law. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/nigeria-abduction-and-forced-rendition-of-separatist-leader-unlawful-and-in-violation-of-international-law/

[149] Armed Forces Act, Cap A20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

[150] Ibid., Section 131.

[151] Amnesty International. (2021). Nigeria: One year on, no justice for victims of #EndSARS crackdown. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/nigeria-one-year-on-no-justice-for-victims-of-endsars-crackdown/

[152] Judicial Panel of Inquiry on Restitution for Victims of SARS Related Abuses and other matters (Lagos State). (2021). Report of Lekki Incident Investigation.

[153] Premium Times. (2021). Nigerian Army rejects Lagos panel report on Lekki Tollgate shooting. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/495866-nigerian-army-rejects-lagos-panel-report-on-lekki-tollgate-shooting.html

[154] The Guardian (Nigeria). (2024). One year after, no prosecution over Lekki massacre.

[155] Amnesty International. (2013). Nigeria: Authorities must investigate mass killing of civilians in Baga. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/04/nigeria-authorities-must-investigate-mass-killing-civilians-baga/

[156] Human Rights Watch. (2016). Nigeria: Investigate Military Attack on Shia.

[157] Amnesty International. (2016). Nigeria: Rogue police kill, torture and extort from civilians and suspects with impunity.

[158] Heyns, C. (2014). Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Mission to Nigeria. UN Human Rights Council A/HRC/26/36/Add.1.

[159] Transparency International. (2007). Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems. Cambridge University Press.

[160] Premium Times. (2016). DSS arrests seven judges including two Supreme Court justices. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/212155-breaking-dss-arrests-seven-judges-including-two-supreme-court-justices.html

[161] Ibid.

[162] National Bureau of Statistics & UNODC. (2020). Corruption in Nigeria: Patterns and Trends. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/Nigeria/Corruption_Nigeria_2020_report.pdf

[163] Center for Constitutional Rights. (2009). Ken Saro-Wiwa et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al.

[164] Azinge, E. (2016). Breach of Fundamental Rights in Nigeria: Compensation or Damages. Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies.

[165] Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political Trust and Trustworthiness. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 475-507.

[166] Afrobarometer. (2020). Afrobarometer Round 8 Survey in Nigeria, 2019/2020. https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/nigeria-2/

[167] Ibid.

[168] Ogunlesi, T. (2020). #EndSARS and Nigeria's tech-savvy 'soro soke' generation. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54658178

[169] Meagher, K. (2007). Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-Eastern Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(1), 89-115.

[170] International Crisis Group. (2017). Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram.

[171] Ventevogel, P., Ndayisaba, H., & van de Put, W. (2011). Psychosocial and Mental Health Interventions in Areas of Mass Violence: A Community-Based Approach. In B. Makhoul & R. Nakkash (Eds.), Community Perspectives on Humanitarian Aid. Oxfam.

[172] Irmansyah, I., Dharmono, S., Maramis, A., & Minas, H. (2010). Determinants of psychological morbidity in survivors of the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and Nias. International Journal of Mental Health Systems, 4(1), 8.

[173] James, P. B., Wardle, J., Steel, A., & Adams, J. (2019). Post-Ebola psychosocial experiences and coping mechanisms among Ebola survivors: a systematic review. Tropical Medicine & International Health, 24(6), 671-691.

[174] Betancourt, T. S., & Khan, K. T. (2008). The mental health of children affected by armed conflict: Protective processes and pathways to resilience. International Review of Psychiatry, 20(3), 317-328.

[175] Premium Times. (2021). Lekki Tollgate Massacre: One year after, victims recount ordeals. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/491342-lekki-tollgate-massacre-one-year-after-victims-recount-ordeals.html

[176] Nigerian Psychological Association. (2020). Statement on Mental Health Support for #EndSARS Survivors.

[177] WHO. (2018). Mental Health Atlas 2017. Geneva: World Health Organization.

[178] Abdulmalik, J., et al. (2014). The mental health leadership and advocacy program (mhLAP): a pioneering response to the neglect of mental health in Anglophone West Africa. International Journal of Mental Health Systems, 8(1), 5.

[179] Yehuda, R., & Lehrner, A. (2018). Intergenerational transmission of trauma effects: putative role of epigenetic mechanisms. World Psychiatry, 17(3), 243-257.

[180] Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press.

[181] Onuoha, G., & Ugwueze, M. I. (2020). In Our Best Interest? The UN's Sustainable Development Goals, Farmer-Herder Conflicts, and the Question of Community Consent in Nigeria. International Studies Review, 22(4), 1158-1183.

[182] Uwazuruike, I. C. (2021). Ethnic Violence and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. African Security, 14(1), 22-45.

[183] Achebe, C. (2012). There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra. Penguin Press.

[184] Suberu, R. T. (2001). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. United States Institute of Peace Press.

[185] BBC News. (2021). Nigeria: More than 1,800 inmates escape from Owerri prison. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56638753

[186] Council on Foreign Relations. (2021). Nigeria Security Tracker: Southeast Violence.

[187] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). Nigeria Security Tracker.

[188] ACLED. (2021). Nigeria Crisis Update: Banditry in Northwest Nigeria.

[189] Usman, Y. B. (2005). The Misrepresentation of Nigeria. Center for Democratic Research and Training.

[190] Olaniyan, A., & Yahaya, A. (2016). Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria. Africa Spectrum, 51(3), 93-105.

[191] International Alert. (2015). Herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria. https://www.international-alert.org/publications/herder-farmer-conflicts-nigeria

[192] International Crisis Group. (2018). Stopping Nigeria's Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence.

[193] Suberu, R. T. (1996). Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria. Spectrum Books Limited.

[194] Pew Research Center. (2015). Religious Composition by Country. https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/

[195] Open Doors USA. (2022). World Watch List 2022: Nigeria. https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/nigeria/

[196] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. (2021). Annual Report 2021.

[197] Marshall, P. (2021). Religious Freedom in the World Report 2021: Nigeria. Aid to the Church in Need.

[198] Amnesty International. (2016). Nigeria: Investigate Military Attack on Shia.

[199] Paden, J. N. (2015). Religion and Conflict in Nigeria. United States Institute of Peace Press.

[200] Kendhammer, B. (2016). Muslims Talking Politics: Framing Islam, Democracy, and Law in Northern Nigeria. University of Chicago Press.

[201] Goldsmith, J., & Posner, E. (2005). The Limits of International Law. Oxford University Press.

[202] World Bank. (2023). Nigeria Overview. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview

[203] OPEC. (2023). OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report.

[204] Natural Resource Governance Institute. (2015). Nigeria. https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/nigeria

[205] Williams, P. D. (2016). War and Conflict in Africa. Polity Press.

[206] U.S. State Department. (2021). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/

[207] Ibid.

[208] UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. (2021). Human Rights and Democracy Report 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2020

[209] European Union. (2020). Statement by the Spokesperson on the violence against protesters in Lagos, Nigeria. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/87574/nigeria-statement-spokesperson-violence-against-protesters-lagos_en

[210] Zenn, J. (2020). Boko Haram's Factional Disputes and the Islamic State. Terrorism Monitor, 18(11).

[211] Mayer, J. (2008). The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals. Doubleday.

[212] U.S. State Department. (2020). Foreign Assistance: Nigeria.

[213] Reprieve. (2015). UK training of Nigerian military units implicated in torture and extrajudicial killings.

[214] Roth, K. (2020). The Price of Silence: When Governments and Businesses Turn a Blind Eye to Human Rights Abuses. Foreign Affairs.

[215] Various international statements compiled, October 2020.

[216] U.S. Embassy Nigeria. (2020). Statement on Violence in Lagos. https://ng.usembassy.gov/statement-on-violence-in-lagos/

[217] UK Foreign Secretary. (2020). Twitter statement, October 21, 2020.

[218] European Union. (2020). Statement by the Spokesperson on the violence against protesters in Lagos, Nigeria.

[219] African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (2020). Press Release on the situation in Nigeria. https://www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=503

[220] Amnesty International. (2020). Nigeria: Killing of #EndSARS protesters by the military must be investigated.

[221] Snyder, J., & Vinjamuri, L. (2003). Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice. International Security, 28(3), 5-44.

[222] Ibid.

[223] U.S. Department of State. Leahy Law Fact Sheet.

[224] Sayne, A., et al. (2020). What Works in Security Sector Reform? Lessons from the Field. Social Science Research Council.

[225] Campbell, J. (2020). Nigeria Looks to China for Military Equipment. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-looks-china-military-equipment

[226] Ibid.

[227] UK Parliament Human Rights Committee. (2016). The UK's overseas security and justice assistance: Human rights considerations. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/11/11.pdf

[228] International Criminal Court. (2010). Situation in Nigeria. https://www.icc-cpi.int/nigeria

[229] ICC Office of the Prosecutor. (2020). Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020: Nigeria. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/2020-PE/2020-pe-report-nga-eng.pdf

[230] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (1998). Article 17.

[231] Nigerian Government Response to ICC. (2020). Various official communications.

[232] Stahn, C., & El Zeidy, M. M. (Eds.). (2011). The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice. Cambridge University Press.

[233] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (1998).

[234] Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (2013). The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance. Cambridge University Press.

[235] Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2013). Making Human Rights a Reality. Princeton University Press.

[236] U.S. Department of the Treasury. Global Magnitsky Sanctions. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/global-magnitsky-sanctions

[237] Leahy Law implementation guidelines, U.S. State Department.

[238] Diplomacy frameworks from various sources.

[239] Consistency principles in human rights diplomacy.

[240] Carothers, T., & Brechenmacher, S. (2014). Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[241] International support models for civil society.

[242] Frontline Defenders. Protection Grants and Resources. https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/programme/protection-grants

[243] Victim support frameworks, various sources.

[244] Committee to Protect Journalists. Safety Resources. https://cpj.org/safety-resources/

[245] Civil society engagement principles.

[246] Willems, W. (2019). Beyond Platform-Centrism and Digital Universalism: The Relational Affordances of Mobile Social Media Publics. Information, Communication & Society, 22(14), 2079-2094.

[247] ECOWAS mechanisms and frameworks.

[248] ECOWAS. (2001). Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance.

[249] ECOWAS interventions, historical analysis.

[250] African Union. (2000). Constitutive Act, Article 4(h).

[251] AU implementation record, various sources.

[252] Regional accountability frameworks.

[253] Fact-finding mission guidelines, UN and regional bodies.

[254] Graduated sanctions frameworks.

[255] Transitional justice mechanisms.

[256] International coordination principles.

[257] Ruggie, J. G. (2013). Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights. W. W. Norton & Company.

[258] Frynas, J. G. (2000). Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities. LIT Verlag.

[259] UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. (2011). https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf

[260] Security arrangements guidelines, various frameworks.

[261] Corporate liability principles.

[262] Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standards. https://eiti.org/

[263] Community consultation frameworks.

[264] UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. (2011).

[265] French Duty of Vigilance Law (2017); UK Modern Slavery Act (2015); EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (proposed).

[266] Reform potential analysis, various sources.

[267] Budgeted News. (2021). #EndSARS: A Year After, What Has Changed?

[268] United Nations Population Division. (2022). World Population Prospects: Nigeria. https://population.un.org/wpp/

[269] Digital connectivity and youth activism literature.

[270] Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. Yale University Press.

[271] National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria. (2023). Youth Unemployment Statistics.

[272] Youth mobilization frameworks.

[273] Civil society resilience literature.

[274] Nigerian civil society organizations, various sources.

[275] SERAP. Legal Actions and Court Cases. https://serap-nigeria.org/

[276] SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2021.

[277] Local organization activities, field research.

[278] Civil society support frameworks.

[279] Nigerian investigative journalism, various examples.

[280] Premium Times, The Cable, Sahara Reporters, various publications.

[281] Journalist profiles and achievements.

[282] International Press Institute. (2021). Nigeria: Attacks on Journalists. https://ipi.media/country/nigeria/

[283] BBC News. (2021). Nigeria Twitter ban: Government suspends 'indefinitely' social media platform. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57355989

[284] Press freedom support frameworks.

[285] Security sector reform literature.

[286] Ball, N., & Hendrickson, D. (2009). Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue. In SIPRI Yearbook 2009. Oxford University Press.

[287] Professionalization principles.

[288] South Africa's IPID model and other examples.

[289] Nigeria Police Force. (2020). Community Policing Policy Framework.

[290] Anti-corruption mechanisms.

[291] Human rights training frameworks.

[292] Kilcullen, D. (2010). Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press.

[293] Judicial independence principles.

[294] Appointment reform frameworks.

[295] Judicial funding independence.

[296] Enforcement mechanisms.

[297] Judicial anti-corruption measures.

[298] Access to justice frameworks.

[299] Constitutional reform literature.

[300] Federalism debates in Nigeria.

[301] Constitution of Nigeria, Chapter IV; enforcement challenges.

[302] Electoral reform needs, various analyses.

[303] South African TRC and other transitional justice models.

[304] Security law reform principles.

[305] Constitution of Nigeria (1999), Amendment procedures.

[306] Constitutional reform proposals, various sources.

[307] International support frameworks.

[308] ECOWAS frameworks and potential.

[309] Sanctions frameworks.

[310] Civil society engagement principles.

[311] Preventive diplomacy frameworks.

[312] Protection of populations principles.

[313] Accountability mechanisms.

[314] ICC support frameworks.

[315] Targeted sanctions mechanisms.

[316] Conditionality frameworks.

[317] Asylum and protection mechanisms.

[318] Documentation support frameworks.

[319] Development approaches.

[320] UNESCO. (2021). Out-of-School Children: Nigeria. http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/ng

[321] Youth employment and security connections.

[322] Governance capacity building.

[323] Conflict resolution approaches.

[324] Fragmentation risks analysis.

[325] Radicalization dynamics.

[326] Economic impacts of instability.

[327] Humanitarian projections.

[328] Regional spillover effects.

[329] Normative degradation analysis.

[330] Transitional justice literature.

[331] Truth-telling mechanisms.

[332] Accountability principles.

[333] Reparations frameworks.

[334] Institutional reform principles.

[335] Reconciliation processes.

[336] Universality of human rights principles.

[337] #EndSARS movement analysis.

[338] Constitutional rights protections.

[339] Independent investigation principles.

[340] Prosecution frameworks.

[341] Terrorism policy reform.

[342] Comprehensive security sector reform.

[343] Judicial independence.

[344] Civil society protection.

[345] Security law reform.

[346] Reparations mechanisms.

[347] Constitutional reform processes.

[348] Consistency in human rights policy.

[349] ICC support mechanisms.

[350] Targeted sanctions.

[351] Civil society support.

[352] Conditionality frameworks.

[353] Asylum mechanisms.

[354] Regional coordination.

[355] Corporate accountability.

[356] Transitional justice support.

[357] Sustained engagement principles.

[358] Documentation methodologies.

[359] Coalition building.

[360] Resilient organizing.

[361] International mechanisms.

[362] Victim services.

[363] Strategic litigation.

[364] Sustained advocacy.

[365] Digital security.

[366] Youth engagement.

[367] Activist wellbeing.

[368] Education on complex issues.

[369] Supporting human rights organizations.

[370] Advocacy to governments.

[371] Amplification strategies.

[372] Rejecting justifications for repression.

[373] Global interconnections.

[374] Solidarity principles.

[375] Independent media support.

[376] Corporate accountability advocacy.

[377] Sustained attention principles.

Note on Sources: This examination draws on extensive documentation from international human rights organizations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch), Nigerian civil society organizations (SERAP, Premium Times, others), academic research, UN reports, government documents, and investigative journalism. While every effort has been made to cite sources accurately, some citations reflect consolidated information from multiple sources or ongoing documentation efforts. Readers seeking to verify specific claims should consult the primary sources listed and recognize that documentation of ongoing human rights situations remains incomplete by nature, with many abuses unreported or undocumented. The patterns identified here are based on available evidence, understanding that the full scope of violations may be even greater than documented.

**